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Abstract
This thesis investigates distortions in credit and equity markets. It provides insight into
sources of volatility in these markets and their implications for monetary policy.
Chapter 2 analyses optimal monetary policy in an economy with a credit friction and
capital. A central bank implementing policy optimally will face a trade-off in stabilising
inflation, the composition of output, and the net worth of borrowers. The importance of
net worth is a new finding in the literature, and reflects the central bank’s concern that
distortions in credit markets can reduce welfare if ignored. In addition, it is shown that
some tolerance of inflation can be optimal in response to shocks that reduce borrowers’
net worth.
Chapter 3 considers distortions in equity markets and their implications for economic
decision-making. It analyses whether changes in the distribution of technology, coupled
with optimal expectations on the part of investment-firm managers, can induce
endogenous optimism or pessimism. And whether this optimism or pessimism can
in turn lead to equity mispricing, and distorted economic decisions. Using a simple
general equilibrium model, it is shown that a favourable change in the distribution of
technology can induce endogenous optimism leading to over-valued equity prices and
over-investment, when compared with an economy in which rational expectations are
used.
Chapter 4 focuses on identifying the effects of mispriced equity. I find that equity
mispricing has statistically significant effects on household consumption and portfolio
allocation decisions. These effects are estimated to be non-trivial when allowing for
episodes of significant mispricing such as an equity price bubble.
Taken together, these chapters suggest that distortions in credit and equity markets can be
important, and should be taken into consideration by policymakers to the extent that they
affect real economic decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis explores how distortions in financial markets can affect the economy and
monetary policy. It addresses three questions:
1. What is the optimal monetary policy response to real or financial shocks in an
economy with a credit friction and endogenous capital?
2. Does the theory of optimal expectations, modelled on the part of firms, provide a
useful framework for thinking about equity market bubbles?
3. To what extent does mispricing in equity markets affect consumer and firm
decisions?
The underlying theme of the chapters is concerned with the appropriate monetary policy
response to financial market distortions in either credit or equity markets. This is an
important research area in macroeconomics. Financial market volatility has been a
recurrent challenge for macroeconomic policy. It is apparent that policymakers, both over
time and across countries, differ in their views of how macroeconomic policy should
respond to financial volatility including to distortions in credit markets, or to distorted
equity prices. The contribution of this thesis is to provide insight into the sources of such
financial volatility, and whether they are relevant for monetary policy.
Chapter two of my research focuses on the implications of a distortion in credit markets.
Important early research on the macroeconomic implications of credit market frictions
has been undertaken by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). More recently, the implications of distortions in
credit markets for conventional monetary policy has been studied in economies without
capital, see for example De Fiore and Tristani (2009), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) and
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Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2010). There also has been work on unconventional
monetary policy in economies with credit frictions and capital, but not price frictions,
see for example Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The contribution of chapter two is to study
how a central bank would conduct conventional monetary policy optimally in an economy
with both price and credit frictions, and with endogenous capital.
The key insight is that when both credit and price frictions exist, the central bank
faces a meaningful policy trade-off. In particular, the central bank faces a trade-off in
stabilising inflation, to mitigate the distortion associated with the pricing friction, and in
stabilising the net worth of borrowers, to the mitigate the distortion in credit markets. The
importance of net worth is a new result in the literature that studies optimal monetary
policy analytically. Its importance can help to explain policy outcomes in the most recent
financial crisis, and highlights that credit spreads are not necessarily a sufficient financial
statistic when implementing monetary policy optimally in an economy where credit
distortions matter.
Chapter three turns to the question of endogenous optimism or pessimism on the
part of firms and households, which can distort equity price signals. The scope for
endogenous optimism or pessimism to be in the best interest of economic participants is
a relatively new development in microeconomic literature, see for example Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005), Gollier (2005) and Van den Steen (2004). I examine whether the
concept of optimal expectations, as defined by Brunnermeier and Parker, is a useful tool
for thinking about one source of an equity price bubble.
More specifically, I focus on whether changes in the distribution of shocks to the economy
can affect firms’ incentives to be optimistic or pessimistic. And whether this optimism
or pessimism can in turn lead to mispricing in equity markets, and distorted economic
decisions. The theoretical framework studied augments a recent literature that attempts
to build micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium models of equity market mispricing
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including for example Farhi and Tirole (2011), Martin and Ventura (2010), and Hong,
Scheinkman and Xiong (2008).
Chapter four focuses on identifying the effects of mispricing in equity markets on
household and firm decisions empirically. There is a voluminous existing literature that
focuses on identifying the existence of equity price bubbles.1 And a smaller literature
that focuses on identifying the effects of mispricing on the economy, including for
example Chirinko and Schaller (2001), and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005).
The contribution of this chapter is to provide additional evidence on the effects of
mispricing on household consumption and portfolio allocation decisions, and firm
dividend decisions.
The main finding is that mispricing in equity markets can have statistically significant
effects on household and firm decisions. And that the sign of these effects does match
those suggested by qualitative accounts of equity price bubbles. As an example, between
March 1997 and December 2000, the boom phase phase of the US dot-com bubble, US
consumption growth is estimated to be around 0.6 percentage points per annum faster than
in the absence of equity mispricing during this period. There is also evidence to suggest
that households adjust their portfolio allocations in response to equity mispricing shocks.
In sum, these chapters demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that certain types
of financial volatility can have important implications for real economic decisions and
potentially monetary policy. Each chapter is now discussed in further detail.
1 See for example Gu¨rkaynak (2008) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), which provide useful reviews of this
literature.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Monetary Policy with a Credit
Friction and Endogenous Capital
2.1. Introduction
A relevant question is why should we be interested in whether an
asset price, or indeed any other variable for that matter, appears in some
ad hoc class of feedback rule, even though the coefficients of that rule
may have been optimised? It seems more instructive to ask first what
an optimal rule looks like, and then consider how asset prices ought
to figure in it. One might go on to consider whether particular simple
rules represent sufficiently close approximations to the optimal rule to be
useful guideposts for policy...
Charles Bean (2003)
This chapter is concerned with the objectives of a central bank when implementing
monetary policy optimally in an economy with capital, and a credit friction. The aim is to
provide insight into whether volatility in financial variables, such as asset prices, affect the
path of interest rates optimally chosen by a central bank. In particular, I consider whether
asset prices or other financial variables form part of a central bank’s stabilisation goals in
their own right; or, alternatively, whether such variables are only important to the extent
that they are useful for forecasting the output gap and inflation.
There has been much debate on the objectives of a central bank when faced with asset
price and financial volatility. Prior to the recent financial crisis, this debate has typically
focused on the question of whether asset price volatility should be incorporated into a
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policymaker’s objective. For example, much of the discussion has centered on whether a
central bank should look to smooth or “lean against” large movements in asset prices, in
either direction, or whether the central bank should respond asymmetrically, using policy
only to ‘clean up’ or stabilise the economy after an asset price bust. Following the recent
financial crisis, this debate has been re-invigorated. There is now a wider discussion of the
appropriate objectives for policy when faced with volatility in asset and financial markets,
and whether monetary policy ought to be used, in conjunction with other macroeconomic
tools, to help promote financial stability.
Notwithstanding extensive discussion in policymaking circles, theoretical literature on a
central bank’s objectives in an economy with capital and financial frictions is limited.
There is analytical work addressing the central bank’s objectives in a New Keynesian
economy with capital but no credit friction – see for example, Edge (2003), and Takamura,
Watanabe and Kudo (2006). There is also work addressing optimal monetary policy
in an economy with a credit friction but no capital – see for example, Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2010), De Fiore and Tristani (2009) and Carlstrom et al (2010). However, the
central bank’s objectives in an economy where both capital and financial frictions play
an important role remains an open question. Providing analytical insight that addresses
this question is important for determining the objectives of monetary policy, especially if
policymakers believe endogenous capital and financial frictions are important factors that
influence economic volatility and inflation.
The methodology used in this chapter is the Linear Quadratic or LQ approach emphasised
by Woodford (2003). Specifically, I derive a first-order approximation of the solution
to an optimal monetary policy problem for a central bank concerned with maximising
social welfare.2 The advantage of the LQ approach is that it provides insight into the
objectives of a central bank, and whether there exists a meaningful trade-off in achieving
2 Optimal monetary policy here refers to “optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective” as
discussed by Woodford (2003).
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these objectives. This analysis complements previous analytical work undertaken, such as
that of Cu´rdia and Woodford, and De Fiore and Tristani, and provides additional insight
into the findings of previous numerical work on optimal policy, such as that undertaken
by Faia and Monacelli (2007).
To preview the main result, I find that the main financial variable of interest to the central
bank in an economy with a credit friction and capital is the net worth of borrowers. A
central bank implementing policy optimally will look to mitigate volatility in net worth
precisely because it is the net worth of borrowers that affects the extent to which a credit
friction distorts the economy over time. The incentive to smooth net worth exists in
addition to the traditional objectives for monetary policy, that include stabilising volatility
in inflation and volatility in the composition of output. The existence of the credit friction,
in addition to the price friction, introduces a trade-off for policy, and thus a strict inflation
target is no longer equivalent to the optimal policy plan.
Although a policymaker is concerned with stabilising net worth qualitatively, there
remains the question of whether this incentive is important quantitatively. The analytical
results established here, derived under the assumption that the steady state credit friction
is small, highlight that although there is a trade-off between stabilising inflation and
mitigating the credit distortion, quantitatively this trade-off is not found to be large. As
a consequence, inflation targeting remains a good approximation of optimal policy when
the credit friction is not highly distortionary.
I also examine the case of a more distortionary steady state credit friction numerically.
Using a calibration of the model similar to that estimated by Queijo von Heideken (2009),
for the US and Euro area economies, I find that, in contrast to the small friction case,
monetary policy can find it optimal to tolerate some deviation of inflation from target in
response to financial shocks. This result confirms that the extent to which policymakers
wish to stabilise net worth in the economy is contingent on the extent to which the credit
friction is distortionary.
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The next section provides a brief sketch of the New Keynesian model with a flexible rental
market for capital and a credit friction. Section 3 discusses an analytical representation
of the approximate optimal policy problem, including the objectives of the policymaker
and the optimal policy plan. Section 4 considers how sensitive the findings are to the
magnitude of the credit friction. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
2.2. The Credit Friction Model
The economy I consider is a New Keynesian economy with capital and a credit friction.
The economic environment is very similar to those studied by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997; 2001) and Faia and Monacelli (2007). However, some small departures from the
standard setup are considered to facilitate simplification of the optimal policy analysis.
I include a brief review of the full economic environment, and draw attention to the
departures from the standard credit friction model.3
Households
There is a continuum of identical individual households uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,1]. Each household, indexed by h, supplies specialised labour (Ht (h)) and
consumes (Ct (h)). Households are able to save by purchasing investment goods
(
Iht (i)
)
from entrepreneurs that deliver physical capital
(
Kht+1 (i)
)
for use in an industry i in the
period t+1, where i∈ [0,1]. Alternatively, households may save by purchasing a portfolio
of state-contingent securities Et
(
Mt,t+1A
h
t+1
)
where Mt+1 is the price of a security
delivering one unit of consumption if state st+1 is realised.
4 Households receive income
from their portfolio of previously purchased state-contingent securities, Aht , rents from
3 For the reader already familiar with the Carlstrom and Fuerst model, the main departures are:
(a) I focus on an equilibrium where entrepreneurs save all of their available resources until retirement
(see Carlstrom and Fuerst 2001). This is in contrast to the more standard assumption in the
literature that entrepreneurs are indifferent between saving and consuming;
(b) I assume that in steady state the credit friction distortion is small (of second-order); and
(c) I assume a social welfare function that ensures that monetary policy abstracts from any incentive
to redistribute consumption between households and entrepreneurs.
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capital held across industries
(
Pt
∫ 1
0 Rt (i)K
h
t (i)di
)
, wages for their specialised labour
(PtWt (h)), and are the residual claimants to any profits from production Pt
∫ 1
0 D
h
t (i)di.
Formally, a household h chooses a sequence of specialised labour supply, consumption,
Arrow-Debreu securities and investment goods
{
Ht (h) ,Ct (h) ,A
h
t+1 (st+1) , I
h
t (i)
}∞
t=t0
,
for all possible states st+1 ∈Ω and i ∈ [0,1] , that solve
maxEt0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0 [U (Ct (h) ,ψt)−V (Ht (h))]
subject to the flow budget constraint
PtCt (h)+
∫ 1
0
Qt (i) I
h
t (i)di+Et
(
Mt,t+1A
h
t+1
)
≤ Aht +PtWt (h)Ht (h)−PtTt
+Pt
∫ 1
0
Rt (i)K
h
t (i)di
+Pt
∫ 1
0
Dht (i)di
and the capital accumulation constraint
Kht+1 (i) = (1−δ )Kht (i)+ Iht (i)
where Tt is a real lump-sum tax, Wt (h) is the real wage paid for household h’s labour, Rt (i)
is the real return to capital held in industry i, Qt (i) is the nominal price of an investment
good in industry i, δ is the depreciation rate of capital that is common across industries,
and ψt is a taste shock common to all households.
The Euler equations in a symmetric equilibrium where all households are the identical,
including in their initial endowments (Aht0 = At0 for all h), and are indifferent to their
4 I make the usual assumptions regarding the stochastic structure of the economy; specifically, I assume it
exists on a non-degenerate probability space {Ω,F ,P}where a history at time t is denoted by st ∈Ω,and
a state, st , is an element of a given history (for example, s
t ≡ {s1, ...,st}). Et is the time t conditional
expectation. I use the generic notation for a random variable Xt ≡ Xt (st).
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allocation of investment across industries, are given by
Uc (Ct ,ψt) = βEt
(
Uc (Ct+1,ψt+1)
(
1+ ibt
) Pt
Pt+1
)
(2.1)
qt (i) = βEt
(
Uc (Ct+1,ψt+1)
Uc (Ct ,ψt)
(Rt+1 (i)+(1−δ )qt+1 (i))
)
(2.2)
VH(Ht (h))
Uc (Ct ,ψt)
=Wt (h) (2.3)
where Ct =Ct (h) for all h∈ [0,1], and qt (i)≡ Qt(i)Pt is the real price of an investment good.
It should be noted that Tobin’s qt (i) reflects the shadow price of a unit of capital installed
for use in t+1 in industry i (or equivalently, is the share price of a firm that holds capital
in industry i on the households’ behalf).
Entrepreneurs (Investment Supply)
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs in the economy who lie on the interval [1,1+ζ ].
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and supply investment goods to households through their
access to a risky investment technology. An entrepreneur, indexed by j, is able to purchase
It ( j) units of final output and invest it in a risky project that yields ωt ( j) It ( j) units of
final capital, which is then sold to households at price Qt .
5 The stochastic technology
underpinning an entrepreneurs’ risky project is idiosyncratic and identically distributed
with an exogenous cumulative distribution function Φω (x)≡ Pr(ωt ≤ x) , that is common
for all entrepreneurs, and satisfies the first and second moment conditions
∫ ∞
−∞ xdΦω (x) =
1 and
∫ ∞
−∞ (x−1)2 dΦω (x) = σ2ω .
Entrepreneurs have limited net worth, and use financial intermediaries (banks) to leverage
their project. The amount they borrow, Lt( j), is defined by the total value of their
investment, PtIt ( j), less their net worth, NWt ( j) so that
Lt ( j)≡ PtIt ( j)−NWt ( j)
5 I assume that all investment goods are perfectly substitutable. And so, entrepreneurs will all receive the
same price for investment goods they sell.
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Entrepreneurs’ net worth is determined by their capital income and a small government
fiscal subsidy (Fe) financed by the lump-sum tax on households,
NWt ( j) = PtF
e
t +(PtRt +Qt (1−δ ))Ket ( j) (2.4)
where Ket ( j) is the stock of physical capital held by entrepreneur j. The government
subsidy is a simplification that provides some starting capital for entrepreneurs, and
allows me to abstract from their labour supply decision (see for example, De Fiore and
Tristani 2009). This is a simplification that assists the optimal policy derivations that
follow.
I assume that entrepreneurs borrow from perfectly competitive banks.6 The default
threshold, ω t ( j), for an entrepreneur is defined by
ω t ( j)≡
(
1+RLt ( j)
)
(PtIt ( j)−NWt ( j))
QtIt ( j)
where RLt ( j) is the interest rate charged by banks on a loan to entrepreneur j.
Entrepreneurs are only able to repay their loans when their investment return satisfies
ωt ( j)≥ ω t ( j). In the event that ωt ( j)< ω t ( j), entrepreneurs default and receive a zero
payoff.
Financial Intermediaries
To model the credit friction I assume asymmetric information in the form of costly state
verification for banks (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997). Although entrepreneurs can observe
ωt ( j) after their investment return has been realised, for banks to observe ωt ( j) they must
pay a verification or bankruptcy cost, νt ∈ [0,1], that is proportional to the nominal resale
value of an entrepreneurs investment income. I allow for exogenous time variation in the
proportion of a project that is lost in the event of bankruptcy. Or, more conveniently in
6 Provided that the expected return from the investment project is large enough, entrepreneurs will be
willing to invest their entire net worth in their project and to borrow from banks.
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the optimal policy derivations that follow, I focus on the renormalised exogenous shock
ξt ≡ ln(1−νt), which can be considered, approximately, as a shock to the proportion
of funds recovered by a bank in the event of default. This recovery rate shock is always
negative.
Under the optimal contract, banks only pay the verification cost when an entrepreneur
defaults and does not repay their loan (Gale and Hellwig 1985). Following Faia and
Monacelli (2007), the banks participation constraint can be written as
QtIt ( j)g(ω t ( j) ,νt)≥ PtIt ( j)−NWt ( j)
where
g(ω t ( j) ,νt)≡ 1−νtΦ(ω t ( j))− f (ω t ( j)) (2.5)
f (ω t ( j))≡
∫ ∞
ωt( j)
(ωt ( j)−ω t ( j))dΦ(ωt ( j)) (2.6)
g(ω t ( j) ,νt) can be interpreted as the expected share of investment income accruing to
banks that lend to entrepreneur j, and f (ω t ( j)) can be interpreted as the expected share
of investment income accruing to entrepreneur j.
The Optimal Contract
The optimal contract consists of a default threshold and investment level {ω t ( j) , It ( j)},
chosen by the entrepreneur, that maximises their return subject to the banks’ participation
constraint. Entrepreneurs solve
max
{ωt( j),It( j)}
QtIt ( j) f (ω t ( j))
subject to: QtIt ( j)g(ω t ( j) ,νt)≥ PtIt ( j)−NWt ( j)
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The optimal contracting conditions, after aggregation, are
qt f (ω t) =
fω (ω t)
gω (ω t ,νt)
(qt .g(ω t ,νt)−1) (2.7)
It =
nwt
1−qt .g(ω t ,νt)
(2.8)
where nwt ≡ NWtPt , fω (ω t) ≡
∂ f (ωt)
∂ωt
and gω (ω t ,νt) ≡ ∂g(ωt ,νt)∂ωt . It should be noted that
in equilibrium all entrepreneurs choose the same default threshold, ω t ( j) = ω t for all
j ∈ [1,1+ζ ] from (2.7). Also note that investment in effect becomes proportional to the
aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs, see (2.8).
Entrepreneurs (Consumption)
Non-defaulting entrepreneurs consume after the returns from their investment decision
have been realised.7 To ensure a well defined and stable equilibrium, I assume
entrepreneurs face an exogenous retirement shock, consistent with Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001). Stochastic retirement ensures that when considering equilibria where
entrepreneurs save resources through capital, this saving is not sufficient for entrepreneurs
to become self-financing. The consumption decision problem for an individual
entrepreneur is
max
{Cet ( j)}
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
(
κβ e
)t−t0 Cet ( j)
subject to: QtK
e
t+1 ( j)+PtC
e
t ( j)≤ (ωt−ω t)QtIt ( j)
Ket+1 ( j)≥ 0
Cet ( j)≥ 0
where β e ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor for entrepreneurs, κ ∈ [0,1] is the probability than
an entrepreneur is not affected by the retirement shock, and Cet ( j) denotes consumption
7 Defaulting entrepreneurs forfeit all their investment proceeds and have no resources to consume.
Provided these entrepreneurs are not also hit by the retirement shock, they enter the investment supply
market in the next period with only the government fiscal subsidy.
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by entrepreneur j. It should be emphasised that entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained
in the sense that they cannot borrow against expected future project returns to fund
additional consumption or saving. It is straightforward to verify that the entrepreneurs’
budget constraint will bind, and thus
qtK
e
t+1 ( j)+C
e
t ( j) = (ωt−ω t)qtIt ( j)
To complete the description of the entrepreneurs’ first-order conditions, there are several
possible equilibria associated with this decision problem. The appropriate choice can vary
depending on the steady state that one chooses to approximate around. To provide insight
on optimal monetary policy, I focus on two possible equilibria. The first is an equilibrium
where entrepreneurs consume all of their available resources, and so
Ket+1 ( j) = 0
This optimality condition can be supported in a steady state where β e < β and κ =
1. Thus, stochastic retirement is not required since entrepreneurs are assumed to be
sufficiently impatient that they are always willing to consume all of their available
resources.
As an alternative, I also consider an equilibrium where entrepreneurs save all of their
available resources until they are stochastically forced to retire.8 That is, prior to
retirement,
Cet ( j) = 0
8 One can also consider a third equilibrium where entrepreneurs are indifferent between saving and
consuming
1 = β eEt
(
Rt+1+qt+1 (1−δ )
qt
qt+1 f (ω t+1)
1−qt+1g(ω t+1,νt+1)
)
However, when approximating equilibria with small monitoring costs, this equilibrium is not stable
when solved numerically (i.e. perturbations to the economy result in a switch to either a saving or no
saving equilibrium). For the case where entrepreneurs are indifferent, and monitoring costs are large, the
equilibrium is stable and results are considered in subsequent numerical comparisons in Section 2.4.
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which can be supported in a steady state where κ < β and 1 > κβ e > β , given that I
will latter assume that steady state monitoring costs are small. In this case, the restriction
that κβ e > β ensures that entrepreneurs are sufficiently patient to be willing to save until
their retirement. The restriction that κ < β ensures that entrepreneurs retire frequently
enough so that they are unable to become self-financing.9 The measure of entrepreneurs
is assumed to be constant over time so that any entrepreneur forced to retire is replaced
by the birth of a new entrepreneur that begins life with capital Fet .
Aggregating across the measure of entrepreneurs, the equilibrium conditions are
qtK
e
t+1+C
e
t = f (ω t)qtIt (2.9)
and, for the no-saving and saving equilibria respectively,
Ket+1 = 0 if β
e < β and κ = 1 (2.10)
or
Cet = (1−κ) f (ω t)qtIt if 1 > κβ e > β and κ < β (2.11)
Whether entrepreneurs save or not will have a substantial bearing on optimal monetary
policy. The reason for this is that if (2.10) is used, the endogenous evolution of net worth
is shut down in the model since entrepreneurs do not save. In contrast, if (2.11) is used,
the endogenous evolution of net worth is retained and will have important consequences
for optimal policy. I now briefly review the supply side of the economy, which is standard.
9 The implied restriction that entrepreneurs are very patient, β e > 1, may at first seem counterintuitive.
However, it arises because I assume that steady state monitoring costs, and returns to saving, are small.
This is in contrast to the usual assumption made for numerical work, where steady state monitoring
costs, and returns to saving are high, and so entrepreneurs are assumed to be impatient.
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Final Producers
Final good producers combine intermediate goods to produce a final good that can be
consumed either by households or entrepreneurs, or used by entrepreneurs in their risky
investment project. Assuming perfect competition in the market for final goods, each
period final good producers solve
max
Xt(i)
PtYt−
∫ 1
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di
subject to a Dixit-Stiglitz transformation technology between intermediate inputs and final
goods
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Xt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
(2.12)
where Yt is output (the final good), pt (i) is the price of intermediate good i, Xt (i) denotes
the quantity of intermediate good i used in production, and θ is the constant elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods used. The demand for intermediate goods
produced by firm i is given by
Xt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
Intermediate Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers (firms)
on the unit interval. Each firm produces a single differentiated intermediate good using
firm-specific labour, and capital. For tractability, I assume that a fully flexible rental
market for capital exists that allows capital to be instantaneously reallocated between
firms. Consistent with the standard New Keynesian model, only a fraction of firms γ
(randomly selected) are able to choose their price optimally each period (Calvo 1983).
Firms not able to choose their prices optimally, retain the price they set in the previous
period.
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Each period all firms, whether they are able to reset their price or not, choose a
cost-minimising bundle of labour and capital subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
technology. Firm i solves
min
Kt(i),Ht(i)
Rt(i)Kt(i)+Wt(i)Ht(i)
subject to
Xt(i) = Kt(i)
α (ZtHt(i))
1−α (2.13)
where Zt can be interpreted as a technology or productivity innovation common to all
firms. Firm i will choose a capital to labour ratio that satisfies
Kt(i)
Ht(i)
=
Wt (i)
Rt (i)
α
1−α (2.14)
and the real marginal cost for firm i, St (i), is given by
St (i) =
1
Z1−αt
(
Wt (i)
1−α
)1−α(Rt (i)
α
)α
(2.15)
At this point it should be noted that although I assume households supply specialised
labour, the capital rental market is perfectly flexible. This assumption ensures that capital
rents across industries are the same in each period Rt (i) = Rt , and by implication that
there is a unique measure of asset prices across all industries, Qt (i) = Qt (see (2.2)).
There is a second decision for those firms able to reset their price optimally. These firms
choose the price of their intermediate good to maximise the expected value of profits
distributed to (and thus discounted on behalf of) households. The program for those firms
able to choose their price is
max
pt0(i)
Et
∞∑
t=t0
γ t−t0Mt0,t
Pt
Pt0
((
pt0(i)
Pt
− (1−χ)St(i)
)
Xt(i)
)
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subject to the demand for their intermediate good,
Xt(i) =
(
pt0(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
where the nominal stochastic discount factor is defined as,
Mt0,t ≡ β
t−t0 Uc(Ct ,ψt)
Uc(Ct0,ψt0)
Pt0
Pt
real marginal costs are given by (2.15), and χ is a fiscal subsidy on real marginal costs
that is also financed by the lump-sum tax on households. This subsidy is used to eliminate
the steady state distortion associated with monopolistic competition, and is a useful
simplification in the optimal policy analysis that follows.
The optimal price chosen by the subset of intermediate firms who can choose their price
freely is given by
pt(i)
Pt
= (1−χ) θ
θ −1
Et
∑∞
τ=t (βγ)
τ−t Uc(Cτ ,ψτ )
Uc(Ct ,ψt)
Pθτ YτSτ(i)
Et
∑∞
τ=t (βγ)
τ−t Uc(Cτ ,ψτ )
Uc(Ct ,ψt)
Pθτ Yτ
(2.16)
where the aggregate price index is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the form
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt (i)
1−θ di
] 1
1−θ
(2.17)
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Market Clearing Conditions
The aggregate resource constraint, and market clearing conditions are10
Yt =Ct +ζC
e
t +ζ It (2.18)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt +ζ It−ζνtΦ(ω t) It (2.19)
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kht (i)di+ζK
e
t (2.20)
Kt (i) = K
h
t (i)+K
e
t (i) (2.21)
ζCet =
∫ 1+ζ
1
Cet ( j)d j (2.22)
ζKet =
∫ 1+ζ
1
Ket ( j)d j (2.23)
ζ It =
∫ 1+ζ
1
It ( j)d j (2.24)
ζNWt =
∫ 1+ζ
1
NWt ( j)d j (2.25)
Definition 2.1. A rational expectations (RE) equilibrium is defined as a set of
sequences
{
Kt (i) ,K
h
t (i) ,Ht (i) ,Wt (i) ,Xt (i) ,St (i) , pt (i) ,Rt (i) ,Qt (i)
}∞
t=t0
for all i ∈
[0,1],
{
ω t ( j) ,NWt ( j) ,K
e
t ( j) ,C
e
t ( j) ,g(ω t ( j) ,νt) , f (ω t ( j)) , It ( j)
}∞
t=t0
for j ∈ [1,1+
ζ ], and
{
Ct ,Yt , It ,Kt ,Pt ,C
e
t ,K
e
t ,NWt ,ω t ,Qt ,Rt , i
b
t
}∞
t=t0
given initial endowments Kht0 (i) =
Kht0,K
e
t0 ( j) = K
e
t0,At0 (i) = At0 and bounded shock processes
{
ψt ,Zt ,νt ,F
e
t
}∞
t=t0
such that
(2.1) to (2.9), (2.12) to (2.25), and either of (2.10) or (2.11) are satisfied.
Note that in equilibrium all entrepreneurs choose the same default threshold, ω t ( j) =ω t ,
and that Rt (i) = Rt and Qt (i) = Qt given the assumption of perfectly flexible capital
markets. The properties of the RE equilibrium, such as uniqueness and determinacy, will
10 Alternatively, one could re-specify the credit friction to affect the marginal rate of transformation of
output into investment by assuming that monitoring costs are incurred in the form of reduced output
rather than reduced capital accumulation. The results that follow are robust to re-writing the model in
this way.
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in general depend on how monetary policy is implemented by the central bank through its
choice of nominal interest rates over time,
{
ibt
}∞
t=t0
.
2.3. Optimal Monetary Policy in the Credit Friction Model
I now consider the implementation of optimal monetary policy in the economy with a
credit friction. In particular, I focus on the analytical LQ solution approach, emphasised
by Woodford (2003), to attain insight into the objectives of monetary policy, and what
policies will achieve these objectives. Numerically, the LQ approach is equivalent to a
log-linear approximation of the solution to the Ramsey-policy problem for the central
bank.
A Second-Order Approximation of Welfare
To begin, one must define the appropriate normative objective for the central bank. I
assume that the central bank is concerned with maximising a measure of aggregate social
welfare, that incorporates both the welfare of households and entrepreneurs. In particular,
I assume
SWt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
(∫ 1
0
U (Ct (i))di−
∫ 1
0
V (Ht (i))di
)
+Et0
∞∑
t=t0
Λt
(
κβ e
)t−t0 ∫ 1+ζ
1
Cet ( j)d j
The above social welfare measure implies that all households receive an equal weighting
in social welfare, as do all entrepreneurs. In terms of the relative weighting applied
across household and entrepreneurs, Λt represents a time-varying weight on the welfare
of entrepreneurs (the household weight is normalised to one). I choose a deterministic
process for Λt , which ensures that monetary policy does not have an incentive to
redistribute mean consumption between household and entrepreneurs, as will become
clearer below.
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Taking a second-order approximation11 of households’ contribution to social welfare
(see Appendix 6.1) I have12
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
(
U (Ct)−
∫ 1
0
V (Ht (i))di
)
=−(UcY )Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0LHt
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(2.26)
where
LHt ≡ ωy
y2t
2
+ωi
i2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+ωk
k2t
2
+ ω˜e
(
cet
)2
2
+ secet −ωyiyt it−ωykytkt−ωeycet yt
−ωeicet it−ωξ
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)
and all lower case variables denote their log deviation from steady state. It should be noted
that y, i,pi,k,ce,Φ̂(ω) ,ξ map to output, investment, inflation, capital, entrepreneurial
consumption, the default rate and the recovery rate shock respectively. se denotes
the steady state share of entrepreneurial consumption in output and all other welfare
coefficients, the ω’s, are functions of the structural parameters defined in Appendix 6.1.
For brevity, and without loss of generality, I abstract from the effects of productivity and
taste shocks.13
11 With the exception of ξt , the approximations here are taken with respect to the natural logarithms of
variables.
12 Note that Ct (i) =Ct in the symmetric equilibrium I focus on, t.i.p stands for terms that are independent
of monetary policy, and that ϑ is a vector consisting of the sequences of all exogenous shocks in
the economy. I use the notation O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
to denote the approximation residual which is of third-
order or higher in the bound ‖ϑ‖ on the amplitude of the exogenous shocks (see Benigno and
Woodford (2006) for further discussion).
13 Results that include these shocks are available on request.
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A second-order approximation of entrepreneurial welfare yields
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
(
κβ e
)t−t0 ∫ 1+ζ
1
Cet ( j)d j =−(Y )Et0
∞∑
t=t0
(
κβ e
)t−t0 Let
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(2.27)
where
Let ≡−secet − se
(
cet
)2
2
Comparing the first-order terms in the household and entrepreneurial loss functions, the
presence of first-order terms in entrepreneur consumption, cet , implies that there can be
an incentive for the central bank to use monetary policy to redistribute consumption
between entrepreneurs and households. The amount of redistribution considered optimal
is a function of the weight on entrepreneurial welfare in social welfare, Λt , the effective
discount factor for entrepreneurs’
(
κβ e
)
relative to that for households (β ) , and the
slope of the household utility function evaluated at the steady state (Uc). To ensure
that monetary policy abstracts from any incentive to redistribute consumption between
households and entrepreneurs, I assume that the weight on entrepreneurial welfare evolves
over time according to
Λt ≡Uc
(
β
κβ e
)t−t0
This assumption ensures that the first-order terms relating to entrepreneurial consumption
in both household and entrepreneurial welfare cancel in every time period t, and is similar
to the approach used by De Fiore and Tristani (2009). The approximation of social welfare
in this case simplifies to
SWt =−Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0UcY (Lt)
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(2.28)
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where
Lt ≡ ωy
y2t
2
+ωi
i2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+ωk
k2t
2
+ωe
(
cet
)2
2
−ωyiyt it−ωykytkt−ωeycet yt
−ωeicet it−ωξ
(
ξtΦ̂(ω)+ξt it
)
(2.29)
and ωe ≡ ω˜e− se.
A useful property of the above social welfare measure is that it does not contain
first-order terms. This stems from the specific choice of the weight on entrepreneurial
welfare, Λt , and that I choose to approximate around a steady state where the distortions
associated with monopolistic competition and bankruptcy are assumed to be small. These
assumptions imply that monetary policy will focus on time variation in the costs of
these distortions associated with economic shocks, rather than using monetary policy
to mitigate steady state distortions. These assumptions also contribute significantly to
the simplification of the optimal policy problem, as the absence of first-order terms in
(2.29) implies that the central bank’s objective can be maximised subject to a first-order
approximation of the constraints that describe the economy’s decentralised equilibrium.
For those readers who prefer analysis with large steady state distortions, this question is
addressed numerically in Section 2.4.
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A First-Order Approximation of the Constraints
Using a first-order approximation of the constraints in a symmetric decentralised
equilibrium, I have14
kt+1 = (1−δ )kt +δ it +δΦ(ω)ξt (2.30)
σcc
h
t = σcEtc
h
t+1−
(
ibt −Et (pit+1)
)
+υψt−υEtψt+1 (2.31)
σcc
h
t = σcEtc
h
t+1− (1−β (1−δ ))Etrt+1+ q̂t
−β (1−δ )Et q̂t+1+υψt−υEtψt+1 (2.32)
q̂t =
̂˜fω (ω t)−
̂
gω
(
ω t ,1− eξt
)
+
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
− f̂ (ω t) (2.33)
it = n̂wt−
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
(2.34)
rt =
(
σ +
1+η
1−α
)
yt− sσ it−σsecet −
1+αη
1−α kt
− (1+η)zt−υψt (2.35)
pit =Θrt−Θyt +Θkt +βEtpit+1 (2.36)
σcc
h
t = σyt−σsδ it−σsecet (2.37)
cet = f̂ (ω t)+ q̂t + it (2.38)
where f˜ω (ω t)≡− fω (ω t) ,s≡ KY ,υ ≡
Ucψ
Uc
,η ≡ VHHHVH σc ≡−
UccC
Uc
, σ ≡ σc YC and variables
with hats denote log deviations of functionals from their steady state value, or where the
lower case of a variable has already been used to denote its real value.15 The first three
equations describe capital accumulation, the household consumption Euler equation and
the household investment Euler equation respectively. The next two equations are the
optimal contracting conditions, that determine the relationships between asset prices, the
default threshold, bankruptcy costs, investment and net worth. This is followed by the
14 For brevity, I omit the approximation errors here.
15 For example, f̂ (ω t) ≡ ln f (ωt )f (ω) where f (ω t) is a function of the default threshold, or real net worth is
defined by nwt ≡ NWtPt and thus n̂wt ≡ ln
nwt
nw .
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equation for rental returns to capital, the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the aggregate
resource constraint and the equation for entrepreneurial consumption.
Entrepreneurial capital holdings and net worth follow either
ket+1 = 0 (2.39)
n̂wt = F̂
e
t (2.40)
if β e < β and κ = 1 in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do not save, or
ket+1 = f̂ (ω t)+ it (2.41)
n̂wt =
Fe
nw
F̂et +β
−1 K
e
nw
ket +
(
β−1−1+δ
) Ke
nw
rt +(1−δ )
Ke
nw
q̂t (2.42)
if 1 > κβ e > β and κ < β in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs save and then
consume at retirement.16
Optimal Monetary Policy
The LQ approximation of the solution to the optimal policy problem is to maximise (2.28)
and (2.29) subject to the above constraint system (2.30 to 2.38 and either of 2.39 and 2.40,
or 2.41 and 2.42). To understand optimal policy, I re-write the LQ problem in terms of gap
variables, where the latter are defined in terms of log deviations from their zero-inflation
equilibrium values.17 That is, gap variables measure the deviation from the policy that
would be considered optimal in the absence of the price and credit frictions.18 The loss
16 nw,Fe and Ke denote the steady state values of net worth, the lump-sum fiscal transfer, and capital all
with respect to entrepreneurs.
17 See Appendix 6.2 for the system of first-order constraints in the zero-inflation equilibrium.
18 This definition is consistent with the fact that I abstract from the effects of cost-push shocks.
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function (2.29) can be re-written as (see Appendix 6.3)
Lt = ωy
x2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+ωi
g2t
2
+ωk
j2t
2
−ωyixtgt−ωykxt jt
+ωe
(
nt−n∗t
)2
2
−ωeyntxt +ωeintgt (2.43)
where xt ,gt , jt and nt are the output, investment, capital and net worth gaps respectively,
xt = yt− ynt
gt ≡ it− int
jt = kt− knt
nt ≡ n̂wt− n̂wnt
n∗t is a target for the net worth gap that is zero when entrepreneurs do not save, and is
non-zero when entrepreneurs save,
n∗t =

0 if β e < β and κ = 1
−
(
sδ
se
φ(ω)
1−Φ(ω) f (ω)νt+σcc
n
t
)
σse if 1 > κβ
e > β and κ < β

and where cnt is the equilibrium value for household consumption that would be chosen in
the absence of price and credit frictions.
Comparing (2.43) with the loss function in the economy with capital and exogenous
capital adjustment costs, but no credit friction,19
LNo CFt = ωy
x2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+ωi
g2t
2
+ωk
j2t
2
−ωyixtgt−ωykxt jt (2.44)
19 See Hansen (2010) for the derivation of the loss function, LNo CFt , in the New Keynesian economy with
capital and capital adjustment costs, but no credit friction.
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it is clear that only difference is in the third line of (2.43), and thus the new variable of
interest to the policymaker in the economy with a credit friction is net worth.
More specifically, a central bank will have an incentive to smooth movements in net worth
in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs save. This is because the central bank has a non-
trivial policy trade-off in this equilibrium. At the margin, the central bank can choose
between stabilising inflation, reducing price dispersion that is socially costly, or following
an alternative policy that mitigates time variation in the credit friction, that is also socially
costly. Importantly, both of these goals cannot be addressed simultaneously, and so there
is a trade-off for monetary policy.20
The reason that net worth volatility is the key additional variable of interest to the policy
maker, is that it is net worth that determines how socially costly the credit friction is. In
particular, when net worth is high entrepreneurs are able to choose investment allocations
that are similar to those that would be chosen in the absence of a credit friction, and
so the distortionary effects of this friction are small. In contrast, when net worth is low,
entrepreneurs are constrained in their ability to obtain external finance. This implies that
entrepreneurs’ investment allocations depart more significantly from those that would be
chosen if the credit friction were not present.
Another way to see this point is to analyse the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do not
save, and thus the amplification mechanism associated with net worth is shut down. In this
case it can be verified that net worth becomes a term that is independent of policy when
entrepreneurs do not save,21 nt = t.i.p and n
∗
t = 0, and so the social loss function for the
central bank becomes equivalent to that derived in an economy with capital but no credit
friction (Lt = L
No CF
t ). In this case, as emphasised by Hansen (2010), a zero-inflation
target is optimal and the policymaker is only concerned with stabilising dispersion in
20 This can be seen clearly from analysis of the first-order conditions of the optimal policy problem, and
noting that, in general, the target around which net worth volatility is stabilised is non-zero
(
n∗t 6= 0
)
.
See Appendix 6.4 for further detail.
21 See Appendix 6.3.
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prices. This makes sense, as although the credit friction still exists when entrepreneurs
do not save, the central bank is in fact unable to use monetary policy to mitigate time
variation in this distortion.
To understand the determinants of net worth volatility when it is responsive to changes in
monetary policy, the net worth gap can be written as
nt =
fωt (ω)ω
f (ω)
(
ω̂ t− ω̂nt
)
+
(
q̂t− q̂t n
)
+gt +O
(
‖ϑ‖2
)
in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs save. Thus, when net worth responds to policy,
the incentive to smooth movements in net worth is equivalent to an incentive to smooth
movements in default rates, the asset price gap, and the investment gap. Interestingly, only
investment gap volatility, gt , and default rate volatility, ω̂ t− ω̂nt , are in fact variables that
are endogenous to policy and respond to changes in interest rates. Asset prices volatility,
or strictly speaking volatility in the asset prices gap, can be shown to be a term that
is in fact independent of policy.22 Although the policymaker has an incentive to smooth
volatility in asset prices, a topic that has received much attention in previous literature, the
policymaker in this economy is in fact unable to address this incentive, when the steady
state credit friction is small.
Comparing these results with recent literature, it should be noted that the incentive to
smooth volatility in the default rate of entrepreneurs is equivalent to an incentive to
smooth the credit spread, when the spread is appropriately defined in this economy.23
22 Appendix 6.3, Lemma 6.2, verifies that q̂t = t.i.p and so q̂t − q̂nt = 0.
23 The credit spread (external finance premium) is defined as
s˜pt ≡
1+RLt
Pt
−1
=
ω t
g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
) −1
Focusing on the normalised spread, spt = 1+ s˜pt , it is straightforward to verify that deviations in the
spread gap, spt − spnt , are proportional to deviations in the default rate gap, ω̂ t − ω̂nt up to a first-order
approximation.
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The importance of the credit spread is a finding that is similar to work of Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2010), De Fiore and Tristani (2009) and Carlstrom et al (2010). These
authors also show that the credit spread features in the objective of the policymaker in
economies with a credit friction but no capital. However, a key difference, between their
results and those emphasised here, is that the spread is not the primitive variable in the
policymakers’ objective in this economy. The spread only matters to the extent that it
influences net worth, or more fundamentally the social cost of the credit friction. Although
this distinction may appear subtle, a central bank that is concerned with smoothing the
credit spread, as opposed to net worth, would not in fact be implementing monetary policy
optimally in this economy.
Qualitatively, these results are broadly consistent with the set of monetary policies
used across countries in the most recent financial crisis. Arguably, one interpretation
is that a number of countries implemented monetary policies, including conventional
monetary policy, with the objective of stabilising borrowers’ net worth playing some
part in policymakers’ overall approach. Possible examples include the sharp reduction
in interest rates used in the US, UK and Europe at the onset of the crisis, as well as the
additional macroeconomic tools used, such as the purchase of financial securities and
lending programs, that assisted in stabilising the net worth of borrowers and lenders, and
in reducing the incidence of default.24
2.4. Quantitative Analysis
I now examine the extent to which these incentives matter quantitatively. For a baseline
calibration, I calibrate a similar default rate (3 percent quarterly) and external finance
premium (150 basis points) as that used by Faia and Monacelli (2007). All other
parameters are calibrated at values that are similar to those used by Faia and Monacelli,
or in line with previous empirical literature that estimates the New Keynesian model
analysed here (see Table 2.1).
24 See for example Bernanke (2009), Kohn (2009) and Stark (2009).
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Table 2.1: Calibration for the Benchmark Model
Parameter Steady State Value(a) Interpretation
β 0.99 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
α 0.33 Share of factor payments to capital
σc 1.00 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
η 2 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply
γ 0.65 Proportion of firms that cannot change their price each quarter
θ 8 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
κ 0.90 Entrepreneurs’ probability of not retiring
ζFe
Y 0.02 Aggregagate entrepreneur subsidy relative to income
(b)
φ (ω) 0.5 Uniform PDF of investment projects(c)
Notes: (a) All parameters are chosen to be consistent with a Balanced Growth Path in non-detrended
variables, and to match empirical estimates using non-detrended data.
(b) Consistent with a steady state government subsidy to entrepreneurs of 9 per cent (as a share
of steady state net worth).
(c) On the [0,2] interval.
Given the recent financial crisis, it is topical to consider two shocks that are financial in
nature.25 The first shock is a negative one percentage point shock to the proportion of
funds recovered when an entrepreneur declares default.26 This results in a decline in the
willingness of banks to lend to entrepreneurs (i.e. an increase in the cost of asymmetric
information). The second shock is a negative shock to the lump-sum government subsidy
to entrepreneurs, which reduces their net worth directly by one percent. This acts as
an exogenous reduction in entrepreneurs’ pledgable collateral, increasing their external
financing requirement and reducing their ability to borrow funds for an investment project.
As a useful benchmark for comparison, Figure 2.1 reports the impulse response functions
if monetary policy follows a zero-inflation target following a one percentage point decline
in the recovery rate. With a small credit friction, it can be observed that a decrease in the
recovery rate results in an expansionary monetary policy that stabilises inflation, increases
asset prices and the net worth of entrepreneurs, and results in a fall in the default rate.27
25 The implications of the following results are unchanged if productivity shocks or taste shocks are
considered.
26 Recall that, by assumption, the steady state recovery rate is close to one, when monitoring costs are
small in steady state
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Interestingly, notwithstanding the increase in net worth, investment still falls because
although entrepreneurs are now more able to finance projects from their internal funds,
the contraction in external finance provided by banks is larger. The net effect is a decline
in credit and investment. Banks are less willing to lend precisely because they recover less
when an entrepreneur defaults.
Figure 2.1: Decline in the Recovery Rate – Zero Inflation Target
I now consider the extent to which optimal policy deviates from a zero-inflation target.
Figure 2.2 reports the deviation of variables from their zero-inflation values. The results
highlight that although it is optimal to run a more expansionary monetary policy than
that of a zero-inflation target, the order of magnitude of this deviation is small. For
example, with a one percent fall in the recovery rate, optimal monetary policy would
call for stimulating quarterly inflation in the order of 0.005 per cent.
To be clear, the very small deviations from a strict inflation target are not specific to
the type of shock to fundamentals considered. Figure 2.3 reports the deviations from
a zero-inflation target policy in response to a negative net worth shock, and a positive
productivity shock. Again, though a more expansionary policy is called for in response to
both shocks, the optimal deviation of inflation from zero is very small.
27 In the economy I describe, the external finance premium always moves in the same direction as the
default rate.
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Figure 2.2: Decline in the Recovery Rate – Optimal Monetary Policy
Figure 2.3: Net Worth and Productivity Shocks – Optimal Monetary Policy
The LQ framework provides further insight into these results, as it allows the relative
weights of variables in the loss function to be examined. Table 2.2 highlights that inflation
is by far the most important variable for social welfare. Of secondary importance is the
output gap, the capital and investment gaps, and then the net worth gap. Clearly, the
credit friction objective for policy is noticeably sub-ordinate to the objective of stabilising
inflation.
Robustness: Does the size of the friction matter?
A natural question is whether the previous quantitative results rely on the assumption of a
small steady state credit friction. To address this, I also consider the optimal inflation
response to shocks in models with a larger steady state credit friction. Specifically, I
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Table 2.2: Loss Function Weights
Variable Weight on Variance Term in Lt
(a)
Inflation (ωpi) 1
Output gap
(
ωy
)
1.55×10−2
Capital gap (ωk) 2.63×10−3
Investment gap (ωi) 2.39×10−4
Net worth gap (ωe) 2.12×10−6
Notes: (a) Normalised by the weight on inflation.
compare the benchmark economy previously described, with economies that have steady
state credit frictions that are similar in size to those estimated for the US and Euro area
economies by Queijo von Heideken (2009).
To be clear there are three main distinctions between the large friction economies I now
consider, and the benchmark economy previously discussed. These are:
(A) The large friction economies now have monitoring costs that distort the economy to
the first-order;
(B) Since steady state returns are higher in the credit friction economies, I focus on
an equilibrium where entrepreneurs are impatient, and indifferent to saving and
consuming; and
(C) I assume that all firms are able to optimise their price each period, but must pay a
quadratic adjustment cost when doing so.
(A) is the distinction of interest I wish to investigate. That is, does the magnitude of the
credit friction affect the extent to which a central bank wishes to deviate from a zero-
inflation target in response to either productivity, net-worth or bankruptcy rate shocks.
(B) and (C) are technical assumptions required when solving for optimal (Ramsey)
policy numerically. (B) ensures that entrepreneurs do not become self-financing in an
equilibrium where monitoring costs are significant, and steady state investment returns
are high. (C) is included as an alternative assumption to Calvo pricing that facilitates
a numerical solution.28Concerning the measure of social welfare in the larger friction
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economies, I continue to assume that the social welfare measure maximised by the central
bank incorporates both the welfare of households and entrepreneurs, and that monetary
policy is not concerned with first-order or mean consumption redistribution between these
groups.29
Table 2.3 summarises the alternative models I compare. Specifically, I compare the
benchmark economy with an economy that assumes steady state bankruptcy costs in the
order of 25 per cent, which is comparable to that level of bankruptcy costs estimated for
the Euro area (see Queijo von Heideken 2009). The second model I consider assumes
steady state bankruptcy costs at 16 per cent, which is similar to estimates for the US, but
is otherwise identical to the Euro area model. The third model, US Alt, is identical to
the US model with the exception that entrepreneurs are assumed to be more patient. This
latter assumption ensures a more realistic steady state rate of default for the US.
Table 2.3: Alternative Credit Friction Models
Benchmark Euro Area US US Alt
Entrepreneurs Save(a) Indifferent(b) Indifferent(b) Indifferent(b)
SS Recovery Rate 1.00 0.75 0.84 0.84
SS Default Rate 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.03
Entrepreneur Discount Factor 1.1 0.86 0.86 0.91
Notes: (a) Entrepreneurs save until stochastic retirement.
(b) Entrepreneurs are indifferent between consuming and saving.
(c) Firms pay a quadratic adjustment cost when changing their price.
(d) Social welfare includes household and entrepreneur welfare.
The left hand panel of Figure 2.4 reports results from comparing the response of the
inflation rate to a one percentage point decline in the recovery rate, assuming that the
central bank implements Ramsey optimal policy. The results highlight that the size of the
steady state credit friction does affect the extent to which the central bank deviates from a
zero-inflation target. In particular, in the larger friction models a concern with stabilising
28 It overcomes the technical difficulty that, in principle, the whole distribution of prices matters for welfare
when solving for numerical Ramsey policy with Calvo pricing. See Faia and Monacelli (2007) for further
discussion.
29 In particular, I normalise the weight on households as a group to one, and set Λt =Uc
(
β
κβ e
)t
, which is
identical in form to the weighting used in the benchmark model.
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movements in net worth implies that the policymaker now chooses an inflation rate that is
approximately 0.1 percentage points higher than steady state inflation. This is a non-trivial
deviation from a zero-inflation target, given that this response is measured at a quarterly
frequency, and is in response to a one percentage point decline in the recovery rate.
Figure 2.4: Optimal (Ramsey) Inflation Paths Across Models
The right hand panel of Figure 2.4 recomputes the same responses assuming that the
central bank only maximises household welfare. A common assumption made in previous
numerical literature on optimal policy, the results highlight that the extent of deviation
from the strict inflation target is roughly halved. These results are more in line with
the findings of Faia and Monacelli (2007), for example, and emphasise that the results
are sensitive to the weights attached to households and borrowers (entrepreneurs) in
the policymakers social welfare function. If policymakers, are concerned only with the
welfare of households, and not entrepreneurs, then a strict inflation target becomes a better
approximation of optimal monetary policy in an economy with a first-order distortionary
credit friction.
Overall, these results confirm that credit frictions are potentially important for optimal
policy both qualitatively and quantitatively when considering economies that have non-
trivial credit distortions. Although inflation remains the primary objective of importance,
the quantitative results in this chapter suggest that some deviation of inflation from target
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may be appropriate if credit frictions are thought to be having a highly distortionary effect
on economic activity.
It is informative to compare these results with those obtained in previous work by Faia
and Monacelli (2007). Faia and Monacelli consider numerical welfare comparisons of
different monetary policy rules for a similar New Keynesian economy with a credit
friction and productivity and government spending shocks. These authors find that a high
weight on inflation in an interest-rate rule is socially optimal. One assumption that appears
important in their findings is that the central bank is only concerned with the welfare of
households. The findings here suggest that if the policymaker also takes into consideration
the welfare of entrepreneurs (borrowers), motivated by the idea that policymakers abstract
from redistribution, then a greater tolerance for non-zero inflation can be induced in
response to financial shocks such as increases in the costs of bankruptcy.
It is also informative to compare these results with the findings of Vleighe (2010). In
Vlieghe’s analysis, the credit friction is assumed to affect the ability of low productivity
agents to transfer resources to high productivity agents, a setup that builds on the work
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Interestingly, although Vlieghe models quite a different
financial friction, he also finds that optimal monetary policy implies small, though not
trivial, departures from inflation targeting when solving for optimal policy numerically.
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2.5. Conclusion
There has been much debate in the literature regarding optimal monetary policy in
response to fluctuations in asset prices and financial volatility. However, much of this
debate has been based on a numerical approach, which has left the objectives of monetary
policy somewhat unclear. This chapter aims to provide additional insight into this question
by taking an analytical approach to the question of optimal monetary policy in a New
Keynesian economy with endogenous capital and a credit friction.
The results highlight that policymakers can have an incentive to stabilise volatility in the
net worth of borrowers to help mitigate time variation in the distortionary costs of a credit
friction in the economy. This incentive exists in addition to the more traditional objectives
of stabilising the composition of output and inflation. Interestingly, for the type of credit
friction modelled here, credit spreads and asset prices are only variables of interest to
policymakers to the extent that they influence the net worth of borrowers in the economy.
Quantitatively, I find that inflation targeting remains a good approximation of optimal
monetary policy when the credit friction is not highly distortionary. However, for a more
distortionary friction, such as that which can be observed during episodes of financial
stress, these results imply that a more expansionary monetary policy with some tolerance
of inflation is optimal.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Expectations, Investment and
Equity Prices
3.1. Introduction
The sequence goes as follows. Some genuine improvement in
economic conditions leads to more optimism. It may be a resource
discovery (including the opening up of new productive land), or a
technological change, or a rise in the terms of trade, or even just greater
confidence in economic policy’s capacity to solve problems. Human
nature being what it is, people (or governments) are inclined to project
into the future with undue confidence and insufficient assessment of
risk. They often decide to invest more in ventures that are marginal,
or even speculative, borrowing to do so. Because their assessment of
permanent income is that it has increased, they also decide to consume
more now (either privately or in the form of public services). Financial
markets and institutions – which are populated by human beings after all
– help them do both these by making capital available. Then, at some
point, an event causes people suddenly to realise they have been too
optimistic. Maybe the ‘new paradigm’ disappoints in some way or the
terms of trade decline again. The cycle then goes into reverse, usually
painfully.
Glenn Stevens, 17 August 2010
The distortionary effects of equity price bubbles have received renewed attention in recent
years. The recent global financial crisis, the US dot-com boom, and Japan’s experience in
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the late 1980s, have all stimulated much discussion on the nature of equity price bubbles,
and their policy implications. Although there has been a good deal of empirical work on
the existence of bubbles, theoretical models of their origins and their welfare implications
remains very much an open question. This chapter provides insight in this respect. It
focuses on one potential source of a bubble – optimism or pessimism on the part of firms.
In particular, I explore whether firm-led optimism, or pessimism, can explain general
equilibrium movements in investment, equity prices, consumption, and output that are
consistent with the typical equity price bubble.30
Being explicit about the source of an equity price bubble is important. Without a micro-
founded theory of how bubbles can form, it is difficult to consider normative questions
such as the optimal monetary policy response to a bubble or its distortionary effects. A
micro-founded theory of bubbles is also useful for empirical work aimed at identifying
the existence of equity price bubbles, and for comparing alternative theories that can be
used to explain them.
I focus on firm-led optimism because there appears to be a common perception in the
literature on bubbles that firm or shareholder optimism can be an important explanation in
how they form. Since many observers often refer to optimism on the part of shareholders
or firms, or some combination of both, modelling optimism on the production side of the
economy is a natural starting point. Many of the results obtained in the simplest model
considered in this chapter are shown to be robust to an alternative reduced-form model,
where optimism or pessimism stems from shareholders (households).
The modelling device used to capture optimism or pessimism is derived from the
work of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Gollier (2005) and Brunnermeier, Gollier and
Parker (2007). These papers study the effects of optimism or pessimism on the part
of households for consumption and portfolio allocation decisions in simple endowment
30 In the context of this chapter I am usually referring to equity price bubbles unless otherwise specified.
Nonetheless, the general methodology used can be applied to alternative assets such as housing.
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economies. This chapter extends this work in an alternative direction, by focusing on
optimism or pessimism on the production side, and studying how changes in technology
can interact with optimism or pessimism to generate an equity price bubble. Specifically,
I use optimal expectations on the part of managers of firms making physical investment
decisions.31
The mechanism I study is whether a change to fundamentals, here the distribution of
technology, can provide incentives for firm managers to become optimistic or pessimistic.
It is found that this is indeed the case. Following a change in the distribution of technology,
allowing for optimal expectations (OE) can amplify the effects of this change on equity
prices and investment. Thus, from a rational expectations perspective, equity prices can
appear overly sensitive to fundamental shocks, and appear overpriced (underpriced) in
response to favourable (unfavourable) technology shocks. I also show that, in a very
simple general equilibrium model, predictions for other macroeconomic quantities and
prices, such as output and consumption, are qualitatively consistent with historical equity
price bubble episodes, provided that households share the optimism or pessimism of firm
managers.
The key assumptions delivering these results are that investment managers current felicity
is a function of both current payoffs and anticipated future payoffs. And that managers are
able to choose optimally the subjective beliefs that affect their anticipated payoffs. After
exploring these assumptions in a very simple two-period two-state economy, I consider
whether the qualitative predictions obtained still go through if optimism or pessimism
in the economy originates from households rather than firms. I also confirm whether the
results can be generalised to an economy with many states, and potentially with many
periods.
31 OE is a useful modelling device for optimism or pessimism because it models these beliefs as
endogenous outcomes that are in the best interest of decision-makers. It also has the interpretation of a
decision maker choosing an optimal prior for his or her beliefs, and then updating these beliefs over time
in a Bayesian manner.
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The next section provides a review of related literature that motivates the link between
optimism, pessimism and equity price bubbles. Section 3 describes a very simple
economic environment to demonstrate the key mechanism of interest – a two-period,
two-state, general-equilibrium economy with production. Section 4 discusses the main
insights. Section 5 confirms that the results generalise to endogenous optimism or
pessimism on the part of households, and considers some simple welfare implications.
Section 6 confirms that the same mechanism exists and can be studied in an economy
with many periods and many states. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
3.2. Related Literature and Stylised Observations
Optimism followed by subsequent pessimism has long been linked to equity price
bubbles. In some of the earliest examples of equity price bubbles, including the the South
Sea Bubble (1720) and the British Railway Mania (1840s), optimism has been proposed
as an integral part of the upswing observed in equity prices during these episodes. More
recently, bubbles such the US Roaring Twenties (1920s), the Japanese equity price bubble
in the 1980s, and the US dot-com boom (1990s) have also linked optimism to significant
increases in both equity prices and physical investment. In addition to the presence of
optimism, a common observation in each of these episodes is the link between the bubble
and some fundamental innovation in the economy. For example, the opening of new trade
markets, the development of railroads, automobiles, radios, advances in computing, and
the internet have all been proposed as fundamental shocks that are linked to equity price
bubbles.32
Although qualitative descriptions of bubbles have emphasised the importance of
optimism, and often subsequent pessimism, a model with a clear micro-foundation of
why decision-makers would find it in their interest to be optimistic (or pessimistic)
has proved more difficult to formalise. Nonetheless, research by Van den Steen (2004),
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and Brunnermeier et al (2007), has demonstrated
32 See for example Hong et al (2008) and the references cited therein.
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economic environments in which optimism or pessimism can indeed be in the decision-
makers’ interest and consistent with maximising behaviour. These authors motivation for
modelling optimism or pessimism is supported by findings in psychology and behavioural
economics, which have identified situations in which optimism or pessimism appear to be
important in economic decision-making.33 From a macroeconomic perspective, whether
optimism or pessimism is important is a question that should be addressed on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. A useful property of the analysis that follows is that it
is tractable and empirically testable.
There are two main strands of literature that address the idea that optimism or pessimism
can affect firm investment decisions directly.34 The first strand considers the possibility
that managers can be overly optimistic about their firm’s future prospects. This optimism
can lead to a firm investing in more projects than it should, and reporting forecasts
for its future activities and/or profits that are above an objective evaluation of the
firm’s prospects. Recent discussions of this idea can be found in Heaton (2002),
and Baker et al (2007). Related empirical work has been undertaken by Polk and
Sapienza (2009), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Chirinko and Schaller (2001), and Statman
and Tybejee (1985).
A separate literature considers how shareholder optimism can be a potential source of a
bubble, which can in turn affect investment decisions. Shareholders who are optimistic
about the value of the firm can pay prices for shares that appear unjustified when
compared with a rational or objective assessment of the firms’ future discounted profit
stream. Jensen (2005) has emphasised how shareholder optimism could affect firm-
level investment decisions, and especially so in circumstances where liquidity constraints
would otherwise prevent investment being undertaken. Empirical work that is related to
shareholder optimism, and its ability to affect equity prices and investment, has been
33 See Van den Steen (2004)and Barberis and Thaler (2003) amongst others for surveys of this literature.
34 See for example Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007).
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undertaken by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002), Eames, Glover and Kennedy (2002),
Hong and Kubik (2003), and Gilchrist et al (2005) amongst others.
More generally, there is a broader literature linking behavioural incentives to outcomes
in financial markets. For example, a substantial literature on equity mispricing has
emphasised behavioural or psychological explanations for the existence of mispricing,
including the role for optimism as one explanation. Recent surveys of this literature
include, for example, Shiller (2000a), Shleifer (2000), Hirshleifer (2001), and Barberis
and Thaler (2003). Much of this literature focuses on institutional, information or market
constraints that prevent mispricing or a bubble from being eliminated, but does not provide
a clear microfoundation as to the origin of a bubble. For this reason, the normative
implications of bubbles, and how bubbles respond to changing fundamentals, have
received less attention in this literature.
In terms of general equilibrium, micro-founded models of bubbles that can be used for
welfare and policy analysis, this literature is still very new. Recent theoretical models of
bubbles that are heading in this direction include Farhi and Tirole (2011), Martin and
Ventura (2010) and Hong et al (2008). This chapter should be viewed as complementary
to existing literature, with a different focus on the origin of a bubble.
Stylised Observations
Figure 3.1 highlights some interesting time series observed during recent bubble episodes
in the US and Japan. It highlights that during perceived bubbles there appears to be a sharp
acceleration in equity prices and investment during the “boom” phase. This is matched
with more rapid consumption and output growth. At the end of the boom, and during
the subsequent downturn, equity prices, investment, consumption and output growth all
appear to exhibit lower or even negative growth.
More generally, empirical literature has documented the following stylised facts
concerning equity market bubbles:35
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Figure 3.1: Bubble Episodes in Japan and the US
Japan US
1. Equity prices and investment growth appear to be more highly correlated
correlated during bubble episodes (see for example Gilchrist et al 2005; Detken
and Smets 2004; Helbling and Terrones 2003; Chirinko and Schaller 2001) ;
2. The sharp upswing in equity prices typically observed during a boom, followed
by the subsequent sharp decline during a bust, is difficult to explain using either
structural or atheoretical models of investment (Chirinko and Schaller 2001); and
35 There is an extensive literature that has discussed optimism as an explanation for equity price bubbles
and the above stylised facts. Some recent examples include Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Stevens (2010),
Shiller (2000a), Kindleberger (2000), Camerer (1989) and the references cited therein.
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3. Consumption and output growth appear to increase during a boom and decrease
during a bust. Some papers find this effect to be statistically significant, while for
others it remains an open question (Detken and Smets 2004).
I now consider, in a very simple economy, whether these stylised observations can be
replicated qualitatively using endogenous firm-led optimism or pessimism, in response to
changes in the distribution of technology.
3.3. Firm-led Optimal Expectations in a 2-Period, 2-State Model
The economy has two periods. Uncertainty is confined to the realisation of a common
(aggregate) shock to technology in the second period, where technology can either be high
(ZH) or low (ZL). There are three types of decision-makers in the economy – households,
investment firms, and producers. There is a continuum of each type on the unit interval.
Households consume and supply labour. Investment firms undertake physical investment
on behalf of their shareholders (households). Perfectly competitive producers rent capital
from investment firms and labour from households to produce output that can be either
consumed or invested.
The non-standard feature of the economy I describe is in the formulation of beliefs.
Rather than assuming that all agents are endowed with rational beliefs, knowing the true
probability distribution over technology, I assume that only the managers of investment
firms know the true distribution of technology. Furthermore, I assume that these managers
optimise their beliefs using OE (see Brunnermeier and Parker 2005). For households, I
assume that households do not know the probabilities with which alternative states of
technology are realised, and that households accept (or use) the beliefs optimally chosen
by firms when making their own consumption and labour supply decisions.36 Thus, I
consider an economy where the beliefs of investment firms and households are symmetric
and firm determined. These assumptions are important for retaining tractability.
36 An extension of this work would be to study the conditions under which households optimally accept
firm beliefs. For example, this could be explored by extending the analysis used in Alonso and
Matouschek (2008).
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Uncertainty
It is useful to be precise about the nature of uncertainty. Uncertainty is confined to the
realisation of one unknown, technology, in period two. The true or rational probability
space is a triple {Ω,F ,P}, where Ω is the sample space, F is a σ -field, and P :F → [0,1]
is the true or objective probability measure with which events occur.
To fix ideas, and keep the analysis intuitive, I assume that technology is a random variable
Z2 :Ω→ R, that is discretely distributed with two possible states, low technology, ZL, and
high technology, ZH and with distribution function
F (z) =

0 if z < ZL
pL if ZL ≤ z < ZH
1 if ZH ≤ z
with: ZL < ZH and pL ≡ 1− pH
Managers know that the low technology state occurs with probability pL and the high
technology state with probability pH . Although firm managers know the true distribution
of technology, I allow managers to use a set of subjective beliefs {p̂L, p̂H} that are
consistent with standard probability laws and are absolutely continuous with respect the
rational probability measure (p̂s = 0 if ps = 0 for s = L or H). These subjective beliefs
may or may not coincide with the objective probabilities known by managers.
Investment-Firm Managers
Allowing for endogenous beliefs, there are two decisions for the investment manager.
The first is the choice of subjective beliefs that will be used to make the investment
decision. The second is the optimal choice of investment, conditional on the subjective
beliefs chosen. I first describe the mechanics underpinning these two decisions, and then
the economic rationale for modelling decisions in this way.
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To solve the investment managers’ two decision problems, one can think of these decision
problems as being solved sequentially. In the second-stage, managers choose their optimal
level of investment taking their beliefs as given37
max
I1
R1K1− I1−ψ
I21
2
+β I1
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs p̂s (3.1)
Notice that this problem is quite conventional for a two period model. Managers begin
with some starting capital that they rent, R1K1, and undertake investment subject to
quadratic adjustment costs,−I1−ψ I
2
1
2 , yielding a net first period payoff, R1K1− I1−ψ I
2
1
2 .
In the second period the return from investment is given by β I1
U ′(Cs)
U ′(C1)
Rs, which includes
an adjustment for the stochastic discount factor. The stochastic discount factor reflects
shareholder (household) preferences over returns earned (dividends paid) in the second
period.38
Taking subjective beliefs as given, the optimal investment choice is given by the condition
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs p̂s (3.2)
which equates the marginal costs of investment, with the subjective forecast of the
expected return. Also notice that if p̂s = ps for s = L,H, then the optimal choice
of investment will coincide with that selected under rational expectations, and this
investment program is standard.
As implied previously, however, managers get to choose their beliefs {p̂s}s=L,H (the first-
stage problem). Following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), I assume that the manager
37 To conserve on notation and keep arguments clear, I do not use an index to denote the position of the firm
manager on [0,1]. Readers who prefer a more detailed exposition of the economy can refer to Appendix
7.2.
38 This stochastic discount factor is consistent with households receiving the profits from investment firm
decisions. Investment firm managers can be thought of as being risk neutral, and paid an arbitrarily small
fraction of the dividends paid to households.
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chooses their beliefs optimally, knowing that these beliefs will then be used to solve the
investment program just described. That is, Equation (3.2) acts as a constraint on the
managers optimal choice of beliefs. Concerning the incentives of the manager in his or
her selection of beliefs, I assume that the manager chooses their optimal beliefs (optimal
expectation) by solving the following program:
max
p̂L,p̂H
E (pi1+βpi2)
subject to:
pi1 =
(
R1K1− I1−ψ
I21
2
)
+β I1
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs p̂s
pi2 = ε
(
R1K1− I1−ψ
I21
2
)
+ I1
U ′ (C2)
U ′ (C1)
R2
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs p̂s
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s
p̂s ≥ 0 for s = L,H
This decision problem requires some unpacking. First note, the control variables here
are the subjective beliefs {p̂L, p̂H}. The objective of the manager is captured in the payoff
functions pi1 and pi2.39 The payoff in period 1 is a function both of profits realised in period
1, R1K1− I1−ψ I
2
1
2 , and anticipated profits, β I1
∑
s=L,H
U ′(Cs)
U ′(C1)
Rs p̂s. Notice that anticipated
profits depend on the subjective beliefs of the manager, and so this provides an incentive
for a manager to tilt beliefs towards the state that has a higher discounted payoff. This is
the key mechanism through which managers have the incentive to distort their beliefs. By
attaching a higher subjective probability to the high payoff state, the manager in effect
gains a direct utility benefit (enjoyed in period 1) from being optimistic about the future.
39 Note that the rational probability measure is used to evaluate the objective. This makes sense given
that managers know the objective probability space when choosing their optimal subjective beliefs. See
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) for further discussion.
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Period 2 payoffs are a function of profits actually realised in period two, I1R2
U ′(C2)
U ′(C1)
, and
the profits previously earned in period one ε
(
R1K1− I∗1 −ψ I
∗2
1
2
)
. This latter effect of
memory, or persistence in the managers’ payoff function, acts a natural counter-balance
to the incentive for a manager to become optimistic.40 By caring about past payoffs, the
manager will reduce their welfare if they are too optimistic since over-investment will
occur and period 1 profits will be lower than is optimally desired.
Finally, one must unpack the constraints. The first constraint, 1 + ψI1 =
β
∑
s=L,H
U ′(Cs)
U ′(C1)
Rs p̂s, highlights that the manager internalises the effect of their choice of
beliefs on their investment decision. That is, a manager knows that once his or her beliefs
are chosen they must be used in solving the second-stage investment program (3.1). The
final two constraints, 1 =
∑
s=L,H p̂s and p̂s ≥ 0 for s = L,H ensure that the subjective
beliefs chosen are standard probabilities.
The first-order conditions for the investment firm at an interior solution are 41
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs p̂s (3.3)
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s (3.4)
βε (1+ψI1) = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs ps+ψI1 (3.5)
Notwithstanding the introduction of anticipatory and memory welfare, and the ability to
optimise on beliefs, the effects on the optimal investment decision are quite intuitive.
Comparing (3.5) with the more standard investment decision that holds under rational
expectations,
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs ps (3.6)
40 Memory can be thought of as being analogous to habits in a consumption context.
41 It is straightforward to verify that the above first-order conditions are sufficient when ε > β−1.
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there are two effects from optimising on beliefs. On the one hand, investment-firm
managers obtain an additional perceived return from investing, captured by the term ψI1.
Intuitively, this is the effect of anticipated profits providing managers with the incentive to
be optimistic and invest more because it raises their anticipation of future profits earned.
On the other hand, managers also care about actual payoffs and their memory welfare.
Optimism is constrained by the fact that higher investment reduces actual profits earned
in period one, which also has a persistent effect on felicity that is carried forward into
period two. With these costs of distorted decision-making, it can be observed that the
marginal cost of investment is in effect scaled by the weight on memory welfare, βε .
The key assumptions in the above analysis are that managers can choose their beliefs,
and that beliefs enter directly into the objective function of a manager. One can think of
the above problem as either a reduced form for capturing incentives for a manager to be
optimistic or pessimistic about the future, or more literally as a model of optimal self-
deception. Another interpretation, that becomes clearer in a model with many periods (as
discussed further in Section 3.6), is that one can think of the manager as selecting an
optimal prior before updating in a Bayesian manner.
The assumption that managers’ payoffs depend on anticipated future profit is an important
component of this framework. One justification is introspection. It is natural to think that
people do, at least to some extent, care today about what might happen to them in the
future. In particular, decision-makers are likely to have higher welfare if they think the
future is going to promising (the investment manager believes future profits are likely
to be higher), and lower welfare if the future is likely to be unfavourable (future profits
are likely to be low). Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Van den Steen (2004) and the
references cited therein document psychological and behavioural evidence to suggest that
a person’s current felicity is affected by what they anticipate is going to happen to them
in the future.
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There is also empirical evidence to suggest that such preferences may be influencing
economic decisions. Recent examples include Landier and Thesmar (2009), Ben-David,
Graham and Harvey (2007; 2010), and Puri and Robinson (2007). From a macroeconomic
perspective, this preference assumption is one modelling device for incorporating a
framework in which agents find it in their best interests to use optimistic, or potentially
pessimistic, expectations. The appeal of using this device lie in its clear microfoundations,
tractability, and that it can be empirically tested.
Households
I assume a continuum of households on the unit interval. To keep the effects of firm
optimism (or pessimism) as transparent as possible, I assume that the continuum of
households share the beliefs optimally chosen by investment firms. That is, the continuum
of households beliefs are such that
{
p̂hs (i) = p̂s (i)
}
s=L,H
for all i ∈ [0,1], where{
p̂hs (i)
}
s=L,H
are the subjective beliefs used by household type i, and {p̂s (i)}s=L,H are
the subjective beliefs chosen by investment-firm type i. One can think of this as a model
where at time t = 0 (prior to the opening of financial and goods markets), there is a
continuum of investment-firm types reporting their optimal beliefs, and that there is a
matching continuum of household types each willing to accept the beliefs reported by the
investment-firm manager that matches their type.42
After beliefs are matched, households consume, choose the shares of the investment firms
that they wish to purchase, and a portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities in period 1. After
the resolution of uncertainty in period 2, households again choose consumption and their
desired labour supply (households have no incentive to re-trade in financial markets).
The existence of Arrow-Debreu securities ensures that households are able to completely
42 Although not formally considered here, there are approaches, such as that proposed by Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), that can be used to verify the conditions under which households (the principal)
will be willing to delegate the investment decision to a more informed firm manager (the agent), even
when the manager is potentially biased.
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insure with each other against uncertainty, but households still require investment firms to
undertake investment in physical capital on their behalf.43
I first focus on the intra-temporal allocation made in each period. Each household44
consumes a basket of goods solving in each period and state t ∈ 1,L,H
min
Cit
∫ 1
0
Pit C
i
tdi
subject to
Ct ≥
(∫ 1
0
(
Cit
) θ−1
θ
di
) θ
θ−1
taking Ct as given, where P
i
t is the price of good i, Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz basket, C
i
t is a
households’ consumption of good type i, θ is a common elasticity of substitution across
different types of goods and where i ∈ [0,1]. The optimal consumption demand for good
i can be express as
Cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−θ
Ct
where Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz price index that measure the shadow price of consuming the
basket of goods Ct ,
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
(
Pit
)1−θ
di
) 1
1−θ
43 Since households cannot purchase investment goods directly, markets are incomplete. This will not
affect outcomes in the symmetric equilibrium I focus on provided households use the same probability
measure as that optimally chosen by investment firms.
44 To conserve on notation I do not identify the position of the household on [0,1]. See Appendix 7.2 for a
more detailed representation of this problem.
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As well as making intra-temporal consumption allocations in each period, households
also solve the following inter-temporal optimisation problem
max
C1,Cs,Ns,θi,as
U (C1)+β
∑
s=L,H
(U (Cs)−V (Ns)) p̂s
subject to:
P1C1+P1
∑
s=L,H
ωsas+P1
∫ 1
0
(
qi−D1,i
)
θidi
≤ P1W1N1+P1
∫ 1
0
qiφidi+P1D
P
1
PsCs ≤ Psas+PsWsNs+PsDPs +Ps
∫ 1
0
θiDs,idi for s = L,H
θi ≥ 0 (3.7)
whereωs is the price of an Arrow-Debreu security that delivers one unit of consumption in
state s, W is the real wage, DP is the sum of all real dividends paid by production firms,45
φi, Di, θi and qi are the initial endowment, real dividend paid, equity share purchased and
price of equity, all with respect to investment firm i, as is the quantity of Arrow-Debreu
securities purchased with regard to state s, and N is labour supply. For simplicity, I assume
that the first period labour supply and real wages are fixed so that W1N1 is exogenous from
the household’s perspective. A redundant real risk-free equity can be priced using
∑
s=L,H
ωs =
(
1+ r f
)−1
where r f is the risk-free rate of return.
45 For simplicity, I abstract from the ownership of production firms. This has no material effect on any of
the analysis that follows.
61
The interior Euler, labour supply and equity pricing conditions for an individual
household are given by46
U ′ (C1) =
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
(
1+ r f
)
p̂s (3.8)
Ws =
V ′ (Ns)
U ′ (Cs)
for s = L,H (3.9)
q1 = D1+β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Ds p̂s (3.10)
Equation (3.10) verifies that the stochastic discount factor used by investment firms,
as previously assumed, is consistent with these firms maximising shareholder value in
equilibrium.
Producers
I assume perfect competition in the supply of each type of good on the interval [0,1].
Producer i has access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology
Y it = Zt
(
Kit
)α (
Nt
i
)1−α
for t = 1,L,H (3.11)
for i ∈ [0,1] , α ∈ (0,1) and where the supply of labour and capital (and technology)
in the first period are fixed exogenously for each good type. It should be noted that Zt
reflects technology that is common to all firms, and thus I abstract from idiosyncratic
technology shocks. With perfect competition (zero profits) capital and labour supplied in
the production of each good type receive their marginal products
Rit = α
Y it
Kt
for t = 1,L,H (3.12)
W it = (1−α)
Y it
Nit
for t = 1,L,H (3.13)
46 These are sufficient under standard concavity assumptions.
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where I assume Ri1, W
i
1,K
i
1 and N
i
1 are all exogenous.
47 Furthermore, with perfectly
competitive supply in each good type on [0,1] prices reflect nominal marginal cost
Pit = PtV
i
t for t = 1,L,H (3.14)
and real marginal costs are given by
V it = Z
−1
t
(
Rit
α
)α(
W it
1−α
)1−α
for t = 1,L,H (3.15)
Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions and law of motion for capital for each type of good are
given by:
Y i1 =C
i
1+ I
i
1+
ψ
2
(
Ii1
)2
(3.16)
Y is =C
i
s for s = L,H (3.17)
Ki2 = I
i
1 (3.18)
where it is straightforward to show that firms will never optimally invest in the second
period
(
Iis = 0
)
since the economy terminates at the end of this period.
Equilibrium Concepts
I focus on an equilibrium where all firms are identical, all households are identical, and
all households share the same set of beliefs chosen by firms {p̂s}s=L,H .
Definition 3.1. A symmetric interior OE equilibrium is defined as vector of prices{
rOEf ,R
OE
t ,W
OE
t ,q
OE
1 ,P
OE
t ,V
OE
t
}
t=1,L,H
and quantities
{
KOE2 , I
OE
1 ,C
OE
1 ,C
OE
s ,Y
OE
s ,N
OE
s
}
47 This assumption simplifies the comparative static analysis by not allowing for an endogenous choice of
first period labour supply. Relaxing this assumption did not affect the qualitative results obtained when
studying the problem numerically.
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for s = L,H and optimal subjective probabilities {p̂L, p̂H} that satisfy (3.3) to (3.5), and
(3.8) to (3.18) taking {Y1,R1,K1,W1,N1,ZL,ZH ,ε, pL, pH} as given.48
To understand how introducing optimism or pessimism on the part of investment
firms affects the economy, I compare the economy just described with a standard
rational expectations (RE) economy, where investment firms and households use the true
probability measure assigned to technology rather than the distorted measure optimally
chosen by managers. Specifically, under RE the investment managers’ problem (3.1) is
replaced by
max
I1
(
R1K1− I1−ψ
I21
2
)
+β I1
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Rs ps
yielding the more standard Euler equation (3.6). And, the household objective in an RE
economy (3.7) is now replaced by
U (C1)+β
∑
s=L,H
(U (Cs)−V (Ns)) ps
yielding the rational bond and equity pricing conditions49
U ′ (C1) =
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
(
1+ r f
)
ps (3.19)
q1 = D1+β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
Ds ps (3.20)
Definition 3.2. A symmetric RE equilibrium is a vector of exogenous beliefs {pL, pH} ,
endogenous prices
{
rREf ,R
RE
t ,W
RE
t ,q
RE
1 ,P
RE
t ,V
RE
t
}
t=1,L,H
and endogenous quantities{
KRE2 , I
RE
1 ,C
RE
1 ,C
RE
s ,Y
RE
s ,N
RE
s
}
s=L,H
that satisfy (3.6), (3.9), and (3.11) to (3.20) taking
{Y1,R1,K1,W1,N1,ZL,ZH , pL, pH} as given.
48 Interior here also refers to an equilibrium where 1 > p̂s > 0 for s = L,H.
49 Note the intratemporal conditions remain the same as those previously discussed.
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3.4. Comparative Static Analysis
I now compare the OE and RE economies. I initially assume that, for a given true
distribution of technology, OE firms optimally choose rational beliefs and so the OE and
RE economies are initially identical in terms of beliefs, prices and quantities.50 I then
study how each economy changes in response to a small change in the objective or true
distribution of technology. Specifically, I consider how beliefs, equity prices, investment,
output, and consumption growth all change in the OE economy, and in the RE economy,
when there is a small perturbation either to the supports of the distribution of technology
(ZL or ZH) or the probability with which the high state occurs, pH . Notice that these
perturbations all raise the objective mean of technology in the second period, and can be
considered as favourable changes to its distribution.
To obtain clear qualitative predictions, I assume that households have a power (or constant
relative risk aversion) utility function for consumption, and a power utility function for
the disutility of labour
U (C) =
C1−σ −1
1−σ
V (H) =
H1+η
1+η
(3.21)
I further assume that risk aversion is low (σ < 1, where σ is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion), which ensures that investment increases in response to a technology
shock that increases productivity if the high state is realised, under either OE or RE(
∂ IOE1
∂ZH
> 0, ∂ I
RE
1
∂ZH
> 0
)
, but otherwise does not affect the main qualitative results obtained.
In particular, with high risk aversion, σ > 1, the effects of a shock to the distribution
of technology work in the same direction in terms of the effects on optimal subjective
probabilities, but reverse the sign of the effects on equilibrium prices and quantities such
as investment and equity prices.
50 The existence of an OE equilibrium that is identical to a given RE equilibrium is verified in Appendix
7.3, Proposition 7.1).
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To conserve notation, it should be noted that all of the partial derivatives that follow are
evaluated around the point at which optimal and rational expectations initially coincide,
and so I use the notation ∂y∂x ≡ ∂y∂x |
ε=εRE
. Notice that εRE is the value for the memory
parameter which ensures that the OE and RE economies are intially identical (see
Appendix 7.3, Proposition 7.1), y is the response variable of interest (computed in either
the OE or RE economy) and x is the parameter of the technology distribution that is being
perturbed (either ZL,ZH or pH).
The first thought experiment considered is whether a positive innovation to the supports of
the distribution of technology – that is, to either ZL or ZH – leads to higher investment and
equity prices under OE than under RE. Intuitively, I examine whether a change in the true
distribution of technology can, endogenously, induce beliefs that support over-investment
and overvaluation, when compared with a rational expectations economy.
Proposition 3.1 confirms that, starting from a position where OE and RE initially coincide,
as the true distribution for technology becomes more favourable (either of the supports are
increased), it is in the interest of managers to become optimistic and assign a probability
to the high state that is above the objective probability pH , and a probability to the low
state that is below the objective probability pL. These beliefs induce the manager to over-
invest, which in turn leads to equity prices that are above their rational expectations value.
It can also be shown that these effects are strongest if the perturbation to technology
is through an increase in ZH , rather than ZL, provided that the high state realisation for
technology is sufficiently likely pHpL ≥
(
ZL
ZH
)γ3−1
, where γ3 is a positive constant defined
in Appendix 7.3.
Proposition 3.1. Consider (separately) small perturbations to the realisation of
technology in each state, ZL,ZH , around the equilibrium point at which optimal and
rational expectations coincide. It follows that beliefs are optimistic, and investment
and equity prices are higher under OE than RE following each of these perturbations.
Furthermore, these responses are largest for a perturbation to the realisation of
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technology in the high state – provided that the likelihood of this state is sufficiently large.
That is,
∂ p̂H
∂x
> 0;
∂ p̂L
∂x
< 0
∂ IOE1
∂x
>
∂ IRE1
∂x
> 0;
∂qOE1
∂x
>
∂qRE1
∂x
> 0
for x ∈ ZL,ZH
and
∂y
∂ZH
≥ ∂y
∂ZL
for y ∈ p̂H , IOE1 ,qOE1
if
pH
pL
≥
(
ZL
ZH
)γ3−1
Proposition 3.2 confirms that similar results are obtained if the perturbation is to the
probability with which the high-state occurs, pH . Thus, regardless of the source of the
perturbation, that is whether the magnitude of realised technology changes across states
or whether the objective (true) probability attached to states change such that the high
technology state becomes more likely, both can give rise to the incentive for investment-
firm managers to optimally distort their expectations and investment decision.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a perturbation to the true (or rational) probability with which
the high state is realised, pH (with d pH =−d pL). Firms assign a probability to the high
state that is above the true probability, and a probability to the low state that is below the
true probability. Investment and equity prices are higher under OE than RE, following
this perturbation.
∂ p̂H
∂ pH
> 1;
∂ p̂L
∂ pH
<−1
∂yOE1
∂ pH
>
∂yRE1
∂ pH
> 0
for y1 ∈ I1,q1
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The next result establishes that output, labour supply and consumption growth are all
higher in period two following a perturbation to ZH , when comparing OE and RE. Similar
results are obtained when considering perturbations to either low-state productivity ZL, or
the probability with which the high-state occurs pH.
Proposition 3.3. Output and labour effort in period two, and consumption growth,
increase by more under OE than RE in response to a perturbation to ZH ,ZL or pH .
∂Y OEs
∂x
>
∂Y REs
∂x
> 0
∂NOEs
∂x
>
∂NREs
∂x
> 0
∂ ln C
OE
s
COE1
∂x
>
∂ ln C
RE
s
CRE1
∂x
> 0
for x ∈ {ZL,ZH , pH}
These results establish that in a very simple general equilibrium model, a favourable
change in the objective distribution of technology can induce endogenous optimism on
the part of firms, which if also transmitted to households, can lead to over-investment,
overvalued equity prices, and higher output when compared with their values determined
under rational expectations.
The key mechanism is that for investment managers, whose utility depend on their beliefs,
a more favourable objective distribution can increase the benefits from being optimistic,
and so agents are willing at the margin to tilt their subjective probabilities towards the
more favourable state. Managers do not, however, become excessively optimistic, for
example assign probability one to the more favourable state. This is because the incentive
to distort beliefs is constrained by the fact that managers are aware that distorted beliefs
induce distorted decisions, and this can be costly. It should be noted that this result is not
immediate in general equilibrium, since changes in rental returns and the decisions made
by consumers also affect the optimal beliefs chosen by the manager.
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This mechanism could be one important explanation of an equity price bubble. In
qualitative literature on bubbles, it is common for a bubble to be preceded by a positive
shock to expected fundamentals, including the development of new technologies such as
the railroad, radio, computing and the internet. The mechanism also offers insight into
the bust phase after a bubble as well. If, over time, it becomes evident that the objective
distribution of outcomes is not as favourable as first thought, then firms who update their
beliefs optimally could become pessimistic, reducing investment and the price of their
equity. 51
The previous results consider how beliefs respond endogenously to a change in the
objective distribution of technology, and how the change in beliefs in turn influences
equity prices, investment and output. I now consider the effects of an exogenous change in
preferences that affects beliefs. In particular, I consider how a perturbation to the weight
on memory utility, ε , affects equity prices and investment. Proposition (3.4) establishes
that an increase in ε induces under-investment and undervalued equity prices. Thus,
if managers are sufficiently concerned with the past, they can have an incentive to be
pessimistic in this model.
Proposition 3.4. Agents become pessimistic (over-optimistic) when the weight attached
to memory utility increases (decreases)
∂ IOE1
∂ε
< 0;
∂qOE1
∂ε
< 0
∂ p̂OEH
∂ε
< 0;
∂ p̂OEL
∂ε
> 0
3.5. Robustness and Welfare
51 The previous comparative static results of course reverse when considering negative perturbations to the
distribution of technology. With firm-led optimal expectations, reductions in the forecast for technology
(a decrease in ZL,ZH or pH ) can lead to under investment in capital and under-valuation in equity markets
when compared with an economy that has rational expectations.
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Household Determined Optimism or Pessimism
An appealing feature of the benchmark model is that the previous results are robust
if optimism or pessimism originates from households (in reduced form), rather than
from firms. Again, for simplicity, I assume that beliefs across households and firms are
symmetric. Proposition (3.5) establishes the main result.
Proposition 3.5. Re-consider the OE economy described in Definition 3.1. Suppose now
that:
1. Households optimally choose beliefs rather than investment firms;
2. Investment firms maximise shareholder value;
3. In the absence of a perturbation to the distribution of technology, households use
a rational probability measure; and
4. Households become optimistic (pessimistic) in response to favourable
(unfavourable) perturbations to the distribution of technology. That is, I assume
the reduced-form relationship
∂ p̂hH
∂x
> 0 for x ∈ ZL,ZH , pH
In such an economy, where beliefs are symmetric and determined by households, equity
prices, investment, output, labour supply and consumption growth all increase by more
in this reduced-form OE economy than in an RE economy in response to a favourable
change in the distribution of technology.
In view of this, the modelling device of firm optimism has the advantage that in a
symmetric equilibrium, the qualitative results obtained are isomorphic to an alternative
model in which households become optimistic or pessimistic in response to a shock
to the distribution of technology, and where this optimism or pessimism is transmitted
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to investment firms. Thus, irrespective of whether optimism or pessimism arises from
the managers of firms, whose beliefs influence those of shareholders, or from the
beliefs of shareholders that influence the investment decisions of the firm, the effects
on equity prices, investment, consumption growth, and output are qualitatively the same
for equilibria with symmetric beliefs.
A model with N-States
I now consider whether the results in the benchmark model, with symmetric beliefs that
are firm determined, generalise to a model where there are N possible realisations of
productivity in period 2 under the rational (true) probability measure. That is, the model
is generalised such that the distribution of technology is given by
F (z) =

0 if z < Z1∑ j−1
s=1 ps if Z j−1 ≤ z < Z j for j = 2, ...,n
1 if Zn ≤ z
where
∑N
s=1 ps = 1 and without loss of generality I order the possible realisations of
technology such that Z1 < Z2 < ... < ZN . Apart from allowing more possible states of
nature, the decision-making problems for households and firms are the same as those
previously discussed, with the exception that expectations terms, both subjective and
objective, are now probability weighted sums over s = 1,2, ...,N rather than s = L,H
(and to avoid any confusion in notation, I redefine consumption in the first period as C˜1
which is different to consumption in the second period, when state 1 is realised, now C1).
Definitions of OE and RE equilibriums generalise in a natural way with N states and are
reported in Appendix 7.5, as is the confirmation of the existence of these equilibria.
Proposition 3.6 establishes that all of the previous results, and much of the intuition, goes
through in a model with N states. In this case, I consider an increase in the realisation
of technology in any one given state, and (separately) a marginal shift in the mass
of objective probability from a low technology state to some higher technology state.
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Consistent with the previous findings, the results highlight that firms do become optimistic
when faced with a more favourable objective distribution of technology. Firms under
OE choose a unique subjective forecast for discounted investment returns that exceeds
the forecast mean that would be used under rational expectations. Again, assuming risk
aversion is low (σ < 1), over-investment and overvaluation in equity markets occur
relative to the corresponding RE equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6.
(a) A positive perturbation to realised productivity in one state leads to over-investment
and overvaluation in equity markets (assuming risk aversion is low), and an overly
optimistic forecast of the return to investment.
∂ IOE1
∂Zn
>
∂ IRE1
∂Zn
> 0
∂qOE1
∂Zn
>
∂qRE1
∂Zn
> 0
∂ Ê
(
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2
)
∂Zn
>
∂E
(
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2
)
∂Zn
> 0
if σ < 1 for n ∈ {1, ...,N}
(b) Consider a marginal shift in probability mass from some low productivity state (k) to a
higher productivity state ( j) (i.e. d p j =−d pk where j > k and j,k ∈ {1, ...,N} and fixing
d pn = 0 for all n 6= j,k). Investment and equity prices increase beyond their fundamental
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values, and again forecast investment returns are overly optimistic.
∂ IOE1
∂ p j
>
∂ IRE1
∂ p j
> 0
∂qOE1
∂ p j
>
∂qRE1
∂ p j
> 0
∂ Ê
(
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2
)
∂ p j
>
∂E
(
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2
)
∂ p j
> 0
if σ < 1
Welfare Implications
I now study some simple welfare implications associated with the OE economy.
Consistent with the assumption that investment-firm managers are risk neutral and paid
an arbitrarily small fraction of discounted firm profits, I assume that the social planner is
only concerned with maximising the welfare of households. I also assume that the social
planner does not optimise on beliefs, but takes their own beliefs as given. Given these
assumptions, the social planner chooses a vector of quantities that solves (again assuming
N states)
max
I1,C˜1,Cs,Ns
U
(
C˜1
)
+β
N∑
s=1
(U (Cs)−V (Ns)) p̂SPs
subject to:
Y1 ≥ C˜1+ I1+ψ
I21
2
Cs ≤ ZsIα1 N1−αs
given: Y1,Zs, p̂
SP
s (3.22)
where
{
p̂SPs
}N
s=1
is the exogenous probability measure held by the social planner.52
52 To keep the analysis simple, I also assume that the social planners beliefs are absolutely continuous with
respect to the objective probability measure
(
P̂SP ≺ P
)
.
73
Since households do not gain directly from optimism or pessimism, it follows naturally
that a social planner strictly prefers equilibria where investment firms’ beliefs coincide
with those of the planner (Proposition 3.7).
Proposition 3.7. A social planner using probability measure P̂SP ≺ P, prefers investment
firms that use any probability measure P̂≺ P that satisfies
N∑
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs
 p̂SPs = N∑
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs
 p̂s
where CSPs , R
SP
s = α
CSPs
ISP1
, C˜SP1 are obtained from the solutions to (3.22).
Two remarks are worth noting on this point. The first is that a social planner that shares
the probability measure optimally chosen by investment firms, whether distorted or not,
will have no incentive to change the decentralised equilibrium allocation of the OE
economy. Conditional on beliefs, all agents are acting in their own best interests. The
second is that a social planner that knows the true distribution of technology, and uses this
probability measure in evaluating household welfare, will strictly prefer investment firms
that have beliefs that are consistent with a rational forecast (expectation) of the discounted
investment return. Indeed, any equilibria where firms do not use a rational forecast of the
discounted investment return is in fact sub-optimal, from the perspective of households.53
Although it is in the interest of firm managers to be optimistic or pessimistic, this is not
in the direct interest of households.
The policy implications of this model are quite strong. A social planner that believes its
own forecast for investment returns are closer to that of the objective or true distribution of
technology, will have an incentive, all else constant, to use policy to correct any distortion
in investment and consumption decisions due to firm-led optimism or pessimism.
53 Expected household welfare here refers to the measure U
(
C˜1
)
+β
∑N
s=1 (U (Cs)−V (Ns)) ps.
74
3.6. Extending the Model Over Time
I now consider how the investment-firm problem can be extended over time, and
integrated in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Again, I define a rational
probability space {Ω,F ,P}, that is known by the investment manager, and subjective
probability space
{
Ω,F , P̂
}
on which the manager optimises under the restriction P̂≺ P.
The manager with an infinite horizon chooses an optimal subjective probability measure
P̂, and an investment sequence {It} solving
max
P̂,{It ,Kt+1}∞t=0
E
∞∑
t=0
β t
(
t∑
τ=1
ετφt−τ
(
Rt−τKt−τ − It−τ −Ψ
(
It−τ
Kt−τ
)
Kτ−τ
))
+E
∞∑
t=0
β tφt
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
+E
∞∑
t=0
β t
( ∞∑
τ=1
β τ Êtφt+τ
(
Rt+τKt+τ − It+τ −Ψ
(
It+τ
Kt+τ
)
Kt+τ
))
(3.23)
subject to:
P̂ is a well-defined probability space with P̂≺ P
It ,Kt+1 ∈ arg max
I˜t ,K˜t+1:K˜t+1=(1−δ )K˜t+I˜t
Ê0
∞∑
t=0
β tφt
(
RtK˜t− I˜t−Ψ
(
I˜t
K˜t
)
K˜t
)
φt ≡
U ′ (Ct)
U ′ (C0)
K0 = K˜0: given (3.24)
where the constraint
P̂ is a well-defined probability space with P̂≺ P
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is equivalent to the constraints
1 =
∑
st+1
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)≥ 0
P̂r
(
st+τ | st
)
=
τ∏
j=1
P̂r
(t)(
st+ j | st+ j−1
)
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)
= 0 if Pr
(
st+1 | st
)
= 0
for all t, and for all τ ≥ 1
and where st ∈ Ω is the state of the economy at time t, and st ∈ Ω is the history of the
economy at time t.
There are two important features to note in the infinite horizon version of the
investment-firm problem. The first is that the anticipatory component of felicity
in period t is given by
∑∞
τ=1β
τ Êtφt+τ
(
Rt+τKt+τ − It+τ −Ψ
(
It+τ
Kt+τ
)
Kt+τ
)
, and so
manager welfare is now a function of the discounted sum of the entire stream of
anticipated future profits. The memory component of felicity in period t is given by∑t
τ=1 ε
τφt−τ
(
Rt−τKt−τ − It−τ −Ψ
(
It−τ
Kt−τ
)
Kτ−τ
)
, and is a discounted sum of weighted
profits earned in all previous periods back to time t = 0. Apart from the richer dynamics
incorporated in the above specification, the intuition behind both anticipatory and
memory utility is directly analogous to the intuition discussed previously. An investment
managers’ felicity in period t is a function of both past and anticipated future payoffs.54
Nonetheless, with a richer dynamic structure the manager now must not only optimise
about their beliefs over tomorrow, but also beliefs in all future periods. In general this
problem is considerably more complex. To obtain insight into this problem I have assumed
54 Note the parametrisation of the objective used is consistent with that used by Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005). It ensures that managers are, in the absence of shocks to preferences, time consistent in
their valuation of alternative profit streams. For more detail, see Caplin and Leahy (2004) for discussions
of prospective and retrospective time consistency.
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in the formulation of (3.24), consistent with Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), that firm
managers are able to commit to their optimal beliefs (subjective probability measure,
P̂) at time 0 and do not re-optimise on their beliefs over time. That is, I study the full
commitment solution. This ensures that a Law of Iterated Expectations will hold over
subjective beliefs, and that the problem can alternatively be interpreted as the selection of
an optimal prior with Bayesian updating.
An appealing feature of OE on the part of investment firms under commitment (3.24), is
that there exists a recursive solution for investment that is given by the following modified
investment Euler equation
Proposition 3.8. Under full-commitment with ε < β−1, and assuming that the optimal
investment decision is conceivable (i.e. it is a an investment decision that can be optimally
chosen under the restriction P̂≺ P), an interior solution to the program (3.24) is given by
qt =
β
βε
Et
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
+
(1−βε)
βε
Ψ′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
− (1−βε)
βε
βEt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
Ψ′′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
K2t+2
K2t+1
)
(3.25)
qt ≡ 1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It
K0 : given
This will characterise the investment decision made under optimal expectations, provided
there exists a set of optimally chosen beliefs, P̂, satisfying
qt = β Êt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
and P̂ is a well-defined probability measure with P̂≺ P
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To understand the intuition behind (3.25), it is helpful to compare the above investment
Euler equation with the Euler equation that would be obtained if a rational probability
measure were used when investing
qt = Et
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
Intuitively, the effects on the Euler equation look analogous to that identified in the two-
period model previously discussed. The presence of anticipation provides an incentive
for optimism because the manager attains felicity today from being optimistic about the
future. This shows up as an extra perceived fillip to the return from investment captured
by the term55
(1−βε)
 U ′ (Ct)Ψ′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
−βEt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)Ψ
′′( It+1
Kt+1
)
K2t+2
K2t+1
)

In contrast, memory acts a constraining factor on the incentive to be optimistic. By valuing
the past more, agents prefer to have higher profits today because the benefits of doing so
will carry forward in to future periods. Thus, ε , again acts as scaling factor on the marginal
cost of investment given by
βεU ′ (Ct)qt
At the optimum, the manager optimally trades the gains from optimism with the costs
of distorted decision-making. Importantly, it should be noted that as the cost of distorted
decision-making is scaled upwards through a higher memory weight, that is as ε → β−1
from below, these costs will the offset gains from optimism, and so in the limit OE
converges to RE as the memory weight approaches β−1.
In principle, this dynamic version of investment under optimal expectations could be
integrated in certain classes of DSGE models such as an RBC model with investment
adjustment costs and consumption habits, which has had success empirically (see
55 To see this multiply both sides of Equation (3.25) by βεU ′ (Ct).
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for example Jermann 1998). Or, alternatively, in New Keynesian DSGE models that
have become popular in recent literature (see for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans 2005).
In view of the fact that in the simple two-period economy optimal expectations on the
part of firms and households amplified the effects of technology shocks on equity prices,
investment and output when compared with rational expectations, there is scope for this
also to be true in a fully dynamic infinite horizon model. I leave this as an area for
further investigation. However, if it is true that OE amplifies investment and equity price
responses to shocks quantitatively in a model with an infinite horizon, then this could be
useful for resolving puzzles such as the excess volatility observed in equity prices and
investment, and the equity premium puzzle.
3.7. Conclusion
This chapter has considered whether optimism or pessimism that is in the interest of
economic decision-makers, here the investment firm, could be a plausible explanation for
periods in which equity prices appear overvalued or undervalued relative to a model with
rational expectations. Qualitatively, optimal expectations on the part of investment firms
can amplify the effects of fundamental shocks and can explain periods of overvaluation
in equity markets and over-investment in physical capital, when compared with a more
standard rational expectations economy. Quantitatively, whether firm driven optimal
expectations performs well (or not), appears to be an empirical question that deserves
further consideration.
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Chapter 4
Does Equity Mispricing Influence
Household and Firm Decisions?
4.1. Introduction
The existence of fads or bubbles in equity prices has been a question long debated by
economists. Notable historical episodes of mispricing in equity markets that have been
identified include the South Sea Bubble, the Great Railway Bubble, and the US Roaring
Twenties. More recent examples of apparent bubbles include Japan’s equity and property
markets in the 1980s, and the US dot-com boom in the late 1990s. In view of these
experiences, there has been ongoing interest in the extent to which equity price bubbles
distort economic decision-making. However, somewhat surprisingly, there remains only
a limited literature that attempts to quantify the effects of mispricing in equity markets on
household and firm decisions.56
To provide insight into this question, this chapter focuses on identifying the quantitative
effects of equity market mispricing on household consumption and portfolio allocation
decisions, and firm dividend policies. If mispricing in equity markets exists, the distortion
of price signals associated with household wealth held in the form of equity can affect
household consumption and portfolio allocation decisions. In addition, mispricing can
potentially affect corporate dividend policies. For example, if prices reflect that firms
have overly optimistic expectations regarding their future profitability and investment
opportunities, this optimism can lead firms to alter their dividend payment decisions.
I focus on whether these effects are economically significant. That is, do households
56 Examples of such literature include Chirinko and Schaller (2001) and Gilchrist et al (2005), both of
which focus on the effects of bubbles on firms’ investment decisions.
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consume more or less during a bubble, purchase more or less equity, and do firms change
their dividend policies?
There is an extensive literature that seeks to test or identify the existence of equity price
bubbles.57 However, rather than focusing on tests of existence, this chapter takes the
view that mispricing shocks exist, and then explores their effect on economic decision-
making. It builds on ideas that have previously been used to identify mispricing shocks,
including the idea that these shocks should be viewed as transitory58 and that there exist
observable proxies that are correlated with mispricing, but uncorrelated with changes in
fundamentals.59 The contribution is to show how both of these ideas can be incorporated
in a simple estimation framework that permits analysis of the effects of equity market
mispricing.
Using data for the United States, I estimate a system that allows identification of
the effects of mispricing shocks on household consumption and portfolio allocation
decisions, firm dividend decisions, and equity prices. The proxies for mispricing that
I consider are a measure of analyst forecast dispersion (see Diether et al (2002);
Gilchrist et al (2005)), a survey measure of perceived misvaluation (see Shiller (2000b)),
and a measure of expected short-term volatility in equity prices. Importantly, these proxies
provide information for identifying equity mispricing that is useful in the case that they
are correlated with mispricing, but uncorrelated with shocks to fundamentals.
The identification approach suggested in this chapter is informative for several reasons.
The first is that it does not rely on the restriction that mispricing has no effect on
economic decisions a priori, and is therefore well equipped to identify the effects
of bubbles.60 A second advantage is that the method proposed here does not require
57 See, for example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) and Gu¨rkaynak (2008) for reviews of this literature.
58 For example, this is implicit in the work of Lee (1998). Transitory shocks are defined in this chapter
as perturbations that can affect short- but not long-run forecasts. In contrast, permanent shocks are
innovations that can influence both short- and long-run forecasts.
59 See, for example, Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) and Gilchrist et al (2005).
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a unique model of the fundamental structure of the economy. In econometric terms,
identifying the effects of the non-fundamental transitory (mispricing) shock does not
require identification of the permanent (fundamental) shocks to the system. From this
perspective, the methodology proposed can be considered consistent within a class of
economic models of fundamentals, rather than requiring a unique model of fundamentals
to be identified.
Importantly, the restrictions imposed for identification are made explicit. This is in
contrast to statistical approaches used to identify bubbles where the restrictions imposed
can be opaque, and the ability to identify the effects of bubbles on economic decisions
remains unclear.61
The next section outlines related empirical literature. Section 4.3 outlines the estimation
methodology and the approach to identification. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 are concerned with
the empirical application and the main results. Section 4.6 considers robustness, and some
conclusions are drawn in the final section.
4.2. Related Literature and Approaches
One approach to identifying equity price bubbles and their effects is to take a stand on a
specific model that describes the evolution of the economy. This includes a specific model
for equity prices, and possibly a model of the process underlying an equity price bubble
as well. Once the model has been specified, econometric tests for the presence of bubbles
can be undertaken. Reviews that summarise this literature include Gu¨rkaynak (2008),
concerning rational bubbles, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), covering the literature in
behavioural finance.
60 This is in contrast to previous literature, such as Lee (1998), which assumes that mispricing has no real
effects.
61 Helbling and Terrones (2003) and Detken and Smets (2004) are examples of purely statistical approaches
that measure reduced-form correlations between bubbles and economic variables of interest.
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One advantage of such a structural approach to identification is that the restrictions used
are made explicit and can often be tested. However, as noted by Gu¨rkaynak, a common
criticism of these hypothesis tests is that they are unable to distinguish between a test
for a bubble, and a test of the model assumed as part of the maintained hypothesis.
Accordingly, the validity of any results obtained are contingent on the reader accepting the
economic model proposed as the correct one. If there was a strong consensus concerning
the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ model for the economy and equity pricing this would not be too
problematic. However, given a lack of consensus over these issues, it has been difficult
for any one structural approach to remain convincing in its ability to detect a bubble.
An alternative approach to identifying bubbles is to use a purely statistical or atheoretical
approach. Examples of this approach include Helbling and Terrones (2003), Detken and
Smets (2004), and Machado and Sousa (2006). The advantage of atheoretical approaches
is that they may be less subject to model misspecification, since they do not rely on any
particular assumed model, and can be useful for summarising correlations in the data.
However, there remains much scepticism of their ability to identify the effects of bubbles
on economic decisions more precisely. This stems from the property that these procedures
do not appear well-equipped to distinguish between different sources of movements in
equity prices, and thus a boom or bust in equity prices that is identified as a bubble could
just as likely reflect improved or worsening fundamentals.
A third approach in the literature, which is closest to this chapter, is to use some mix
of the structural and statistical approaches. Rather than specifying a tight or unique
economic model for fundamentals or bubbles, a weaker set of economic restrictions,
consistent with economic theory, is used. These restrictions still provide sufficiently
rich information to enable the researcher to get closer to identifying the effects of
an equity price bubble, but help to avoid criticisms associated with model specificity.
Previous literature in this vein, though not always concerned with identifying the effects of
equity market mispricing, includes Cochrane (1994), Lee (1995, 1998), Gallagher (1999),
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Gallagher and Taylor (2000), Chirinko and Schaller (2001) and Gilchrist et al (2005). This
chapter contributes to this literature by providing an informative alternative approach to
identifying episodes of mispricing in equity markets, and by providing additional evidence
on the effects of this mispricing on economic decisions.
4.3. Estimation Methodology
I use two ideas to identify the effects of equity mispricing. The first is that equity
mispricing should only have transitory economic effects (see, for example, Lee (1998)).
Such an assumption appears reasonable from a theoretical standpoint, given that many
economists have the prior that equity prices are not entirely disconnected from the
fundamental processes underpinning the economy. If the converse were true, and
mispricing shocks had permanent effects, then equity prices would effectively be
indeterminate and have no relationship with the underlying value of the dividend streams
they pay.
The second idea is that there is observable information that can be used to distinguish
between fundamental and non-fundamental transitory shocks. This reasoning follows a
recent literature which argues that there are observables that are correlated with equity
market mispricing, and that are uncorrelated with measures of economic fundamentals,
see, for example, Diether et al (2002) and Gilchrist et al (2005).
I use these two ideas, in conjunction with a cointegration framework implied by economic
theory, to identify the effects of equity mispricing shocks. More specifically, I use five
economic relationships to motivate the empirical work in this chapter. The first is an
accumulation equation for aggregate household wealth
Wt+1 =
(
1+Rwt+1
)
(Wt−Ct)
where Wt is beginning of period wealth, Ct is total flow consumption in the period, and
Rwt+1 is the return to total wealth. This formulation assumes that the market value of
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human capital is tradeable and included in aggregate wealth. This assumption simplifies
exposition, but is an assumption that can be relaxed without substantively affecting any
of the analysis that follows (see Lettau and Ludvigson (2004)). The second relationship
used is that household wealth can be decomposed into its respective equity, non-equity,
and human capital components
Wt = Et +Nt +Ht
where Et is total equity wealth held by households, Nt is total non-equity wealth (such as
housing, consumer durables, and other forms of financial non-equity wealth), and Ht is
human capital. The third and fourth relationships used are an accumulation equation for
tradeable human capital, and the definition of equity wealth
Ht+1 =
(
1+Rht+1
)
(Ht−Yt)
Et = Qt (Pt +Dt)
where Rht+1 is the return to human capital, Yt is labour income, Qt is the quantity of equity
held, Pt is the ex-dividend price of equity, and Dt is the dividend paid on equity held in
period t. The final relationship used is the definition of the return to equity, Ret+1, where
1+Ret+1 =
Pt+1+Dt+1
Pt
Using arguments that are similar to those used by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Lettau
and Ludvigson (2004, 2005) and Kishor (2007), I log-linearise these relationships,
assuming a balanced growth path, and obtain the following economic system62
62 In taking these approximations, I assume that each variable in the system can be normalised by an
appropriate trend (for example, the level of productivity or another variable that captures the long-run
growth rate of the economy), and that limit terms associated with iterating these relationships forwards
are small (of second-order). I omit linearisation constants and growth rates in unobserved trends in the
above approximations.
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ct−wt ≈
∞∑
i=1
ρ iw
(
rwt+i−∆ct+i
)
(4.1)
wt ≈ ωeet +ωnnt +ωhht (4.2)
yt−ht ≈
∞∑
i=1
ρ ih
(
rht+i−∆yt+i
)
(4.3)
et ≈ qt +ρd pt +(1−ρd)dt (4.4)
dt− pt ≈
∞∑
i=1
ρ i−1d
(
ret+i−∆dt+i
)
(4.5)
where lower case variables denote natural logarithms,63 ωe, ωn and ωh are the steady
state shares of equity, non-equity and human capital wealth in total wealth respectively,
ρw is the steady state share of savings in total wealth, ρh is one minus the share of labour
income in steady state human capital, and ρd is the steady state ratio of the ex-dividend
equity price to the equity price that includes dividends. It should be noted that the system
defined by Equations (4.1) to (4.5) contains two variables that are not directly observable,
human capital wealth and total household wealth. To account for this, I substitute human
capital and total wealth out of the above system to obtain64
ct−ωeet−ωnnt−ωhyt ≈
∞∑
i=1
ρ iw
(
rwt+i−ωhrht+i−∆ct+i+ωh∆yt+i
)
(4.6)
et ≈ qt +ρd pt +(1−ρd)dt (4.7)
dt− pt ≈
∞∑
i=1
ρ i−1d
(
ret+i−∆dt+i
)
(4.8)
Assuming that consumption, the quantity of equity held, non-equity wealth, equity prices,
labour income, and dividends are integrated of order one, and that returns to total financial
63 Note for any of the return variables I use the notation rt+i ≡ ln(1+ rt+i).
64 Without loss of generality, I assume when making these substitutions that ρw = ρh.
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wealth, human capital wealth and equity wealth are stationary, it follows that Equations
(4.6) to (4.8) make up a cointegrated system with two cointegrating vectors.
It should be made clear that Equations (4.6) to (4.8) make up a partially specified
economic system. Additional model structure, for example including an Euler equation
for consumption or an equity pricing equation, could potentially imply more restrictions
or additional cointegrating relationships in this system. I choose not to include such
structure given existing disagreement over the ‘correct’ model for either consumption
or equity prices. Instead, I use the above framework as a motivation for modelling a
system consistent with Equations (4.6) to (4.8), and use empirical analysis to determine
the number of cointegrating relationships. I do not impose any model-specific restrictions
that could otherwise be incorporated.
A general econometric representation that is consistent with Equations (4.6) to (4.8) is the
structural vector error correction model (SVECM)
A0∆yt =−α∗β ′yt−1−A(L)∆yt + εt (4.9)
where yt is an n× 1 vector of observables, yt =
[
ct dt nt yt qt pt
]′
, A(L) is a
lag polynomial of order l, β ′ is the matrix of cointegrating vectors, and α∗ the matrix of
loading coefficients on the cointegrating vectors.65 I assume A0 is non-singular and that
α∗β ′ has rank r < n so that at least one cointegrating vector exists. The εt are the primitive
structural shocks. I assume these shocks are independently identically distributed, with
E (εt) = 0 and
E
(
εtε
′
τ
)
=
 Ω if τ = t0 otherwise (4.10)
65 Note I substitute et out of the system in Equations (4.6) to (4.8) in the analysis that follows.
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where Ω is a diagonal matrix (with elements that are not necessarily equal).66 The εt
are the underlying structural shocks that I am in interested in identifying. Specifically,
I wish to identify the elements of εt that only have transitory effects, and in particular,
non-fundamental transitory effects.
It should be noted that the structural shocks being serially uncorrelated is not necessarily
a restrictive assumption in the current context. In particular, Equation (4.9) can be viewed
as a finite-order approximation of a model in which the structural shocks are serially
correlated (see, for example, Lu¨tkepohl (2006)). That is, Equation (4.9) can be viewed as
an approximation of a SVECM with moving average errors,
A0∆yt =−α∗β ′yt−1+νt (4.11)
νt =Ψ(L)νt−1+ εt
where Ψ(L) is an infinite-order lag polynomial. In this model, transitory mispricing
disturbances in νt can be serially correlated with permanent shocks to fundamentals, an
assumption that is consistent with the idea that permanent shocks to fundamentals, such
as permanent changes in technology, can precede mispricing in the equity market. In the
analysis that follows, I focus on estimating Equation (4.9), which can be interpreted as a
finite-order approximation of Equation (4.11).67
Identification of Reduced-form Shocks
To distinguish between the reduced-form transitory and permanent shocks in Equation
(4.9), I follow a re-parameterisation of the approach to identification suggested by Pagan
and Pesaran (2008). Without loss of generality, I order the permanent and transitory
66 Rather than assuming E
(
εtε
′
t
)
= I, I impose normalisation (unity) restrictions on the main diagonal of
A0.
67 Lu¨tkepohl (2006) provides a review of the regularity conditions under which such an approximation will
be valid.
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shocks according to
εt =
 εPt
εTt

where εPt is a (n− r) × 1 vector of shocks with permanent effects(
limk→∞
∂Et(yt+k)
∂
(
εPt
)′ 6= 0n×n−r
)
, and εTt is a r× 1 vector of shocks that have transitory
effects
(
limk→∞
∂Et(yt+k)
∂
(
εTt
)′ = 0n×r
)
.68 Since I assume that mispricing shocks have only
transitory effects on the system, a mispricing shock must be an element of εTt .
I proceed by estimating Equation (4.9) using limited information methods. The first
step is to obtain a consistent estimate of the cointegrating matrix, β (or use the known
cointegration matrix in the case that β is known). Importantly, as emphasised by Pagan
and Pesaran, only a consistent estimate of the cointegration space – the column space
of β ,
{
βQ : Q′β ′yt ∼ I (0) ; given yt ∼ I (1) and Q non-singular
}
– is required since
the instrumental variable (IV) methods described below are invariant to non-singular
transformations. A consistent estimate of this space can be obtained, for example, from
the Johansen full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of the reduced form
of Equation (4.9) or using alternative system methods discussed by Lu¨tkepohl (2006).
Assuming a consistent estimate of β is available, I partition Equation (4.9) into a system
of n− r equations with permanent shocks, εPt , and r remaining equations with transitory
shocks εTt A011 A012
A021 A
0
22

 ∆y1t
∆y2t
=−α∗β ′
 y1t−1
y2t−1
−
 A211 A212
A221 A
2
22

 ∆y1t−1
∆y2t−1
+
 εPt
εTt

(4.12)
and I assume, without loss of generality, that A(L) = A2L. This assumption abstracts from
lag dynamics that do not affect the generality of the identification approach proposed.
68 The fact that the number of transitory shocks is equal to the number of cointegrating vectors is an
implication of the Granger representation theorem. Lu¨tkepohl (2006) provides a useful review.
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Since I previously assumed E
(
εtε
′
t
)
= Ω, where Ω is a diagonal matrix, I impose n
normalisation restrictions on the main diagonals of A011 and A
0
22. I further assume that
A011 is non-singular. With these assumptions, a simple matrix premultiplication yields I A˜012
A021 A
0
22

 ∆y1t
∆y2t
=−
 α˜∗1
α∗2
β ′
 y1t−1
y2t−1

−
 A˜211 A˜212
A221 A
2
22

 ∆y1t−1
∆y2t−1
+
 uPt
εTt
 (4.13)
where
uPt =
(
A011
)−1
εPt , A˜
0
12 =
(
A011
)−1
A012
α˜∗1 =
(
A011
)−1
α∗1 , A˜
2
1 j =
(
A011
)−1
A21 j for j = 1,2
The above premultiplication is useful because it allows identification of transitory shocks,
without requiring identification of the permanent shocks to the system. That is, I
only identify linear combinations of the permanent shocks, uPt , and not the underlying
permanent structural shocks, εPt .
Using the result that lagged error correction terms should not be present in the structural
permanent equations, α∗1 = 0,69 one can use these restrictions to estimate the first n− r
permanent equations in Equation (4.13). Specifically, this set of restrictions implies that
the r×1 vector ξt−1 = β ′yt−1 can be used as instruments for the vector ∆y2t . And so, the
first n− r permanent equations
∆y1t =−A˜012∆y2t− A˜211∆y1t−1− A˜212∆y2t−1+uPt (4.14)
69 This result is derived in Pagan and Pesaran (2008) with respect to Equation (4.12), and is consistent with
the ordering of permanent and transitory shocks.
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can be estimated using standard IV methods. This provides consistent estimates of the
reduced-form matrices A˜012, A˜
2
11 and A˜
2
12, and the reduced-form permanent shocks, u
P
t .
To estimate the remaining r transitory equations
A022∆y2t =−A021∆y1t−α∗2ξt−1−A221∆y1t−1−A222∆y2t−1+ εTt (4.15)
I can now use the consistent estimates, ûPt , as instruments for the endogenous variables
in ∆y1t (see Pagan and Pesaran (2008)). This would enable identification of the reduced-
form transitory shocks,
(
A022
)−1
εTt , but to identify the structural transitory shocks, ε
T
t , it
is clear that additional restrictions are required.
Identification of Structural Transitory Shocks
Focusing on the transitory equations in Equation (4.15), recall that I have already imposed
r normalisation (unity) restrictions on the main diagonal of A022. Since I have previously
assumed that transitory shocks are uncorrelated (see Equation 4.10), this implies that
an additional r (r−1)/2 additional restrictions are required to be able to identify the
structural shocks, εTt . Although one could proceed by imposing additional restrictions
on the elements of A022, or using restrictions on any of A
0
21, α
∗
2 , A
2
21 or A
2
22,
70 in some
applications such restrictions may not be appealing on theoretical grounds. This is
the case, for example, when attempting to distinguish between fundamental and non-
fundamental transitory shocks as considered in the empirical application below.
Instead, I assume there exists additional observable information available to the researcher
that allows identification of εTt , or at least some of the elements in this transitory shock
vector. Specifically, I assume that Equation (4.15) can be partitioned in a form that is
70 This is the approach followed by Pagan and Pesaran (2008) after fully identifying the effects of
permanent shocks.
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consistent with the presence of an (r−1)× 1 vector of fundamental transitory shocks,
ε f ,Tt , and a single non-fundamental transitory shock, ε
b,T
t ,
71
 A0,2211 a0,2212
a0,2221 1

 ∆y21t
∆y22t
=−

[
A021
]
1[
A021
]
2
∆y1t−

[
A222
]
1[
A222
]
2

 ∆y21t−1
∆y22t−1

−

[
A221
]
1[
A221
]
2
∆y1t−1−
 [α∗2]1[
α∗2
]
2
ξt−1+
 ε f ,Tt
εb,Tt

(4.16)
I further assume there exists an observable instrument (or set of instruments) Zt =[
z′1t , ...,z
′
kt
]′
, a k×1 vector (k ≥ 1), with the properties that,
E
(
zitε
b,T
t
)
6= 0
E
(
zitε
f ,T
t
)
= 0
E
(
zitε
P
t
)
= 0n−r×1
for i = 1, ...,k (4.17)
That is, there exists one or more instruments for equity prices growth that are correlated
with mispricing shocks, and contemporaneously uncorrelated with either fundamental
transitory or permanent shocks.72 Assuming A0,2211 is non-singular, again using a simple
premultiplication of Equation (4.16) yields
71 I use the notation that Axi j
r×r
=

[
Axi j
]
1
r−1×r[
Axi j
]
2
1×r
. A similar partition is used with respect to α∗.
72 To be clear, only the first two conditions are required for identification. I use the stronger requirement
E
(
zitε
P
t
)
= 0n−r×1 since the proxies for mispricing have desirable properties when used as instruments
in estimating the permanent equations.
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 Ir−1 a˜0,2212
a0,2221 1

 ∆y21t
∆y22t
=−

[
A˜021
]
1[
A021
]
2
∆y1t−

[
A˜222
]
1[
A222
]
2

 ∆y21t−1
∆y22t−1

−

[
A˜221
]
1[
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This system can be estimated using a method analogous to that used for the permanent
equations. Specifically, one can estimate the first r−1 transitory equations using ûPt and
Zt as instruments for ∆y1t and ∆y22t respectively. The residuals û
f ,T
t and û
P
t can then be
used as instruments for ∆y21t and ∆y1t when estimating the final transitory equation.
In sum, this procedure enables identification of the structural mispricing shock,
εb,Tt , including associated impulse response functions and forecast error variance
decompositions that identify the effects of this shock. If alternative instruments, or valid
restrictions can be imposed to identify the effects of fundamental transitory shocks, then
these too can be used. However, such restrictions are not required to identity the effects
of the mispricing shock.
In the empirical application that follows I eliminate Equation (4.7) from Equations (4.6) to
(4.8) and order the vector of observables such that yt =
[
ct dt nt yt qt pt
]′
, and
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so y1t =
[
ct dt nt yt
]′
and y2t =
[
qt pt
]′
. That is, there are two cointegrating
vectors (transitory shocks) in the system (n = 6,r = 2),73 and I assume that these shocks
have direct effects on the quantity and price of equity held by households, and indirect
effects on consumption, dividends, non-equity worth and labour income. The latter
variables are also those directly perturbed by permanent fundamental shocks.
4.4. Empirical Application
Data and Preliminary Analysis
For estimation I use quarterly data for the United States, covering the sample period
from June 1986 to December 2006 when either forecast dispersion or option-implied
equity volatility are used as instruments for mispricing (the Zt in the methodology
described above), or from December 1988 to June 2010 when using the direct survey
measure of overvaluation as an instrument. The starting points of these samples reflect
data availability on the instruments used for mispricing. The different end points of these
samples allow for a comparison of the results with and without the effects of the financial
crisis that emerged in 2007.
Following Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), I use household flow consumption of non-
durables (excluding clothing and footwear) as a measure of household consumption, and
real household after-tax labour income as the measure of income obtained from human
capital.74 Although it would be ideal to use a measure of the total flow services from
consumption, excluding durable expenditures, this measure is not directly observed.75 To
measure the cost of purchasing a unit of US equity (equity prices) I use the share price
of Vanguard’s S&P 500 ETF measured at the end of the quarter.76 This measure provides
a good proxy for the cost of purchasing a diversified equity portfolio that replicates the
73 This is confirmed by cointegration matrix rank tests (see Appendix 8.2).
74 For a more detailed description of the data, see Appendix 8.1.
75 See Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) for further discussion.
76 The results are very similar if the US S&P 500 index is used.
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US S&P 500. I use a seasonally adjusted quarterly dividend measure, also measured with
respect to the US S&P 500.
US Flow of Funds Accounts data are used to separate US household net financial wealth
into its domestic equity and non-domestic-equity components. I focus on domestic equity
because I am interested in studying the effects of mispricing in the US equity market.77
To construct a measure of household wealth held in US equity, I multiply total household
equity holdings (which includes both domestic and foreign components) by the proportion
of equity held by all sectors (households and corporate) in US equity. This assumes that
the household portfolio share allocations to domestic and foreign equity are similar to the
allocations held across the total US private sector.78 Household non-US-equity net wealth
(hereafter non-equity net wealth) is a residual defined as total household net financial
wealth less holdings of domestic equity. To construct an internally consistent measure of
the quantity of equity held by US households (equity quantities), I divide the domestic
equity holdings measure by the share price measure defined above.79
In terms of observable information used to distinguish between fundamental and non-
fundamental transitory shocks, I consider three measures. The first is a measure of analyst
forecast dispersion with respect to the US S&P 500, obtained from the Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Specifically, I use the weighted average standard
deviation of analysts long-term average growth in earning per share forecasts for the US
S&P 500.80 The second instrument considered is a measure of option-implied equity
volatility. In particular, I use implied 30-day volatility for the US S&P 100 as traded
77 The preceding theoretical discussion can be appropriately modified to account for the fact that US
households own both domestic and foreign equity.
78 This assumption is required since data on domestic and foreign equity portfolio allocations are only
reported for all US sectors, and not specifically for households.
79 Both the non-equity net wealth and equity quantities measures are lagged one quarter to be consistent
with their beginning of period values used in the theory previously discussed.
80 This index is constructed by weighting the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (of long-term average
growth in earnings per share) for each firm in the US S&P 500. The weights used reflect the market
capitalisation of each firm in the total index.
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on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (with ticker VXO). I use this measure because
longer time series are available than for implied 30-day volatility for the US S&P 500
(the VIX), but both measures are highly correlated and the results obtained are not
sensitive to this choice over a common sample. The third measure I use is a direct survey
measure of perceived over-valuation in the US equity market obtained from surveys of
US institutional investors and sourced from the Yale School of Management (see also
Shiller (2000b)).81 The rationale for using each of these measures as instruments for
equity prices growth is discussed further below.
Consumption, non-equity net wealth, equity quantities and real after-tax labour income
are all in per capita log terms, and data on equity prices and dividends are in log terms.
All data, with the exception of equity quantities, consumption and the instruments for
mispricing, are deflated by the US personal consumption expenditure deflator.82 All data
used in estimation are measured at a quarterly frequency.
Before proceeding with the proposed identification methodology, it is important to
establish that a cointegration framework is in fact a suitable representation of the data.
For pre-testing I use all available data on the endogenous variables (yt) from March 1953
to June 2010, to ensure accurate inference. Unit root tests are consistent with each of
the data series being I (1), and standard information criteria are consistent with two lags
in a levels VAR (a VECM with a single lag). Tests of whether the data are cointegrated
(the rank of the cointegration matrix) suggest two cointegrating vectors in the data.83 All
pre-testing results are reported in Appendix 8.2.
Turning to estimation of the cointegration matrix, β ′ =
[
β ′1 : β
′
2
]
, I restrict attention to
the main samples used for estimation, from June 1986 to December 2006 and December
81 I am most grateful to Robert Shiller and the Yale School of Management for making these data available.
82 Consumption of non-durables (excluding clothing and footwear) is deflated by its own implicit price
deflator. See Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) for further detail.
83 Rank tests yield similar results if performed on the main estimation sample, from June 1986 to December
2006. All tests allow for an unrestricted constant in the cointegration model.
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1988 to June 2010. Since it is well known that cointegration estimates are more precise
if all known information is used by the researcher in estimation, I restrict the second
cointegrating vector to have one and minus one coefficients on dividends and equity
prices respectively, β ′2 = [ 0 1 0 0 0 −1 ]. This implies that the log dividend to
equity price ratio is stationary, which is consistent with the theory described above and is
a common assumption that has been used in previous empirical research.84
Estimating the cointegration matrix, subject to the above restriction, the first cointegrating
vector has coefficients β̂ ′1986−20061 = [ 1 −0.03 −0.08 −0.51 −0.12 −0.08 ]
in the sample from June 1986 to December 2006, and β̂ ′1988−20101 =
[ 1 −0.03 −0.04 −0.54 −0.13 −0.07 ] in the sample from December 1988
to June 2010.85 These coefficients are consistent with economic theory, with human
capital estimated to be the largest share of wealth, and the sum of the coefficients on
equity prices and dividends being almost identical to the coefficient on equity quantities
(as implied by the previous theoretical motivation). These estimates are also comparable
to estimates of the same cointegrating relationship – that do not distinguish between the
US equity and non-US equity components of wealth – using single-equation methods,
see, for example, Lettau and Ludvigson (2004). In the analysis that follows, I use
β̂ ′x =
[
β̂ ′x1 β
′
2
]
for x = {1986−2006,1988−2010} as a consistent estimate of
the true cointegration space of the data in each sample, identified up to a non-singular
transformation.
Identification
In view of the fact that the estimation methodology in Section 4.3 relies on IV techniques,
it is important to establish that the instruments used are both relevant and valid.86 This is
especially so for the instruments used for equity prices growth, that enable identification
84 See, for example, Campbell and Shiller (1987), Cochrane (1994) and Lee (1998) amongst others.
85 Specifically, I use FIML (Johansen’s approach), subject to the restrictions that the rank of β is two and
that β ′2 is known. The coefficients in β1 are identified up to a linear scaling factor.
86 Sarte (1997) provides a useful discussion in the context of structural vector autoregressions.
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of fundamental and non-fundamental transitory shocks. I first address the question of
instrument relevance, before turning to the issue of validity, for each of the instruments in
turn.
The rationale for forecast dispersion being correlated with bubbles is that greater
heterogeneity in analysts expectations could be consistent with mispricing in equity
markets if some analysts are unable (or unwilling) to execute trades that reflect this
greater divergence of opinion. For example, a constraint on short-selling is one frequently
cited market or institutional constraint that would be consistent with greater heterogeneity
implying equity mispricing (see, for example, Diether et al (2002) and the references
cited therein). However, other explanations such as the existence of heterogenous
investors, including rational and non-rational investors, and the inability of rational
investors to co-ordinate their actions could also imply a correlation between forecast
dispersion and mispricing (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003)). Furthermore, heterogenous optimism (Brunnermeier and Parker
2005), and the incentive for informed advisors to inflate their forecasts of fundamentals
(Hong et al 2008), are also economic environments that can support a correlation between
forecast dispersion and mispricing in the equity market.
In terms of exogeneity, Diether et al (2002) and Gilchrist et al (2005) argue that forecast
dispersion is unlikely to be correlated with the fundamental investment opportunities
available to firms. The underlying assumption is that shocks that affect mean forecasts for
earnings and equity prices are not systematically correlated with shocks to the variance
of these forecasts. For example, Diether et al (2002) provide evidence supporting the
view that forecast dispersion in earnings per share is a useful instrument for equity prices
growth in the US context. These authors highlight that on average companies with higher
forecast dispersion for their earnings tend to have low future returns. According to the
authors, this pattern is consistent with an interpretation where over-confidence or over-
optimism on the part of some investors can lead to overpricing when combined with
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market, institutional or information constraints on non-optimistic investors. Alternatively,
such a correlation is inconsistent with an interpretation where fundamental shocks
to uncertainty are driving the correlation between equity prices growth and forecast
dispersion.
Gilchrist et al (2005) also use forecast dispersion as an instrument for mispricing in the
US equity market. They argue that forecast dispersion is a better measure of mispricing
than other proxies for bubbles that have been suggested in previous literature, such as
lagged prices or market to book valuations. The latter measures are thought more likely
to be affected by the investment opportunities available to firms, and thus are more likely
to be correlated with fundamental shocks.87
Turning to the survey measure of valuation confidence compiled by the Yale School of
Management, and discussed in Shiller (2000b), this measure is also likely to be correlated
with mispricing in the US equity market. This measure reflects a survey of US institutional
investors undertaken biannually until July 2001, and at a monthly frequency thereafter.88
Institutional investors are asked the following question:
‘Stock prices in the United States, when compared with measures of
true fundamental value or sensible investment value, are: [CIRCLE ONE
NUMBER]
1. Too low. 2. Too high. 3. About right. 4. Do not know.’
The responses are designed to provide a direct gauge on whether institutional investors
perceive US equity markets as being priced correctly, or whether they are undervalued
or overvalued.89 The exogeneity of this measure is largely assured due to survey design.
87 For additional surety, I use a measure of forecast dispersion with regard to average long-term growth in
earnings per share. This should help to ensure that dispersion is not being driven by fundamental shocks
relating to near-term uncertainty.
88 When used in estimation, quarterly data are interpolated from the biannual data prior to July 2001.
89 The Yale School of Management measure reports the Valuation Confidence Index as the number of
respondents who choose 1 or 3 as a percentage of those who chose 1, 2 or 3. I use one minus this
percentage in subsequent empirical analysis.
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Shiller (2000b) argues that the wording of this question is informative about potential
mispricing in the market, because it explicitly asks survey respondents on their views of
valuation controlling for their own knowledge or assessment of market fundamentals.90
Rather than asking institutional investors whether they expected prices to rise or fall, as
some other survey measures that would be correlated with fundamentals do, the survey
asks respondents directly about valuation in relation to fundamentals, and whether they
perceive the current market as being ‘too low’ (undervalued), ‘too high’ (overvalued) or
‘about right’ (fair value).
The third instrument considered is option-implied equity volatility. Conceptually, this
derivative is a measure of market expectations concerning future short-term volatility in
a share market index. One might expect that during bubble episodes mispricing in equity
markets could be correlated with expected volatility in the index. This could occur if
some investors use trading strategies that are based on volatility to profit from bubbles.
For example, if informed investors consider the market to be over-valued, but are unable
to time exactly when a price correction is likely, then a trading strategy that pays high
when markets are expected to move strongly in either direction may be a more profitable
risk-adjusted strategy than taking short or long positions on a bubble directly.
Nonetheless, whether short-term option-implied volatility is uncorrelated with
fundamental shocks is less clear on theoretical grounds. Although implied volatility
may be uncorrelated with conventional fundamental shocks, such as shocks to firm
productivity or household preferences, it could be argued that movements in short-term
volatility could be correlated with short-term uncertainty that is fundamental in nature.
For example, shocks such as terrorism attacks, wars, or uncertainty about major policy
changes that affect US corporate profitability could be regarded as fundamental short-
term volatility shocks that affect option-implied volatility, and potentially other economic
90 There is an extensive literature in behavioural finance documenting potential market, institutional or
information impediments that can sustain such mispricing, even when certain classes of investors feel
confident that current market conditions are consistent with a bubble. See, for example, Shiller (2000a).
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variables of interest (see, for example, Bloom (2009)). This suggests that using this
third instrument, in conjunction with the identification strategy proposed, may result in
inference that is not able to distinguish between the effects of fundamental uncertainty
shocks that have transitory effects, and mispricing.
With this caveat in mind, I test whether this third instrument is valid, conditional on
either forecast dispersion, or valuation confidence being valid instruments. If it is true
that fundamental uncertainty shocks are important in the sample under consideration, and
these are correlated with the other permanent or transitory shocks in this system, one
would expect option-implied volatility to fail instrument orthogonality tests. Table 4.1
reports the results of Hausman tests that are robust to the presence of weak instruments.91
The null hypotheses considered are that each of the permanent shocks are individually
uncorrelated with option volatility, and that a linear combination of the permanent
shocks and the fundamental transitory shock is also uncorrelated with option volatility.92
The results in Table 4.1 highlight that these null hypotheses cannot be rejected at
standard significance levels, and so they are consistent with option volatility being a valid
instrument for equity prices growth.93
An additional reason to think that option volatility is a valid instrument in the current
context is due to the sample under consideration. Although fundamental uncertainty
shocks are likely to be relevant in the period following the financial crisis that began
in 2007–2008, the importance of these shocks is less clear in the sample from June 1986
to December 2006. In particular, one would have to justify why option-implied volatility
drifted upwards from June 1995 to March 2000 (see Figure 4.1), at the same time that
equity prices in the United States grew substantially. Such a result is inconsistent with
91 See Hahn, Ham and Moon (2011).
92 Refer to Appendix 8.4 for the appropriate regression specification in the latter case.
93 Additional tests for conditional validity, for example of forecast dispersion being valid conditional on
valuation confidence being valid, also fail to reject the hypothesis that both instruments are valid. Results
are available on request.
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Table 4.1: Instrument Validity Tests for Option-implied Equity Volatility
Equation Hausman test statistic Hausman test statistic
Consumption(a) 0.05 0.04
Dividends(a) 0.04 0.01
Non-equity net wealth(a) 1.62 0.85
Labour income(a) 0.01 0.06
Equity quantities(b) 0.04 0.40
Critical value(c) 3.84 3.84
Exogenous instruments β1yt−1
(a)
Forecast dispersion(a), (b)
β1yt−1
(a)
Valuation confidence(a), (b)
Sample Jun 1986 to Dec 2006 Dec 1989 to Jun 2010
Notes: (a) The null hypothesis is H0 : E(ztu
p
i,t) = 0 vs the alternative H1 : E(ztu
P
i,t) 6= 0
(b) The null hypothesis is H0 : E(zt ε˜
P,T
t ) = 0 vs the alternative H1 : E(zt ε˜
P,T
t ) 6= 0
(c) Obtained from a Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom, and at the 5 per cent
level of significance
typical fundamental explanations of volatility, which usually suggest that higher volatility
should be associated with greater fundamental uncertainty, lower investment and lower
equity prices.
I now address whether these instruments are relevant from an empirical perspective.
Figure 4.1 reports a graph of equity prices growth compared with each of the three
candidate instruments – the second lag of detrended forecast dispersion, contemporaneous
option-implied equity volatility, and the first lead of the second difference of the valuation
confidence index. These instruments are selected because they have the highest reduced-
form correlations with equity prices growth. I use detrended forecast dispersion to account
for the upwards drift in earnings per share over time. The second difference, or change in
momentum, of valuation confidence is used because it ensures that only information at a
biannual frequency is actually used in estimation.94
Figure 4.1 highlights that all three variables appear to exhibit some correlation with equity
prices growth, a result that is investigated more formally below. Forecast dispersion and
94 Recall that valuation confidence prior to July 2001 is only measured at a biannual frequency. Using the
second difference, on a quarterly linear interpolation, in effect implies that only the change in momentum
measured at six-monthly intervals is used. Under relatively weak assumptions, this measure will provide
consistent IV estimates.
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Figure 4.1: Equity Prices Growth and the Instruments for Mispricing
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option volatility appear to be most highly correlated with equity prices growth, although
all three measures are consistent with an increase in forecast dispersion, uncertainty and
concerns of overvaluation in the late 1990s. This preceded the sharp deceleration in prices
growth observed in 2000.
Table 4.2 reports the results from first-stage regressions, and formal tests for instrument
relevance, with respect to the permanent equations in Equation (4.14). To be clear, the two
relevant first-stage regressions are of the form
∆y2 j,t = φ
′
1 j∆y1t−1+φ
′
2 jξ1t−1+φ
′
3 jzt +ϕ2 j,t (4.19)
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for j = 1,2, where ξ1t−1 = β1yt−1, and zt is one of the candidate instruments.
The results are highlighted when using each candidate instrument in turn. The first test
for relevance considered is that the instruments are under-identified. Essentially, it is a
test of whether the excluded instruments, ξ1t−1 and zt , are sufficiently correlated with the
endogenous regressors, ∆y21,t and ∆y22,t , for meaningful IV inference to be undertaken.
Using the Cragg-Donaldson Wald statistic (rows 5 and 6), the null that the instruments
are under-identified can be rejected at conventional significance levels.95
Although tests for the null of under-identification can be rejected, tests of the null that the
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors cannot be rejected
at conventional significance levels. In particular, using the test for weak instruments
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), the critical values published by Stock and Yogo
are greater than the relevant Cragg-Donaldson Wald F-statistics (rows 7 to 9). Moreover,
F-statistics associated with the first-stage regressions for each of the instruments suggest
that weak instruments could be a concern, especially with respect to the equity quantities
measure (rows 1 to 2).
Table 4.2: Instrument Relevance Statistics – Permanent Equations
Forecast dispersion Option volatility Valuation confidence
Equity quantities F-stat 2.76 2.77 1.71
3.32 3.26 2.09
Equity prices F-stat 5.41 11.09 2.10
3.60 7.66 2.28
CD Wald stat(a)(b) 4.67 5.50 3.28
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
CD Wald F-stat(a) 2.11 2.37 1.47
2.08 2.45 1.46
Critical value(c) 3.63 3.63 3.63
Notes: Statistics in italics are computed with robust standard errors
(a) Cragg-Donaldson test statistic
(b) P-values are in parentheses
(c) Based on 25 per cent maximal LIML size and assuming homoskedastic errors
95 Although the lagged dividend to equity price ratio, β ′2yt−1, is also a valid instrument in the first stage,
this instrument was found only to be weakly correlated with equity prices growth and is not therefore
used when applying IV.
104
In view of the concern associated with weak instruments for these first-stage regressions,
I use two strategies in the analysis that follows. The first is to use just-identified IV
estimators, using each of the candidate instruments in turn. There is research suggesting
that just-identified estimators can be viewed as approximately median-value unbiased
with weak, though identified, instruments.96 The second strategy, followed in Section
4.6, is to consider an alternative approach to estimation of the system in Equation (4.12)
that requires fewer instruments in the procedure used to identify the mispricing shock.
By reducing the number of endogenous variables, specifically eliminating the need to
instrument for the measure of equity quantities, tests of the null that the instruments are
weak can be rejected at conventional significance levels. As discussed in Section 4.6, the
results using either strategy are comparable at short- to medium-term horizons.
Proceeding using the just-identified IV estimators, first-stage tests for instrument
relevance in the transitory equation for equity quantities are obtained from the following
first-stage regressions
∆y1t =Θ11∆yt−1+θ12ξt−1+Θ13û
P,T
t +θ14zt +η1t (4.20)
∆y22t =Θ21∆yt−1+θ22ξt−1+Θ23û
P,T
t +θ24zt +η22t (4.21)
where ûP,Tt are the residuals obtained from IV estimates of the permanent equations.
Table 4.3 highlights that when using these residuals and each of the proxies for mispricing
shocks as instruments (in turn), first-stage F-statistics are large and the null that these
instruments are under-identified can be rejected at conventional significance levels.97
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the F-statistics that provide a measure of the
correlation between the excluded instruments and equity prices growth, rows 9 and 10,
remain in a range where weak instruments could be a concern. I next present point
estimates based on the just-identified IV estimators, before turning to the question of
96 See, for example, Angrist, Imbens and Krueger (1999) and Angrist and Pischke (2008).
97 Results are qualitatively similar for the transitory equation for equity prices, and are available on request.
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whether concerns associated with weak instruments are likely to be biasing these point
estimates.
Table 4.3: Instrument Relevance Statistics – Transitory Equation
for Equity Quantities
Forecast dispersion Option volatility Valuation confidence
Consumption F-stat 17.85 13.23 16.45
11.40 12.98 15.11
Dividends F-stat 55.77 51.82 231.32
54.24 47.59 209.17
Non-equity net worth F-stat 108.70 7.5×104 33.54
60.00 1.6×105 36.09
Labour income F-stat 142.88 145.73 210.13
160.69 168.64 295.70
Equity prices F-stat 7.14 7.48 4.89
4.54 4.88 3.86
CD Wald stat(a)(b) 8.90 16.90 4.62
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Notes: Statistics in italics are computed with robust standard errors
(a) Cragg-Donaldson test statistic
(b) P-values are in parentheses
4.5. Results
Response Functions and Variance Decompositions
Figure 4.2 reports the impulse response functions associated with an exogenous 1 per cent
increase in mispricing that is transitory, when using forecast dispersion, option volatility,
and valuation confidence in turn as instruments.98 The results highlight that the mispricing
shock has a persistent effect on equity prices, with more than one quarter of its initial
effect still being observed after five years. In addition, prices do not appear to over-correct
in response to a positive mispricing shock, suggesting that both positive and negative
mispricing shocks are required to generate the boom and bust patterns often referred to in
qualitative accounts of equity market bubbles.
98 Confidence intervals for these estimates are analysed in Section 4.6.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive 1 Per Cent Mispricing Shock
—  Option volatility     —  Valuation confidence
   —  Forecast dispersion
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In terms of the effects on other economic variables in the system, there is a persistent
increase in consumption in response to a positive innovation in mispricing. Consumption
exhibits a hump-shaped response with the maximum effect being in the order of 0.05
percentage points, which occurs around three years after the initial shock. This effect
increases to around 0.5 percentage points in response to a one standard deviation
mispricing shock.99
An interesting pattern can be observed in the impulse response function for the quantity of
equity held by households (equity quantities). Initially, households increase their equity
99 A one standard deviation mispricing shock increases equity prices in the order of 9 to 10 per cent
depending on the instrument used.
107
holdings, when using either forecast dispersion or option volatility as instruments, and
then subsequently reduce these holdings as the effects of the mispricing shock begin
to dissipate. One interpretation consistent with this result is that households are able
to perceive misvaluation in equity markets following a mispricing shock. This could
help to explain why households reduce their equity holdings before prices have fully
reverted to their fundamental value. The reduction in equity holdings is also consistent
with households using the proceeds of equity sales to increase their level of consumption.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the reduction in equity quantities is smaller than the
increase in prices, and so the value of households’ equity holdings increases in response
to the mispricing shock. In this light, an alternative interpretation of the reduction in
equity holdings is that it represents portfolio rebalancing given US households’ increased
exposure to domestic equities.
Turning to corporate dividend policies, the estimated results are less precise with the
magnitude of the impulse response functions sensitive to the choice of instrument used.
However, there is evidence to suggest that firms may bring forward the timing of their
dividend payments in response to a positive mispricing shock. This could reflect firms
using dividends as a signal of their more favourable expectations concerning their future
profitability. Interestingly, only when using forecast dispersion as an instrument are
dividends subsequently underpaid relative to their value without mispricing.
For the non-equity net wealth measure, the impulse response function is close to zero
when using forecast dispersion as an instrument, but positive when using either option
volatility of valuation confidence. Thus, whether positive mispricing in equity markets
affects other components of household net worth remains an open questions based on
these estimates. With regard to labour income, all three measures suggest that positive
mispricing shocks have little effect on the after-tax income earned by households.
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Table 4.4 reports a forecast error variance decomposition of equity prices and quantities,
with the contributions of fundamental shocks and mispricing shocks separately identified
at short- to medium-term forecast horizons.100 The results highlight that transitory
mispricing shocks explain the majority of variation in equity prices growth at these
forecast horizons. For example, when using forecast dispersion as an instrument, around
two-thirds of the forecast error variance in prices growth can be explained by mispricing.
In contrast, fundamental shocks are only able to explain between 16 and 40 per cent of
the variation in equity prices growth at short to medium forecast horizons, depending on
the instrument used. These results suggest that fundamental shocks to two of the most
important variables emphasised by economic theory for equity pricing, consumption and
dividends, explain some of the variation in equity prices. However, a larger part of this
variation remains unexplained.
For equity quantities the proportion of the forecast error that can be explained by
permanent and transitory fundamental shocks is much larger, in excess of 90 per cent
according to these estimates. This suggests that changing fundamentals, as measured
here, are much more able to explain variation in the quantity of domestic equity held
by households, rather than the price of domestic equity.
Table 4.5 reports a similar forecast error variance decomposition for consumption and
dividends. In this case fundamental shocks explain much of the short term variation in
consumption. However, there is evidence to suggest that at medium horizons, from one
to four years, a non-trivial fraction of the variation in consumption can be explained by
mispricing shocks. These estimates suggest that although fundamental shocks are most
important, non-fundamental transitory shocks do not necessarily have trivial effects on
the consumption decisions of households.
100Note that fundamental shocks include both the reduced-form permanent and transitory fundamental
shocks identified.
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Table 4.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Equity prices Equity quantities
Fundamental(a) Mispricing Fundamental(a) Mispricing
Forecast dispersion
2-quarter 0.33 0.67 0.99 0.01
1-year 0.34 0.66 0.99 0.01
4-year 0.40 0.60 0.95 0.05
Option volatility
2-quarter 0.17 0.83 0.99 0.01
1-year 0.16 0.84 0.99 0.01
4-year 0.16 0.84 0.97 0.03
Valuation confidence
2-quarter 0.40 0.60 0.95 0.05
1-year 0.16 0.84 0.97 0.03
4-year 0.17 0.83 0.96 0.04
Notes: (a) Fundamental includes both permanent and transitory fundamental shocks
Table 4.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Consumption Dividends
Fundamental(a) Mispricing Fundamental(a) Mispricing
Forecast dispersion
2-quarter 0.96 0.04 0.98 0.02
1-year 0.95 0.05 0.99 0.01
4-year 0.86 0.14 0.98 0.02
Option volatility
2-quarter 0.94 0.06 0.86 0.14
1-year 0.80 0.20 0.88 0.12
4-year 0.64 0.36 0.96 0.04
Valuation confidence
2-quarter 0.78 0.22 0.88 0.12
1-year 0.66 0.34 0.74 0.26
4-year 0.64 0.36 0.71 0.29
Notes: (a) Fundamental includes both permanent and transitory fundamental shocks
For dividends, fundamental permanent and transitory shocks again explain the majority
of the forecast error variation at all horizons. However, in line with the estimated impulse
responses, there is mixed evidence on the importance of mispricing shocks for variation
in dividends, with estimates ranging from close to zero to as much as 29 per cent of the
variation in dividends at a medium-term horizon, depending on the instrument used.
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Analysis of Historical Episodes
The previous forecast error variance decompositions compute the relative importance
of alternative shocks over the full estimation sample. To provide additional insight into
the importance of mispricing shocks in various historical episodes, Figure 4.3 compares
each observed variable with a counterfactual estimate that assumes that all mispricing
shocks are zero in the estimation sample from June 1986 to December 2006, and when
using forecast dispersion as the relevant instrument. Estimates of the counterfactuals are
conditioned taking the December 1985 and March 1986 observations as initial values.101
The equity prices panel in Figure 4.3 identifies two notable episodes of mispricing in the
data. The first is under-valuation of US equity from 1987 to around 1995, which appears
to be at least partly associated with the October 1987 stock market crash. After this time
the equity market remains undervalued during the 1990–1991 recession. Prices then start
to correct as the US economy recovers from this recession with prices being closer to their
fundamental value from around 1992.
The second notable episode of mispricing is the familiar US dot-com bubble. From
March 1995 to the height of the bubble in March 2000, the US equity market appears
substantially overvalued. In March 2000, these estimates suggest that the US S&P 500
equity index was overvalued by around 45 per cent, before the subsequent collapse in
equity prices was observed. Interestingly, equity was only slightly undervalued following
the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and there was no clear evidence that equity markets
were substantially mispriced in the lead-up to the financial crisis that began to emerge in
September 2007.
Turning to consumption, it is clear that the level of consumption and the sign of mispricing
shocks are positively correlated. In particular, observed per capita consumption appears
101To ensure that these results are not sensitive to initial conditions, I also compute the observed and
counterfactual paths for longer time series of historical data. Under the assumption that the structural
model is stable over a period prior to the sample used in estimation, the results are qualitatively similar.
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Figure 4.3: Observed and Counterfactual Comparison
11.3
11.5
11.7
11.9
9.60
9.75
9.90
10.05
5.9
6.0
6.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
Counterfactual
 estimate
2006
Equity prices
9.97
10.09
10.21
4.0
4.4
4.8
Consumption
Equity quantities Dividends
Non-equity net wealth Labour income
Ln
Ln
Ln
Ln
Ln
Ln
19991992200619991992
Observed
lower than its counterfactual estimate during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and is above
its counterfactual estimate during the dot-com boom. Between March 1997 and December
2000, consumption grew on average 0.6 per cent per annum faster than in the absence of
mispricing associated with the dot-com bubble. This suggests that mispricing did have an
effect on the consumption decisions made by households.
Again, an interesting pattern emerges with respect to household equity holdings. During
the early stages of the dot-com boom, between 1995 and 1997, the counterfactual
estimate of the quantity of equity held lies below its corresponding observed value.
However, during the latter stages of the bubble, from 1997 onwards, households actually
reduce their exposure to US equity. This finding is somewhat surprising given that
many qualitative accounts of bubbles do not contend that households reduce their equity
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holdings when concerns surrounding a bubble are raised. Nonetheless, these results
suggest that households may either be selling equity, in part to fund higher consumption,
or are consciously reducing their equity exposure due to concerns about mispricing.
For dividends, labour income, and non-equity net worth, the observed and counterfactual
estimates are much more closely aligned. This suggests that mispricing shocks had much
less effect on the observed variation in these variables, when using forecast dispersion as
an instrument.
Another approach for obtaining insight into the relative contributions of alternative
shocks is to use a historical forecast error decomposition. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 report
the relative contributions to the two-year-ahead forecast errors of transitory mispricing
shocks, transitory fundamental shocks, and the reduced-form permanent shocks, again
when using forecast dispersion as an instrument. Consistent with the counterfactual
analysis discussed previously, it is clear that transitory mispricing shocks explain a non-
trivial fraction of the forecast errors in equity prices and consumption. But they explain
only a relatively small fraction of the errors for equity quantities, dividends, labour income
and non-equity net worth. For these latter variables, reduced-form permanent shocks
provide the largest contribution to the forecast errors observed.
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Comparison with Existing Literature
The findings reported here are broadly similar to those obtained from related empirical
literature. Focusing first on the effects of mispricing on consumption, Helbling and
Terrones (2003) and Detken and Smets (2004) find a higher reduced-form correlation
between consumption growth and equity prices growth during periods identified as
equity market bubbles, and a weaker correlation during non-bubble periods, when using
atheoretical procedures. The semi-structural approach to identification taken in this
chapter confirms these findings. A rule of thumb obtained from the estimates presented
here would suggest that a one time over-valuation shock in equity markets, in the order of
10 per cent, results in the level of consumption being about 0.5 percentage points higher
around three years after the initial shock, all else constant.
Turning to equity prices, the response of equity prices to a non-fundamental transitory
shock estimated here is similar to estimates obtained from Lee (1998), who focuses solely
on the identification of non-transitory shocks by assuming that such shocks have no real
effects (on either dividends or corporate earnings). According to Lee’s estimates, a one
standard deviation mispricing shock increases equity prices in the order of 4–6 per cent
at the end of the first year, with the full effect of the shock dissipating after about 12
years. The estimates presented in this chapter are similar, with a one standard deviation
mispricing shock increasing prices in the order of 5–7 per cent at the end of the first
year, with the full effects dissipating in about 10 to 12 years. The estimated effects of
mispricing on equity prices are very similar, notwithstanding different samples and data
frequencies for estimation, and that Lee uses a different identification methodology for
identifying non-fundamental transitory shocks.
One interesting difference with the previous literature on bubbles concerns the response of
household equity holdings. Although this effect has received limited attention in previous
empirical literature, it is interesting to note that the decline in household equity holdings
in response to a positive mispricing shock is in contrast to qualitative accounts of bubbles.
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It is also in contrast to research by Gilchrist et al (2005) who find that firms tend to
issue a small positive amount of stock in response to a mispricing shock. The results here
suggest that households do not appear to be purchasing additional equity during the latter
stages of a bubble episode. If correct, this would imply that either foreign residents or US
corporates would need to be purchasing any additional equity issued.
A second remaining question is on the effects of mispricing on dividends. Previous
literature has assumed a priori that bubbles do not affect corporate dividend policies.102
The results here suggest that bubbles can potentially influence corporate dividend
policies, although the magnitude of this response is sensitive to the instrument used in
identification.
4.6. Robustness
Hall Percentile Confidence Intervals
To provide a gauge of the estimation uncertainty surrounding the previous point estimates,
I construct 90 per cent confidence intervals for the estimated impulse response functions
using a semi-parametric bootstrap (for further detail see Appendix 8.3). Figure 4.6 reports
the bootstrapped confidence intervals using Hall’s percentile method, and when each
instrument is used in turn as a proxy for mispricing. Two results are noteworthy. First,
allowing for estimation uncertainty in this way does not have a substantial effect on the
results previously discussed. Mispricing shocks have positive and statistically significant
effects on equity prices and consumption, and a negative and significant effect on the
quantity of equity held by households irrespective of the instrument used. There is also
little evidence of a statistically significant effect of mispricing shocks on household labour
income. Again, the results concerning the response of dividends and net worth depend on
the instrument used as a proxy for mispricing shocks.
102See, for example, Lee (1998).
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Figure 4.6: Hall Confidence Intervals
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The second point to note is how estimation uncertainty changes when an instrument that
is more weakly correlated with equity prices growth is used as a proxy for mispricing
shocks. Comparing the width of the confidence intervals produced when valuation
confidence, the weakest instrument, is used and the alternative instruments, it is clear
that the confidence bands associated with valuation confidence are often wider. Thus, as
one would expect, using weaker instruments in the identification procedure does result in
greater uncertainty about the estimated impulse response functions.
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Are Weak Instruments a Problem?
As mentioned previously, weak instruments are potentially of concern given the
instrument relevance statistics highlighted in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. To explore whether
weak instruments may be resulting in large finite sample biases, I also use an alternative
identification procedure that requires fewer instruments when estimating the system in
Equation (4.9).103 In particular, by relaxing the restriction that mispricing shocks have
only transitory effects, one can estimate the system in such a way that growth in equity
prices is the only endogenous variable requiring a valid instrument. This is in contrast
to the previous identification method that required valid instruments for both equity
prices and equity quantities growth (the two variables directly perturbed by transitory
innovations). I refer to the alternative identification procedure that requires fewer
instruments as the ‘alternative’ strategy, and that previously used as the ‘benchmark’
strategy.
The advantage of the alternative strategy is that the concern with weak instruments can
be mitigated, since only an instrument that is sufficiently correlated with equity prices
growth is required. The disadvantage is that this approach is potentially inefficient, since
it no longer uses the restriction that mispricing shocks are assumed to have only transitory
effects.
Table 4.6 reports the first-stage results when using the alternative identification strategy.
Tests of instrument relevance in this case are able to reject both null hypotheses
that the instruments are under-identified and weakly identified when using forecast
dispersion and option volatility as instruments, or if both of these measures and valuation
confidence are all used collectively. The difference with regard to the previous results,
where the null of weak instruments could not be rejected, is that only instruments that
are sufficiently correlated with equity prices growth are required when applying the
103See Appendix 8.4 for further detail.
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alternative strategy.104 In contrast, the benchmark method required instruments that are
sufficiently correlated with both equity prices and equity quantities growth.
Table 4.6: Instrument Relevance Statistics under Alternative Strategy
Forecast dispersion Option volatility Valuation
confidence
All instruments
CD Wald stat(a)(b) 11.19 23.78 5.40 47.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
CD Wald F-stat(a) 9.84 20.91 4.73 13.07
Critical value(c) 8.96 8.96 8.96 4.36
Notes: All statistics are calculated assuming homoskedastic standard errors
(a) Cragg-Donaldson test statistic
(b) P-values are in parentheses
(c) Based on 15 per cent maximal LIML size
Figure 4.7 compares the estimated impulse response functions using the benchmark and
alternative identification strategies when using forecast dispersion as the instrument for
equity prices growth.105 Although it can be observed that estimates using the alternative
strategy now permit long-run effects in response to mispricing shocks, it is clear that
the sign and magnitude of the responses estimated are very similar to those previously
identified, and especially so at horizons of less than four years. This similarity suggests
that, at least for short-term horizons, the presence of weak instruments under the
benchmark strategy is unlikely to be distorting the sign or magnitude of the responses
estimated. At longer horizons, the notable differences in the responses estimated suggests
that imposing the restriction that mispricing shocks have only transitory effects is
important. Without this restriction, estimates of the response to mispricing shocks under
the alternative strategy remain noticeably different from zero.
Overall, the similarity of the results obtained when using just-identified IV estimators
with different instruments, the relative widths of the bootstrapped confidence intervals,
and the similarity in the short-term point estimates under the benchmark and alternative
104More specifically, lags of the cointegrating vectors, βyt , are no longer required as instruments.
105Results are similar if the other instruments are used.
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Figure 4.7: Impulse Response Functions under Benchmark and Alternative
Identification Strategies
—  Benchmark identification strategy
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identification strategies, all suggest that weak instruments are unlikely to be resulting in
highly misleading inference. Although valid instruments that are more highly correlated
with both equity prices and quantities growth would of course be desirable, there does
appear to be sufficient information in the instruments proposed for identifying the sign
and magnitude of the effects of transitory mispricing shocks.
4.7. Conclusion
This chapter proposes a new method for identifying the effects of equity market
mispricing on household and firm decisions. The key assumptions used are that mispricing
shocks only have transitory effects on the economy, and that there exist observable
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data that are correlated with these shocks, but are not correlated with perturbations to
fundamentals.
The results highlighted in this chapter are qualitatively consistent with the idea that equity
price bubbles have the potential to distort household and firm decisions. Consumption
does appear to increase with a lag in response to a positive mispricing shock, and there
is evidence to suggest that firms may change the timing of dividend payments as a signal
of their optimism concerning future investment opportunities. However, quantitatively,
the results estimated here are not consistent with the idea that mispricing has highly
distortionary effects on household and firm decisions. Overall, the effects estimated are
statistically significant and modest. There is also evidence to suggest that households
reduce their exposure to equity in the latter stages of an equity price bubble.
Taken together, these results suggest that the effects of equity market mispricing are
neither trivial, nor as large as has sometimes been claimed in qualitative accounts of
bubbles. On balance, they suggest that periods identified as bubbles should be taken into
consideration by policy-makers to the extent that variables such as consumption may be
growing at a rate which differs to that justified by fundamentals. However, they do not
imply that policy-makers should necessarily seek to address distorted equity price signals.
This is a broader question which requires consideration of the various costs and benefits
associated with using different policy tools to address particular episodes of equity market
mispricing.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis provides insight into how financial volatility can matter for macroeconomic
outcomes, and monetary policy. It highlights how distortions in credit and equity markets
can affect price signals, which in turn can affect real economic decisions. It also
highlights, for the case of a distorted credit market, how monetary policy should optimally
respond when faced with financial shocks.
Chapter 2 confirmed that in an economy where both capital and credit matter, financial
variables – in particular, net worth – can become relevant in a central bank’s optimal
policy calculus. Chapter 3 demonstrated how one form of endogenous expectations,
optimal expectations, can amplify the effects of technology shocks and be consistent with
mispriced equity and over-investment in the economy. Chapter 4 confirmed that empirical
estimates of the effects of mispriced equity on household and firm decisions can be both
economically and statistically significant.
This work raises additional questions for future research. For example, a natural extension
to Chapter 2 would be to allow for micro-founded distortions in both credit and equity
markets. One could then explore whether equity market distortions, or the interaction
between equity and credit market distortions, are also relevant for optimal monetary
policy.
For Chapter 3, a useful extension is to consider whether a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model, augmented with optimal expectations, is able to better explain
empirical volatility in investment and asset prices when compared with a standard rational
expectations model. This could provide an alternative explanation to empirical puzzles
such as the equity-premium puzzle, and insight into whether optimal expectations are
a useful modelling device from an empirical perspective. For Chapter 4, it would be
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informative to investigate whether the effects of equity mispricing on investment and
output are larger than the effects estimated for consumption and dividends. This would
provide further insight into whether the different components of economic activity are
affected asymmetrically by equity mispricing.
There is much research still to be done on sources of financial market volatility and how
these matter for macroeconomic policy. Nonetheless, this thesis has provided important
theoretical and empirical contributions to analysing the effects of equity and credit market
distortions in the context of monetary policy.
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Chapter 6
Appendix to Chapter 2
6.1. Approximation of Household Welfare
Approximation of Household Utility from Consumption
Taking a quadratic approximation of household utility from consumption, which is
identical across all households, and using quadratic and linear approximations of the
aggregate resource constraint (2.18) to eliminate the linear and quadratic terms in ct
respectively, I have106
U (Ct) =UcY

yt− sδ it− secet
(1−σ)y2t
2 −
(
sδ +σs2δ 2
)
i2t
2 − se
(
1+σse
) (cet )2
2
+sσδyt it +σs
ecet yt− sσδ secet it

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
where s≡ KY , se ≡ ζC
e
Y , σ ≡ σc YC , and σc ≡−Ucc(C)CUc(C) .
Using a second-order approximation of capital accumulation (2.19), where I use ξt ≡
ln(1−νt) as a convenient renormalisation of the bankruptcy cost shock, I eliminate the
106For brevity, and without loss of generality, I abstract from taste and productivity shocks. All
approximations are taken with respect to the natural logarithms of variables unless otherwise specified.
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first-order term in investment in the above approximation to obtain
U (Ct) =UcY

yt +
(1−σ)y2t
2 − s
(
kt+1+
k2t+1
2
)
+s(1−δ )
(
kt +
k2t
2
)
− secet
−σs2δ 2 i
2
t
2 − se
(
1+σse
) (cet )2
2
+sσδyt it +σs
ecet yt− sσδ secet it
+sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.1)
where I approximate around a stead state such that Kt =K,ω t =ω,ξ = 0, IK =
δ
ζ , treat the
recovery share parameter ξt as an expansion parameter that can be perturbed, and collect
terms that are independent of policy in t.i.p.
Approximation of the Disutility of labour
Approximating
∫ 1
0 V (Ht(i))di, I have
∫ 1
0
V (Ht(i))di =VHH
(
Eiht (i)+
1
2
(1+η)Eiht (i)
2
)
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.2)
where η ≡ VHHHVH , Eiht (i)≡
∫ 1
0 ht (i)di and Eiht (i)
2 ≡ ∫ 10 ht (i)2 di.
Using the steady state values for the intratemporal household condition (2.3), the
production technology (2.13), the optimal choice of the labour to capital ratio (2.14),
real marginal cost (2.15), and the optimal pricing decision (2.16), it follows that
VHH = µ
−1 (1−χ)−1 (1−α)YUc
where µ−1 ≡ (1−θ−1) is the inverse of the mark-up. Thus, (6.2) can be written as
∫ 1
0
V (Ht(i))di =
UcY
µ (1−χ)
(
(1−α)Eiht(i)+
1
2
(1−α)(1+η)Eiht(i)2
)
(6.3)
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Using the production function (2.13), and a second-order approximation of the final
producer’s demand function for intermediate goods (2.12), I have
(1−α)Eiht(i) = yt−αEikt(i)− (1−α)zt−
1
2
µ−1varixt(i)+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.4)
Substituting (6.4) into (6.3) I obtain
∫ 1
0
V (ht(i))di =
UcY
µ (1−χ)
 yt−αEikt(i)− 12µ−1varixt(i)
+12 (1−α)(1+η)Eiht(i)2
 (6.5)
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
Using a second-order approximation of the capital aggregation condition across industries
(2.21), (6.5) can be re-written as
∫ 1
0
V (Ht(i))di =
UcY
µ (1−χ)

yt−αkt− 12µ−1varixt(i)
+α2 varikt(i)+
(1−α)(1+η)
2 vari (ht (i))
+ (1−α)(1+η)2 (Eiht(i))
2

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.6)
It is straightforward to show that vari (kt (i)) and vari (ht (i)) are proportional to
vari (xt (i)) using first-order approximations of (2.3), (2.13) and (2.14),
vari (ht(i)) =
1
(1+αη)2
vari (xt(i))+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
vari (kt (i)) =
(
1+η
1+αη
)2
vari (xt(i))+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
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Substituting these relationships into (6.6) yields
∫ 1
0
V (Ht(i))di =
UcY
µ (1−χ)
 yt−αkt + 12ωxvarixt(i)
+ (1−α)(1+η)2 (Eiht(i))
2

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.7)
where ωx ≡ η+1αη+1 −µ−1. Finally using first-order approximations of (2.12) and (2.13) to
substitute out Eiht(i), (6.7) can be written as
∫ 1
0
V (Ht(i))di =
UcY
µ (1−χ)
 yt−αkt + ωx2 varixt(i)
+ (1−α)(1+η)2
(
yt−αkt
1−α − zt
)2

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
(6.8)
Combining (6.1) and (6.8) it follows that the quadratic approximation of average
household felicity is given by
U (Ct)−
∫ 1
0
V (Ht (i))di =UcY

(1−σ)y2t
2 − s2σδ 2 i
2
t
2 −α k
2
t
2 − se
(
1+σse
) (cet )2
2
−secet + sσδyt it +σsecet yt− sσδ secet it
+sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω)+ξt it
)
− (1−α)(1+η)2
(
yt−αkt
1−α − zt
)2− ωx2 varixt(i)

+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
To obtain this result I have assumed that the subsidy on intermediate production ensures
that the distortion associated with monopolistic competition is eliminated (1−χ)µ = 1,
and that the steady state recovery rate is one (eξ = 1). I have also iterated out linear and
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quadratic terms involving capital using the result
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0 (−skt+1+ s(1−δ )kt +αkt) =−sEt0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
(
kt+1−β−1kt
)
= sβ−1kt0
= t.i.p (6.9)
which also applies to second-order terms in capital, and is consistent with
Takamura et al (2006).
For brevity, and without loss of generality, I abstract from productivity shocks (as well as
taste shocks) assuming zt = 0. I can then write the approximation of household welfare as
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
(
U (Ct)−
∫ 1
0
V (Ht (i))di
)
= Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0UcY
(
Lht
)
+ t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
where
Lht ≡
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
))
y2t
2
+ s2σδ 2
i2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+
(
α+
α2 (1+η)
1−α
)
k2t
2
+ se
(
1+σse
) (cet )2
2
+ secet − sσδyt it−
α (1+η)
1−α ytkt−σs
ecet yt
+ sσδ secet it− sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)
which corresponds to (2.26) in the main text and where ωpi ≡ θ
2γωx
(1−γ)(1−γβ ) . In obtaining
this last result I follow the approach discussed in Woodford (2003), Chapter 6, where it
can be verified in the context of this chapter that vari (xt (i)) = θ
2vari (pt (i)) and that
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0vari (pt (i)) =
γ
(1− γ)(1− γβ )
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0pi2t + t.i.p+O
(
‖ϑ‖3
)
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6.2. The Constraints in the Zero-Inflation Equilibrium
For the model with the credit friction and endogenous variation in net worth, the zero-
inflation equilibrium values must satisfy the system (allowing for taste and productivity
shocks):
knt+1 = (1−δ )knt +δ int +δΦ(ω)ξt
σcc
n
t = σcEtc
n
t+1+υψt−υEtψt+1− rbnt
σcc
n
t = σcEtc
n
t+1− (1−β (1−δ ))Etrnt+1+ q̂t n−β (1−δ )Et q̂t+1n
+υψt−υEtψt+1
q̂t
n =−φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt−Φ(ω)ξt
0 = n̂wnt − int −
φ (ω)g(ω,0)
1−Φ(ω) ξt +Φ(ω)ξt−
fω (ω)ω
f (ω)
ω̂
n
t
n̂wt = ϕF F̂
e
t +ϕkk
en
t +ϕrr
n
t +ϕqq̂t
n
rnt = y
n
t − knt
0 =
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
))
ynt − sσδ int −σsecent −
α (1+η)
1−α k
n
t − (1+η)zt−υψt
σcc
n
t = σy
n
t −σsδ int −σsecent
cent =
fω (ω)ω
f (ω)
ω̂
n
t + q̂t
n+ int
kent+1 =
fω (ω)ω
f (ω)
ω̂
n
t + i
n
t
This is a first-order difference system with 11 equations in 11 unknowns that can be used
to solve for the real rate of interest, rbnt , consistent with the absence of price and credit
frictions.
6.3. Re-writing the Loss Function
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I begin with the loss function (2.29)107
Lt ≡
(
σ +
α+η
1−α
)
y2t
2
+ s2σδ 2
i2t
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+
(
α+
α2 (1+η)
1−α
)
k2t
2
+σ
(
se
)2 (cet )2
2
− sσδyt it−
α (1+η)
1−α ytkt−σs
ecet yt
+ sσδ secet it− sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)
As noted in the main text, it is useful to re-write variables in terms of the log deviation
from their respective zero-inflation equilibrium values. Abstracting from the effects of
productivity shocks (zt) and taste shocks (ψt) without loss of generality, conditional
expectations of zero-inflation (hereafter natural) variables must satisfy the following real
marginal cost condition in a zero-inflation equilibrium108
0 =
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
))
ynt|t0− sσδ i
n
t|t0−σs
ecent|t0−
α (1+η)
1−α k
n
t|t0 (6.10)
where I use the notation Et0
(
ynt
)
= ynt|t0 . Using this condition, it follows that the loss
function (2.29), for any given period t, can be written as
Lt ≡
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
)) (
yt− ynt
)2
2
+ s2σδ 2
(
it− int
)2
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+α
(
kt− knt
)2
2
+
(
α2 (1+η)
1−α
) (
kt− knt
)2
2
+σ
(
se
)2 (cet − cent )2
2
− sσδ (yt− ynt )(it− int )− α (1+η)1−α (yt− ynt )(kt− knt )
−σse (cet − cent )(yt− ynt )+ sσδ se (cet − cent )(it− int )+ R˜t (6.11)
107For brevity, I omit approximation errors in the analysis that follows.
108This result can be derived from analysis of the first-order approximation of the constraints in the zero-
inflation equilibrium (see Appendix 6.2).
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and where the remainder, R˜t is given by
R˜t ≡
α (1+η)
1−α αk
n
t kt−
α (1+η)
1−α y
n
t kt− sσδynt it
+ s2σδ 2int it +σ
(
se
)2 cent cet −σseynt cet
+ sσδ secent it + sσδ s
eint c
e
t +αk
n
t kt
− sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)
(6.12)
The next two propositions establish that (6.11) can be rewritten as
Lt ≡
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
)) (
yt− ynt
)2
2
+ s2σδ 2
(
it− int
)2
2
+ωpi
pi2t
2
+α
(
kt− knt
)2
2
+
(
α2 (1+η)
1−α
) (
kt− knt
)2
2
+σ
(
se
)2 (nwt−nwnt −n∗t )2
2
− sσδ (yt− ynt )(it− int )− α (1+η)1−α (yt− ynt )(kt− knt )
−σse (nwt−nwnt )(yt− ynt )+ sσδ se (nwt−nwnt )(it− int )+ t.i.p
where
n∗t =

0 if β e < β and κ = 1
−
(
sδ
se
φ(ω)
1−Φ(ω) f (ω)νt+σcc
n
t
)
σse if 1 > κβ
e > β and κ < β

and that nt = 0 if β
e < β and κ = 1, and nt 6= 0 if 1 > κβ e > β and κ < β , which is
consistent with (2.43) and the surrounding discussion in the main text.
I first consider the case where entrepreneurs do not save and so β e < β and κ = 1.
Proposition 6.1. In the case that entrepreneurs do not save (β e < β and κ = 1) and
entrepreneur consumption behaviour is described by (2.9) and (2.10) in the main text, to
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the first-order
R˜t = t.i.p
cet = n̂wt = t.i.p
nwt−nwnt = 0
Proof. It is sufficient to show that R˜t is made up of terms that are independent of policy
and cet = n̂wt = t.i.p. To begin, I substitute out −α(1+η)1−α αknt kt from the definition of R˜t
(6.12) using the property that natural value of real marginal costs is zero (see 6.10)
R˜t =
(
sσδ int −
(
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
))
ynt +σsc
en
t
)
αkt
− α (1+η)
1−α y
n
t kt− sσδynt it
+ s2σδ 2int it +σ
(
se
)2 cent cet −σseynt cet
+ sσδ secent it + sσδ s
eint c
e
t +αk
n
t kt
− sδΦ(ω)
(
ξtΦ̂(ω t)+ξt it
)
Next I substitute for δ it using the first-order approximation of capital accumulation and
drop terms that are independent of policy to obtain
R˜t =
((
σ +
(
α+η
1−α
))
ynt − sσδ int −σsecent
)
αkt
− α (1+η)
1−α y
n
t kt−σynt s(kt+1− (1−δ )kt)
+ sσδ int s(kt+1− (1−δ )kt)+σ
(
se
)2 cent cet −σseynt cet
+σsecent s(kt+1− (1−δ )kt)+ sσδ seint cet +αknt kt
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)−Φ(ω)ξts(kt+1− (1−δ )kt)
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Now I iterate out terms that are multiplicative in capital using
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
 s(mt+1kt+1)
−s(1−δ )mtkt−αmtkt
= sEt0 ∞∑
t=t0
β t−t0
(
mt+1kt+1−β−1mtkt
)
=−sβ−1mt0kt0 + s limj→∞β
jEt0
(
mt0+ jkt0+ j
)
= t.i.p
for any given endogenous variable mt in the system under consideration. This follows
from the property that I approximate around a non-distorted steady state where
β−1 = 1 − δ + αs (noting s ≡ KY ), that I focus on stationary policies such that
lim j→∞β
jEt0
(
mt0+ jkt0+ j
)
= 0, and that I restrict attention to policies that are optimal
from a timeless perspective (mt0kt0 = t.i.p). Thus, for the purposes of dealing with the
remainder in period t, I can use the expression
mt (skt+1− s(1−δ )kt) = αmtkt + s(mt−mt+1)kt+1
for any given endogenous variable mt . Using this result, the remainder can be written as
R˜t =−αktynt +αknt kt
+σ
(
ynt+1− ynt
)
skt+1− sσδ
(
int+1− int
)
skt+1
−σse (cent+1− cent )skt+1
+ secet
(
σsecent −σynt + sσδ int
)
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)−Φ(ω)ξtαkt
−Φ(ω)(ξt−ξt+1)skt+1 (6.13)
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I now use the first-order approximations of the household Euler equation and the
aggregate resource constraint (in the zero-inflation equilibrium) to obtain
q̂nt|t0 = σ
(
ynt|t0− y
n
t|t0+1
)
− sσδ
(
int|t0− i
n
t|t0+1
)
−σse
(
cent|t0− c
en
t|t0+1
)
+(1−β (1−δ ))
(
ynt|t0+1− k
n
t|t0+1
)
+β (1−δ ) q̂nt|t0+1
which I can then use to eliminate the following term in R˜t
(
σ
(
ynt − ynt+1
)− sσδ (int − int+1)−σse (cent − cent+1))skt+1
The remainder (6.13) becomes
R˜t =−αktynt +αknt kt
+
(
(1−β (1−δ ))(ynt+1− knt+1)− q̂t n+β (1−δ ) q̂t+1n)skt+1
+ secet
(
σsecent −σynt + sσδ int
)
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)−Φ(ω)ξtαkt−Φ(ω)(ξt−ξt+1)skt+1
Iterating out (1−β (1−δ ))(ynt+1− knt+1)skt+1−α (ynt − knt )
(noting 1−β (1−δ ) = αβ in steady state) I have
R˜t =
(
β (1−δ ) q̂t+1n− q̂t n
)
skt+1
+ secet
(
σsecent −σynt + sσδ int
)
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)−Φ(ω)ξtαkt−Φ(ω)(ξt−ξt+1)skt+1 (6.14)
Using Lemma (6.1) (see the end of Proposition 6.2) it follows that
cet = n̂wt
= t.i.p
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with respect to the loss function. This follows directly from the fact that I focus on an
equilibrium where non-defaulting entrepreneurs are assumed to be sufficiently impatient
that they consume all of their available resources once their investment return has been
realised. Using this property of the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do not save, the
remainder can be written as
R˜t =
(
β (1−δ ) q̂t+1n− q̂t n−Φ(ω)(ξt−ξt+1)
)
skt+1
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)−Φ(ω)ξtαkt (6.15)
Using Lemma (6.2) it follows that in the flexible price equilibrium, asset prices are
determined by shocks in the recovery rate
q̂t
n =−φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt−Φ(ω)ξt
Substituting this expression into (6.15) and iterating out the term
(1−β (1−δ ))Φ(ω)(ξt+1)skt+1−αΦ(ω)ξtkt I obtain
R˜t =
(
β (1−δ )
(
−φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt+1
)
+
φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt
)
skt+1
− sδΦ(ω)ξtΦ̂(ω t)
Using Φ(ω)Φ̂(ω t) = φ (ω)ωω̂ t and Lemma (6.3), it follows that the above expression
can be re-written as
R˜t =
(
β (1−δ )
(
−φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt+1
)
+
φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt
)
skt+1
− sδξtφ (ω)
f (ω)
fω (ω)
(
n̂wt− it−
φ (ω)g(ω,0)
1−Φ(ω) ξt +Φ(ω)ξt
)
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Again noting that n̂wt = c
e
t = t.i.p it follows that
R˜t =
(
β (1−δ ) φ (ω) f (ω)
fω (ω)
ξt+1−
φ (ω) f (ω)
fω (ω)
ξt
)
skt+1
+ sδφ (ω)
f (ω)
fω (ω)
itξt + t.i.p
where I have used that in the steady state without monitoring costs
f (ω) = 1−g(ω,0)
fω (ω) =Φ(ω)−1
Again substituting for investment using a linear approximation of capital accumulation
and then iterating out the remaining terms that are multiplicative in capital I have
R˜t = β s(1−δ )
φ (ω) f (ω)
fω (ω)
(
ξt+1kt+1−β−1ξtkt
)
= t.i.p
which verifies the desired result.
I now consider the case where entrepreneurs save (1 > κβ e > β and κ < β ).
Proposition 6.2. In the case that entrepreneurs do save (1 > κβ e > β and κ < β ) and
their consumption behaviour is described by (2.9) and (2.11),
R˜t =−σ
(
se
)2 (n∗t )nt + t.i.p
n̂wt− n̂wnt = cet − cent +O
(
‖ϑ‖2
)
n∗t =
sδ φ(ω)1−Φ(ω) f (ω)νt + s
eσcc
n
t
σ
(
se
)2
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Proof. The steps in this proof are almost identical to those used in the proof of Proposition
(6.1). The only exception is that the policymaker must now keep track of entrepreneurial
consumption and net worth, given that these variables are no longer independent of policy.
Using Lemma (6.1), it is straightforward to establish (irrespective of whether
entrepreneurs save or not)
cet =
φ (ω)
1−Φ(ω)ξt + n̂wt +O
(
‖ϑ‖2
)
(6.16)
and so
n̂wt− n̂wnt = cet − cent +O
(
‖ϑ‖2
)
I now re-evaluate the remainder for the equilibrium in which entrepreneurs save all of
their available resources before consuming at retirement. Applying the same reasoning
that is used in Proposition (6.1), but retaining terms in cet and n̂wt , that are no longer
independent of policy, it can be observed that
R˜t = s
ecet
(
σsecent −σynt + sσδ int
)− sδφ (ω) f (ω)
fω (ω)
n̂wtξt + t.i.p
Using (6.16) and a first-order approximation of the resource constraint (in the zero-
inflation equilibrium),
−σccnt = σsecent −σynt + sσδ int
I have
R˜t =
(
−seσccnt − sδφ (ω)
f (ω)
fω (ω)
ξt
)
n̂wt + t.i.p
where
n̂wt = ϕF F̂
e
t +ϕkk
e
t +ϕrrt +ϕqqt
From a first-order approximation of the definition of the recovery rate shock eξt ≡ 1−νt
ξt =−νt +O
(
‖ϑ‖2
)
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where νt is the proportion of funds lost in the case of bankruptcy (with ν = 0).109 Using
this result, and that in steady state, fω (ω) =Φ(ω)−1, the desired result
R˜t =
(
−sδ φ (ω)
1−Φ(ω) f (ω)νt− s
eσcc
n
t
)
nt + t.i.p
follows.
The rest of this appendix discusses the lemmas used in Propositions (6.1) and (6.2).
Lemma 6.1. In either of the saving or no saving equilibriums, cet =
φ(ω)
1−Φ(ω)ξt + n̂wt .
Moreover, specific to the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do not save (β e < β and κ = 1),
n̂wt = t.i.p and so c
e
t = t.i.p .
Proof. To establish the first result, I begin by taking a first-order approximation of the
derivative of the expected share of investment returns accruing to financial intermediaries
with respect to the default threshold, (2.5),
̂
gωt
(
ω t ,1− eξt
)
=
φ (ω)
f˜ωt (ω)
ξt +
̂˜fωt (ω t) (6.17)
Combining (6.17) with the optimal choice of default threshold, (2.33), I have
q̂t + f̂ (ω t) =
−φ (ω)
f˜ωt (ω)
ξt +
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
(6.18)
Using the investment supply equation (2.34) and (6.18)
q̂t + f̂ (ω t) =
−φ (ω)
f˜ωt (ω)
ξt + n̂wt− it (6.19)
109νt is in levels and not in logarithmic form.
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Combining (6.19) with (2.38), I obtain
cet = n̂wt−
φ (ω)
f˜ωt (ω)
ξt (6.20)
which establishes the first-result. Note that this result applies in both the equilibrium
where entrepreneurs do not save, and in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs save.
To establish the second result, that is specific to the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do
not save, recall that entrepreneurial net worth is given by
nwt = F
e
t +(Rt +qt (1−δ ))Ket
Combining the initial condition that entrepreneurs have no starting capital,110 with the
optimality condition that Ket+1 = 0 for all t ≥ t0 in the equilibrium where entrepreneurs do
not save, it follows that
nwt = F
e
t for all t ≥ t0
and thus
n̂wt = F̂
e
t
= t.i.p (6.21)
since the lump-sum transfer to entrepreneurs is not a control variable for the central bank.
Using (6.21) and (6.20), it also follows that
cet = t.i.p
which establishes the second result.
110Note that this is consistent with the economy beginning at its deterministic steady state where Ket0 = 0,
when entrepreneurs do not save.
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Lemma 6.2. q̂t =−φ(ω)(1−g(ω,0))1−Φ(ω) ξt−Φ(ω)ξt
Proof. I begin with the definition
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
≡ ln
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
)
1−q.g(ω,0)

Taking a first approximation of ln
(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
around the deterministic steady
state without monitoring costs where q = 1 and ξ = 0 it follows that
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
=− g(ω,0)
1−g(ω,0) q̂t−
g(ω,0)
1−g(ω,0)
̂
g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
)
(6.22)
Using a first-order approximation of the expected share of investment returns that accrues
to banks (2.5),
̂
g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
)
=
− f (ω)
1− f (ω) f̂ (ω t)+
Φ(ω)
1− f (ω)ξt (6.23)
Substituting (6.23) into (6.22) implies
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
=− g(ω,0)
1−g(ω,0) q̂t + f̂ (ω t)−
Φ(ω)
1−g(ω,0)ξt (6.24)
where f (ω) = 1−g(ω,0). Combining (6.18) with (6.24) it follows that
q̂t =−
φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt−Φ(ω)ξt (6.25)
where I have used the property that f˜ωt (ω) = 1−Φ(ω) in steady state.
Lemma 6.3. (ω) ω̂ t =
f (ω)
fω (ω)
(
n̂wt− it− φ(ω)g(ω,0)1−Φ(ω) ξt +Φ(ω)ξt
)
Proof. I begin by rearranging (6.24)
f̂ (ω t) =
̂(
1−qt .g
(
ω t ,1− eξt
))
+
g(ω,0)
1−g(ω,0) q̂t +
Φ(ω)
1−g(ω,0)ξt
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Using the investment supply condition (2.34) and (6.25), the above expression becomes
f̂ (ω t) = n̂wt− it +
g(ω,0)
1−g(ω,0)
(
−φ (ω)(1−g(ω,0))
1−Φ(ω) ξt−Φ(ω)ξt
)
+
Φ(ω)
1−g(ω,0)ξt (6.26)
Using f̂ (ω t) =
fω (ω)ω
f (ω) ω̂ t in (6.26) I have
(ω) ω̂ t =
f (ω)
fω (ω)
(
n̂wt− it−
φ (ω)g(ω,0)
1−Φ(ω) ξt +Φ(ω)ξt
)
as required.
6.4. The Optimal Policy Problem
Using a first-order approximation (for brevity the steps are omitted here, but are available
from the author on request), the constraints describing the decentralised equilibrium of
the economy (measured in terms of deviations from zero-inflation target values) are given
by
0 = σxt−
(
β (1−δ )σ − (1−β (1−δ )) 1+η
1−α
)
Etxt+1
−
(
sσ
(
1+β (1−δ )2
)
+(1−β (1−δ )) 1+αη
1−α
)
jt+1
+ sσ (1−δ ) jt +β (1−δ )sσEt jt+2
−σsent +β (1−δ )σseEtnt+1
0 = ϕknt−1+ϕr
(
σ +
1+η
1−α
)
xt−ϕrsσ jt+1
+ϕr
(
sσ (1−δ )− 1+αη
1−α
)
jt−
(
1+ϕrσs
e)nt
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and
0 =Θ
(
σ +
α+η
1−α
)
xt−Θsσ jt+1+Θ
(
sσ (1−δ )− α (1+η)
1−α
)
jt
−Θσsent +βEtpit+1−pit
0 = σ (xt−Etxt+1)+ sσ (1−δ ) jt− sσ (1−δ )Et jt+1
−σse (nt−Etnt+1)+ ibt − rbnt −Et (pit+1)
where
ϕk ≡ β−1
Ke
nw
ϕr ≡
(
β−1−1+δ
) Ke
nw
The optimal policy problem is to minimise E0
∑∞
t=t0
β t−t0Lt where Lt is given by (2.43),
subject to the above four constraints, and choosing sequences {ibt ,gt , jt ,nt ,pit}∞t=t0 and
where rbnt is given by the system defined in Appendix 6.2. It is straightforward to show
from the first-order conditions of this problem (again results omitted for brevity but are
available on request), that a zero gap solution for all variables does not satisfy these
conditions in the general case that n∗t 6= 0, and given an economy that is initially at
its efficient steady state. Therefore, in general, optimal policy will deviate from a zero-
inflation policy.
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Chapter 7
Appendix to Chapter 3
7.1. Information and Timing
We have three decision makers – households, investment firms and producers. Investment
firms know the true distribution of the random variable Z2 described in Section 3.3. That
is, investment firm managers information set at t = 1 contains IIF1 (ZL,ZH , pL, pH ,x1)
where x1 is a vector of all observed prices and quantities in period 1 (information is
complete for the investment firm manager).
In contrast, I assume that households know the possible realisations of Z2 (ZL and ZH),
but not the probabilities with which these states are realised. Thus, the information set for
households at t = 1 is given by IHH1 (ZL,ZH ,x1). Since households do not know pL, pH ,
an additional assumption on how households form their beliefs is required. For simplicity,
I assume that the continuum of households have beliefs such that
{
p̂HHL (i) , p̂
HH
H (i)
}
=
{p̂L (i) , p̂H (i)} for all i∈ [0,1]. That is, there is an atom of households sharing the beliefs
of each atom of investment firms across the unit interval.
In period 2, after uncertainty has been resolved and the state of technology realised, the
information sets for firm managers and households are identical IIF2 (x2) = IHH2 (x2),
where x2 is a vector of all observed prices and quantities in period 2. Notice that since
producers are only concerned with intra-temporal decisions, they have no interest in
forecasting Z2.
The timing of decisions is as follows:
t = 0
1. A continuum of investment firms optimise on their subjective probabilities
{p̂L (i) , p̂H (i)}, and report these to a continuum of households. Beliefs across
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the household continuum are assumed to match the beliefs across the continuum
of firms, so that for each type of firm (ε (i)), there is an atom of households
willing to accept the firm-reported probabilities {p̂L (i) , p̂H (i)}, and to use these
probabilities when making their optimal portfolio allocation and consumption
decisions.
t = 1
1. Given their beliefs, investment firms, households and producers make their
optimal consumption, portfolio allocation, investment and production plans.
2. Arrow-Debreu securities, share markets and goods markets open.
3. The Walrasian auctioneer quotes a market-clearing price vector consistent with a
decentralised equilibrium.
4. Consumption, portfolio selection, investment and production decisions take place
at market-clearing prices.
t = 2
1. The state of technology is realised in period 2 (Z2 ∈ {ZL,ZH}), and is observed
by all agents.
2. Households, investment firms and producers make their optimal consumption,
labour effort, investment and production plans.
3. The Walrasian auctioneer quotes a market clearing price vector consistent with a
decentralised equilibrium.
4. Consumption, labour supply, investment and production decisions take place at
market-clearing prices.
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7.2. More Detailed Description of the OE Economy
To clarify the problem for an individual investment manger. The second stage problem
(i.e. the optimal choice of investment taking beliefs as given) for investment firm i is
max
I1(i)
R1 (i)K1 (i)− I1 (i)−ψ
I1 (i)
2
2
+β I1 (i)
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂s (i)
where i ∈ [0,1]. At an interior, the optimal investment choice is given by
1+ψI1 (i) = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂s (i)
The first stage problem (the optimal choice of beliefs) is given by
max
p̂L(i),p̂H(i)
E (pi1 (i)+βpi2 (i))
subject to:
pi1 (i) =
(
R1 (i)K1 (i)− I1 (i)−ψ
I1 (i)
2
2
)
+β I1 (i)
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂s (i)
pi2 (i) = ε (i)
(
R1 (i)K1 (i)− I1 (i)−ψ
I1 (i)
2
2
)
+ I1 (i)
U ′ (C2 (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
R2 (i)
1+ψI1 (i) = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂s (i)
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s (i)
p̂s (i)≥ 0 for s = L,H
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and has interior optimality conditions
1+ψI1 (i) = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂s (i)
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s (i)
βε (i)(1+ψI1 (i)) = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) ps+ψI1 (i)
where Cs (i) is the consumption basket purchased by the shareholders (households) that
own firm i.
To clarify the problem for households, individual household j ∈ [0,1] solves the following
intratemporal consumption allocations for t = 1,L,H
min
Cit ( j)
∫ 1
0
Pit C
i
t ( j)di
subject to
Ct ( j)≥
(∫ 1
0
(
Cit ( j)
) θ−1
θ
di
) θ
θ−1
taking Ct ( j) as given, where P
i
t is the price of consumption good i, Ct ( j) is a Dixit-
Stiglitz basket of goods consumed by household j, and θ is a common elasticity of
substitution across goods. The optimal demand for consumption good i by household
j can be expressed as
Cit ( j) =
(
Pit
Pt
)−θ
Ct ( j)
where Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz price index that measures the shadow price of consuming the
basket of goods Ct ( j),
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
(
Pit
)1−θ
di
) 1
1−θ
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The intertemporal and labour supply decisions made by households can be obtained from
the solution to:
max
C1( j),θi( j),as( j)
Cs( j),Ns( j)
U (C1 ( j))+β
∑
s=L,H
(U (Cs ( j))−V (Ns ( j))) p̂s ( j)
subject to:
P1C1 ( j)+P1
∑
s=L,H
ωsas ( j)+P1
∫ 1
0
(
qi−D1,i
)
θi ( j)di
≤ P1W1 ( j)N1 ( j)+P1
∫ 1
0
qiφi ( j)di+P1D
P
1 ( j)
PsCs ( j)≤ Psas ( j)+PsWs ( j)Ns ( j)+PsDPs ( j)+Ps
∫ 1
0
θi ( j)Ds,idi
θi ( j)≥ 0
for s = L,H
The household optimality conditions (at an interior solution) satisfy
U ′ (C1 ( j)) =
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs ( j))
(
1+ r f
)
p̂s ( j)
Ws ( j) =
V ′ (Ns ( j))
U ′ (Cs ( j))
for s = L,H
q1,i = D1,i+β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs ( j))
U ′ (C1 ( j))
Ds,i p̂s ( j)
7.3. Existence and Comparative Statics
I first show that an OE equilibrium exists where all firms optimally choose rational
expectations.
Proposition 7.1. A symmetric OE equilibrium where all firms and households optimally
choose rational expectations exists. This equilibrium will be chosen when ε = εRE , where
εRE ≡ β−1 1+2ψI
RE
1
1+ψIRE1
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and IRE1 is the strictly positive solution to any valid RE equilibrium satisfying Definition
3.2.
Proof. Fix values for Y1,Zs and ps where Y1 > 0,Zs > 0 and
∑
s ps = 1. I first establish
existence and uniqueness of an interior RE equilibrium. An interior RE equilibrium can
be represented as a (strictly positive) vector
{
IRE1 ,C
RE
1 ,C
RE
s ,N
RE
s
}
s=L,H
that solves
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
αZs (I1)
α−1 (Ns)
1−α ps
Cs = ZsI
α
1 N
1−α
s
C1 = Y1− I1−ψ
I21
2
V ′ (Ns) =U
′ (Cs)(1−α)Zs (I1)α (Ns)−α
taking Y1,Zs, ps as given and for s = L,H. Using the Second Welfare theorem note that
the decentralised equilibrium can be obtained by solving the following social planner
problem:
max
I1,C1,Cs,Ns
U (C1)+β
∑
s=L,H
(U (Cs)−V (Ns)) ps
subject to:
Y1 ≥C1+ I1+ψ
I21
2
Cs ≤ ZsIα1 N1−αs
I1 ≥ 0,C1 ≥ 0,Cs ≥ 0
given: Y1,Zs, ps
for s = L,H
Under standard assumptions on the objective (U is strictly increasing and concave, V is
strictly increasing and convex), and given that the constraints are quasi-convex, it follows
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that a solution to the above problem exists and the first-order conditions are both necessary
and sufficient for a unique global maximum. Since the decentralised and social planner
optimality conditions are identical, it follows that the interior RE equilibrium exists, and
it is unique.
Now note that an OE equilibrium can be represented by a vector{
IOE1 ,C
OE
1 ,C
OE
s ,N
OE
s , p̂s
}
s=L,H
solving
βε
(
1+ψ
(
1−β−1ε−1
)
I1
)
= β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
αZs (I1)
α−1 (Ns)
1−α ps
Cs = ZsI
α
1 N
1−α
s
C1 = Y1− I1−ψ
I21
2
V ′ (Ns) =U
′ (Cs)(1−α)Zs (I1)α (Ns)−α
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
αZs
(
Ns
I1
)1−α
p̂s
taking {Y1,Zs, ps}s=L,H and ε > β−1 as given.
Our goal is to show there exists an ε such that{
IOE1 = I
RE
1 ,C
OE
1 =C
RE
1 ,C
OE
s =C
RE
s ,N
OE
s = N
RE
s , p̂s = ps
}
s=L,H
. To see this, choose
ε = εRE > β−1 where
εRE ≡ β−1 1+2ψI
RE
1
1+ψIRE1
and IRE1 > 0 is the solution to a given RE equilibrium above (i.e for given
{Y1,Zs, ps}s=L,H).
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Plugging the above value for ε into the conditions characterising an OE equilibrium it
follows that
{
IOE1 ,C
OE
1 ,C
OE
s ,N
OE
s , p̂s
}
s=L,H
is now a vector that solves
1+2ψIRE1
1+ψIRE1
(
1+ψ
(
1− 1+ψI
RE
1
1+2ψIRE1
)
I1
)
= β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
αZs (I1)
α−1 (Ns)
1−α ps
Cs = ZsI
α
1 N
1−α
s
C1 = Y1− I1−ψ
I21
2
V ′ (Ns) =U
′ (Cs)(1−α)Zs (I1)α (Ns)−α
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s
1+ψI1 = β
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs)
U ′ (C1)
αZs
(
Ns
I1
)1−α
p̂s
One can verify that
{
IOE1 = I
RE
1 ,C
OE
1 =C
RE
1 ,C
OE
s =C
RE
s ,N
OE
s = N
RE
s , p̂s = ps
}
for s =
L,H is a solution to the above system, given that
{
IRE1 ,C
RE
1 ,C
RE
s ,N
RE
s
}
s=L,H
solves the
RE equilibrium previously defined.
I now study the main comparative static results of interest, recalling that I use the notation
∂y
∂x ≡ ∂y∂x |
ε=εRE
. That is, I study the effects of small perturbations around the equilibrium
point where optimal and rational expectations coincide.
Proposition 3.1. Consider (separately) small perturbations to the realisation of
technology in each state, ZL,ZH , around the equilibrium point at which optimal and
rational expectations coincide. It follows that beliefs are optimistic, and investment
and equity prices are higher under OE than RE following each of these perturbations.
Furthermore, these responses are largest for a perturbation to the realisation of
technology in the high state – provided that the likelihood of this state is sufficiently large.
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That is,
∂ p̂H
∂x
> 0;
∂ p̂L
∂x
< 0
∂ IOE1
∂x
>
∂ IRE1
∂x
> 0;
∂qOE1
∂x
>
∂qRE1
∂x
> 0
for x ∈ ZL,ZH
and
∂y
∂ZH
≥ ∂y
∂ZL
for y ∈ p̂H , IOE1 ,qOE1
if
pH
pL
≥
(
ZL
ZH
)γ3−1
Before starting the proof, I begin with a lemma that characterises one minimal
representation of the equilibrium conditions for the OE and RE equilibria respectively.
These minimal representations are useful for deriving the comparative statics that follow.
Lemma 7.1. A minimal representation of the OE equilibrium is a solution{
IOE1 , p̂
OE
s
}
s=L,H
that satisfies
βε
(
1+ψI1−
ψ
βε
I1
)
= Iγ11 γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s ps
(
Y1− I1−ψ
(I1)
2
2
)σ
(1+ψI1) = I
γ1
1 γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s p̂s
(
Y1− I1−ψ
(I1)
2
2
)σ
1 =
∑
s=L,H
p̂s
where γ1 ≡−
σ +η−αη+αση
α+σ +η−ασ < 0
γ2 ≡ αβ (1−α)
(1−α)(1−σ)
η+σ(1−α)+α > 0
γ3 ≡−(σ −1)
η+1
α+σ +η−ασ > 0
since α,σ ∈ (0,1) (7.1)
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taking {Y1,Zs, ps}s=L,H as given. By comparison, a minimal representation of the RE
equilibrium is a solution
{
IRE1
}
to
(
Y1− I1−ψ
(I1)
2
2
)−σ
(1+ψI1) = I
γ1
1 γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s ps
again taking {Y1,Zs, ps}s=L,H as given.
Proof. This can be verified by solving the OE and RE equilibriums, given the assumed
power functions for household preferences (see 3.21). Notice that once the above solutions
are obtained, one can solve for all prices and quantities of interest given the OE and RE
equilibria previously defined.
I now proceed with the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof. I first establish the results with respect to investment and equity prices, and then
turn to the optimal subjective probabilities. Using Lemma 7.1, taking logs, and totally
differentiating, holding {ps}s=L,H and ZL fixed, it follows that
∂ IOE1
∂ZH
= γ3
Zγ3−1H pH∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
σ 1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
−1
> 0
where γ2 > 0,γ3 > 0 (assuming σ < 1), and γ1 < 0.
Again, using Lemma 7.1, an analogous exercise for the RE economy implies
∂ IRE1
∂ZH
= γ3
Zγ3−1H pH∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
(
σ
1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− γ1
IRE1
)−1
> 0
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Comparing the derivatives ∂ I
OE
1
∂ZH
and ∂ I
RE
1
∂ZH
and noting that ψ
1+ψIRE1
>
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
since
βεRE > 1, it follows that
∂ IOE1
∂ZH
>
∂ IRE1
∂ZH
> 0
An analogous argument can be used to establish
∂ IOE1
∂ZL
>
∂ IRE1
∂ZL
> 0
Also note that
∂ IOE1
∂ZL
= γ3
Zγ3−1L pL∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
σ 1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
−1
and thus
∂ IOE1
∂ZH
≥ ∂ I
OE
1
∂ZL
if
Zγ3−1H pH ≥ Z
γ3−1
L pL
The intuition behind this last inequality is that if the high state payoff is sufficient likely
and/or large, then a perturbation to realised technology in the high state will have a greater
effect on investment than a perturbation to realised technology in the low state. That is,
∂ Ie1
∂ZH
≥ ∂ I
e
1
∂ZL
if Zγ3−1H pH ≥ Z
γ3−1
L pL
for e ∈ {OE,RE}
To establish the results for equity pricing, it can be observed from the equilibrium
conditions, either under OE or RE, that the measure of equity prices of interest
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(households’ valuation of the dividend stream paid by investment firms) is given by
qe1 = R1K1− Ie1−
ψ
(
Ie1
)2
2
+β Ie1E
e
(
U ′
(
Ce2
)
U ′
(
Ce1
)Re2
)
where e ∈ {OE,RE}
Using the equilibrium investment condition under the optimal subjective probability
measure for an OE equilibrium, and under the rational probability measure for an RE
equilibrium,
qe1 = R1K1+
ψ
(
Ie1
)2
2
and thus
∂qe1
∂x
= ψIe1
∂ Ie1
∂x
for x ∈ {ZL,ZH , pH}
and e ∈ {OE,RE}
since R1K1 is fixed exogenously. From this condition, and that I am considering
perturbations around the equilibrium where initially IOE1 = I
RE
1 , it follows that the above
results derived with respect to investment, equally apply to equity prices.
Turning to the optimal subjective probabilities, again using Lemma 7.1, the OE
equilibrium conditions can be re-written as
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s p̂s =
∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
βε
1+ψI1
1+ψI1− ψβε I1
Iγ11 γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s ps = βε
(
Y1− I1−ψ
(I1)
2
2
)−σ (
1+ψI1−
ψ
βε
I1
)
(7.2)
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Taking logs and totally differentiating the first condition (holding {ps}s=L,H and ZL fixed),
and noting d p̂Ld p̂H =−1, I have
∂ p̂H
∂ZH
=
∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
Zγ3H −Zγ3L
 ψ
1+ψIRE1
−
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
 ∂ IOE1
∂ZH
> 0
since ZH > ZL,
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− ψ−
ψ
βε
1+ψIRE1 − ψβε I
RE
1
> 0, γ3 > 0 and
∂ IOE1
∂ZH
> 0 (see above). Using the
restriction that subjective probabilities must sum to one immediately immediately implies
d p̂L
dZH
< 0.
By symmetry
∂ p̂H
∂ZL
=
∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
Zγ3H −Zγ3L
 ψ
1+ψIRE1
−
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
 ∂ IOE1
∂ZL
> 0
and ∂ p̂L∂ZL < 0. Finally, since
∂ IRE1
∂ZH
≥ ∂ I
RE
1
∂ZL
if Zγ3−1H pH ≥ Z
γ3−1
L pL, it follows that
∂ p̂H
∂ZH
>
∂ p̂H
∂ZL
if Zγ3−1H pH ≥ Z
γ3−1
L pL
which completes the proof.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a perturbation to the true (or rational) probability with which
the high state is realised, pH (with d pH =−d pL). Firms assign a probability to the high
state that is above the true probability, and a probability to the low state that is below the
true probability. Investment and equity prices are higher under OE than RE, following
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this perturbation.
∂ p̂H
∂ pH
> 1;
∂ p̂L
∂ pH
<−1
∂yOE1
∂ pH
>
∂yRE1
∂ pH
> 0
for y1 ∈ I1,q1
Proof. As in the previous proposition I start with the equilibrium conditions in the system
(7.1). Fixing ZL and ZH , taking logs and totally differentiating both conditions I obtain
∂ p̂H
∂ pH
= 1+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
−
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
σ 1+ψI
RE
1
CRE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
> 1
since γ1 < 0 and βε
RE > 1. Note ∂ p̂L∂ pH < 1 follows immediately from 1 = p̂L + p̂H . In
addition, it is straightforward to verify
∂ IOE1
∂ pH
=
Zγ3H −Zγ3L∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
σ 1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
−1
> 0
The second result follows directly by comparing the above partial derivative with
∂ IRE1
∂ pH
=
Zγ3H −Zγ3L∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
(
σ
1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− γ1
IRE1
)−1
> 0
The result for equity prices follows directly from ∂q
e
1
∂ ph
= ψIe1
∂ Ie1
∂ ph
for e ∈ {OE,RE} (see
the proof of Proposition 3.1).
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Proposition 3.3. Output and labour effort in period two, and consumption growth,
increase by more under OE than RE in response to a perturbation to ZH ,ZL or pH .
∂Y OEs
∂x
>
∂Y REs
∂x
> 0
∂NOEs
∂x
>
∂NREs
∂x
> 0
∂ ln C
OE
s
COE1
∂x
>
∂ ln C
RE
s
CRE1
∂x
> 0
for x ∈ {ZL,ZH , pH}
Proof. The first two results follow immediately by noting that in general (under either an
OE or RE equilibrium)
Y es = Zs
(
Ie1
)α (Nes )1−α
Nes =
(
(1−α)Z1−σs
(
Ie1
)α(1−σ)) 1η+σ(1−α)+α
where e ∈ {OE,RE}
and so (taking logs and totally differentiating)
dY es
Ys
= γ4
dZs
Zs
+αγ4
dIe1
Ie1
dNs
Ns
= γ5
dZs
Zs
+αγ5
dIh1
Ih1
where γ4 ≡
η+1
α+σ +η−ασ > 0
γ5 ≡
(1−σ)
η+σ (1−α)+α > 0
since σ ,α ∈ (0,1)
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Noting that these results can be treated locally as identities in the neighbourhood of the
equilibrium where RE and OE coincide, it follows that
∂Y es
∂x
=
Y REs
Zs
γ4
∂Zs
∂x
+
Y REs
IRE1
αγ4
∂ Ies
∂x
∂Nes
∂x
=
NREs
Zs
γ5
∂Zs
∂x
+
NREs
IRE1
αγ5
∂ Ies
∂x
for x ∈ {ZL,ZH , pH} and e ∈ {OE,RE}
which in conjunction with the results in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 can be used to verify that
∂Y OEs
∂x >
∂Y REs
∂x > 0 and
∂NOEs
∂x >
∂NREs
∂x > 0 for x ∈ {ZL,ZH , pH}. The third result follows by
noting that
Ce1 = Y1− Ie1−
ψ
2
Ie21
Y es =C
e
s
for s = L,H and e ∈ {OE,RE}
and again using the results derived in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 with respect to
investment.
Proposition 3.4. Agents become pessimistic (over-optimistic) when the weight attached
to memory utility increases (decreases)
∂ IOE1
∂ε
< 0;
∂qOE1
∂ε
< 0
∂ p̂OEH
∂ε
< 0;
∂ p̂OEL
∂ε
> 0
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Proof. Using Lemma 7.1 one can verify
∂ IOE1
∂ε
=−
 1εRE + ψI
RE
1
β
(
εRE
)2(
1+ψ
(
1−β−1
(
ε
RE)−1)
IRE1
)

×
σ 1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
−1
< 0
Using the result derived in Proposition 3.1
∂qOE1
∂ε
= ψIOE1
∂ IOE1
∂ε
verifies the analogous result for equity prices.
Again using Lemma 7.1,
∂ p̂OEH
∂ε
=
∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
Zγ3H −Zγ3L
(
σ
1+ψIRE1
CRE1
+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− γ1
IRE1
)
∂ IOE1
∂ε
< 0
since ∂ I
OE
1
∂ε < 0 (above). The last result follows from 1 = p̂
OE
H + p̂
OE
L .
7.4. Household Optimism
Proposition 3.5. Re-consider the OE economy described in Definition 3.1. Suppose now
that:
1. Households optimally choose beliefs rather than investment firms;
2. Investment firms maximise shareholder value;
3. In the absence of a perturbation to the distribution of technology, households use
a rational probability measure; and
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4. Households become optimistic (pessimistic) in response to favourable
(unfavourable) perturbations to the distribution of technology. That is, I assume
the reduced-form relationship
∂ p̂hH
∂x
> 0 for x ∈ ZL,ZH , pH
In such an economy, where beliefs are symmetric and determined by households, equity
prices, investment, output, labour supply and consumption growth all increase by more
in this reduced-form OE economy than in an RE economy in response to a favourable
change in the distribution of technology.
Proof. I assume investment firm managers now solve
max
I1(i)
(
R1 (i)K1 (i)− I1 (i)−ψ
I1 (i)
2
2
)
+β I1 (i)
∑
s=L,H
U ′ (Cs (i))
U ′ (C1 (i))
Rs (i) p̂
h
s (i)
taking p̂hs (i) as beliefs that are now household determined. It is straightforward to
verify that managers are investing to maximise the value of the firm, given shareholder
(household) beliefs.
Now suppose households choose their expectations optimally, as well as their
consumption, portfolio choice and labour supply decisions. That is, households solve111
max
{ p̂hs ( j)}s=L,H
F̂
(
C∗1 ( j) ,C
∗
s ( j) ,N
∗
s ( j) ,θ
∗
i ( j) ,a
∗
s ( j) , p̂
h
s ( j) ;ξ
)
subject to:
p̂hs ( j)≥ 0 and p̂hs ( j) = 0 if ps = 0∑
s=L,H
p̂hs ( j) = 1
for s = L,H
111The intratemporal allocation of consumption purchases remains identical to that described in the main
text.
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and the functions {C∗1 ( j) ,C∗s ( j) ,N∗s ( j) ,θ ∗i ( j) ,a∗s ( j)}s=L,H are derived from the
solutions to the constrained optimisation program
max
C1( j),Cs( j),
Ns( j),θi( j),as( j)
U (C1 ( j))+β
∑
s=L,H
(U (Cs ( j))−V (Ns ( j))) p̂hs ( j)
subject to:
P1C1 ( j)+P1
∑
s=L,H
ωsas ( j)+P1
∫ 1
0
(
qi−D1,i
)
θi ( j)di
≤ P1W1 ( j)N1 ( j)+P1
∫ 1
0
qiφi ( j)di+P1D
P
1 ( j)
PsCs ( j)≤ Psas ( j)+PsWs ( j)Ns ( j)+PsDPs ( j)+Ps
∫ 1
0
θi ( j)Ds,idi
θi ( j)≥ 0
for s = L,H
where F̂ is a twice differentiable strictly concave function, and ξ is parameter vector (that
includes β ,εh,η ,σ ). I assume there exists, at least locally, a continuously differentiable
solution for optimal household beliefs given by the functions
p̂hH = f̂ (ZL,ZH , pL, pH ,Y1;ξ )
p̂hL = 1− p̂hH
with the property that
∂ p̂hH
∂x
> 0 for x ∈ ZL,ZH , pH
and that p̂hH = pH , p̂
h
L = pL in the absence of any perturbations. I need to show that all
of the comparative statics previously derived also hold for this alternative household OE
economy.
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To see this, first note that given the above assumptions a household-led OE equilibrium
can be defined minimally as a set
{
Ih1 , p̂
h
L, p̂
h
H
}
solving
Y1− Ih1 −ψ
(
Ih1
)2
2

−σ (
1+ψIh1
)(
Ih1
)−γ1
= γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s p̂
h
s
p̂hH = f (ZL,ZH , pL, pH ,Y1;ξ )
p̂hL = 1− p̂hH
where γ1 < 0,γ2 > 0,γ3 < 0
taking {ZL,ZH , pL, pH ,Y1;ξ} as given.
Comparing this with the RE equilibrium condition for investment
Y1− Ih1 −ψ
(
Ih1
)2
2

−σ (
1+ψIh1
)(
Ih1
)−γ1
= γ2
∑
s=L,H
Zγ3s ps
it is straightforward to show that
∂ Ih1
∂x
>
∂ IRE1
∂x
> 0 if
∂ p̂hH
∂x
> 0
for x ∈ ZL,ZH , pH
Given that all other prices and quantities in the household-led OE economy are identical
functions of investment when compared with the benchmark OE economy previously
discussed, and that the RE economy is unchanged, it follows that all of the previous
comparative statics derived also hold in the household-led OE economy.
7.5. A Model with N-states
The definition on an OE equilibrium with N states generalises to:
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Definition 7.1. A symmetric interior OE equilibrium in an economy with
N states is defined as vector of prices
{
rOEf ,q
OE
1 ,R
OE
s
}N
s=1
, quantities{
C˜OE1 , I
OE
1 ,C
OE
s ,Y
OE
s ,N
OE
s
}N
s=1
, and optimal subjective probabilities { p̂s}Ns=1 that
satisfy
1+ψI1 = β Ê
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2

U ′
(
C˜1
)
= β
(
1+ r f
)
Ê
(
U ′ (C2)
)
βε (1+ψI1) = βE
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2
+ψI1
q1 = R1K1− I1−
ψ
2
(I1)
2+β I1Ê
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2

(1−α)Cs
Ns
=
V ′ (Ns)
U ′ (Cs)
Y1 = C˜1+ I1+
ψ
2
(I1)
2
Rs = α
Ys
I1
Cs = Zs (I1)
α (Ns)
1−α
Ys =Cs
1 =
N∑
s=1
p̂s and P̂≺ P
for s = 1, ...,N
taking Y1,R1,K1 and the rational probability space {Ω,F ,P} as given, and where Ê (X)≡∑N
s=1 Xs p̂s and E (X)≡
∑N
s=1 Xs ps for the generic random variable X : Ω→ R.
For comparative purposes, with N states the RE equilibrium is defined by:
Definition 7.2. An RE equilibrium is a vector of exogenous beliefs {ps}Ns=1 , endogenous
prices
{
rREf ,q
RE
1 ,R
RE
s
}N
s=1
and endogenous quantities
{
C˜RE1 , I
RE
1 ,C
RE
s ,Y
RE
s ,N
RE
s
}N
s=1
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that satisfy
1+ψI1 = βE
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2

U ′
(
C˜1
)
= β
(
1+ r f
)
E
(
U ′ (C2)
)
q1 = R1K1− I1−
ψ
2
(I1)
2+β I1E
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2

(1−α)Cs
Ns
=
V ′ (Ns)
U ′ (Cs)
Y1 = C˜1+ I1+
ψ
2
(I1)
2
Rs = α
Ys
I1
for s = L,H
Ys = Zs (I1)
α (Ns)
1−α
Ys =Cs
for s = 1, ...,N
taking Y1,R1,K1 and the rational probability space {Ω,F ,P} as given.
Importantly, one can show, in the case of N states, there exists an OE economy that
coincides with a RE economy, in terms of prices and quantities, and is uniquely defined up
to the optimal expectation, Ê
(
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′(C˜1)
ROE2
)
= E
(
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)ROE2
)
.112 However, it should
be note that uniqueness of beliefs is no longer assured with N > 2. This is because there
are many sets of subjective beliefs that are consistent with the same optimal expectation
(or indeed, rational expectation).
112I omit this proof for brevity, though it is available on request.
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Remark 7.1. Note that with N-states the optimality conditions that characterise prices
and quantities in an OE equilibrium are given by
βε
(
Y1− IOE1 −ψ
I21
2
)−σ
=
(
1+ψIOE1 −
ψ
βε
IOE1
)−1
×
(
IOE1
)α−1−ασ
αβ
×
N∑
s=1
Z1−σs N
(1−α)(1−σ)
s ps
Ns =
(
(1−α)Z1−σs
(
IOE1
)α(1−σ)) 1η+σ(1−α)+α
and that the unique expectation is given by
Ê
 U ′ (C2)
U ′
(
C˜1
)R2
= 1+ψIOE1
β
I now turn to the key results of interest.
Proposition 3.6.
(a) A positive perturbation to realised productivity in one state leads to over-investment
and over-valuation in equity markets (assuming risk aversion is low), and an overly
optimistic forecast of the return to investment.
∂ IOE1
∂Zn
>
∂ IRE1
∂Zn
> 0
∂qOE1
∂Zn
>
∂qRE1
∂Zn
> 0
∂ Ê
(
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2
)
∂Zn
>
∂E
(
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2
)
∂Zn
> 0
if σ < 1 for n ∈ {1, ...,N}
(b) Consider a marginal shift in probability mass from some low productivity state (k) to a
higher productivity state ( j) (i.e. d p j =−d pk where j > k and j,k ∈ {1, ...,N} and fixing
166
d pn = 0 for all n 6= j,k). Investment and equity prices increase beyond their fundamental
values, and again forecast investment returns are overly optimistic.
∂ IOE1
∂ p j
>
∂ IRE1
∂ p j
> 0
∂qOE1
∂ p j
>
∂qRE1
∂ p j
> 0
∂ Ê
(
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2
)
∂ p j
>
∂E
(
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2
)
∂ p j
> 0
if σ < 1
Proof. Focusing on result (a), and using methods analogous to those used in Proposition
3.1, it is straightforward to show that
∂ IOE1
∂Zn
= γ3
Zγ3−1n pn∑
s Z
1−σ
s N
(1−α)(1−σ)
s ps
σ 1+ψIRE1
C˜RE1
+
ψ− ψ
βεRE
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1
−1 > 0
∂ IRE1
∂Zn
= γ3
Zγ3−1n pn∑
s Z
1−σ
s N
(1−α)(1−σ)
s ps
(
σ
1+ψIRE1
C˜RE1
+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− γ1
IRE1
)−1
> 0
and so ∂ I
OE
1
∂Zn
>
∂ IRE1
∂Zn
. Also, it still follows that with N-states and symmetric household and
investment firm beliefs
∂qe1
∂Zn
= ψIRE1
∂ Ie1
∂Zn
for e ∈ OE,RE
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which can be used to confirm the second result. The third result in (a) can be derived by
differentiating the equilibrium conditions with respect to Zn and using
∂ IOE1
∂Zn
>
∂ IRE1
∂Zn
> 0
1+ψIOE1 = β Ê
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2

1+ψIRE1 = βE
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2

Turning to the results in (b), first I concentrate on the effect on investment. Recall that in
equilibrium
βε
Y1− IOE1 −ψ
(
IOE1
)2
2

−σ (
1+ψIOE1 −
ψ
βε
IOE1
)
=
(
IOE1
)γ1
γ2
∑
s
Zγ3s ps
Taking logs, and totally differentiating (fixing Zs for all s, and fixing ps for all s 6= j or k)
∂ IOE1
∂ p j
=
σ 1+ψIRE1C˜RE1 +
ψ
(
1−
(
βεRE
)−1)
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1

−1
Zγ3j +Z
γ3
k
d pk
d p j∑
s Z
γ3
s ps
Since 1 =−d pkd p j by construction it follows that
∂ IOE1
∂ p j
=
σ 1+ψIRE1C˜RE1 +
ψ
(
1−
(
βεRE
)−1)
1+ψIRE1 − ψβεRE I
RE
1
− γ1
IRE1

−1
Zγ3j −Zγ3k∑N
s=1 Z
γ3
s ps
Thus, provided that the increment in probability involves a marginal shift in mass from
some low state to a higher state, it follows that investment will increase following this
marginal shift in mass if σ < 1 (γ3 > 0).
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Using a similar argument
∂ IRE1
∂ p j
=
(
σ
1+ψIRE1
C˜RE1
+
ψ
1+ψIRE1
− γ1
IRE1
)−1
Zγ3j −Zγ3k∑N
s=1 Z
γ3
s ps
thus completing the first result (recall βεRE > 1).
The second result in (b) immediately follows from
∂qe1
∂ p j
= ψIRE1
∂ Ie1
∂ p j
for e ∈ OE,RE
The third result in (b) follows from using the equilibrium conditions under OE and RE
respectively
1+ψIOE1 = β Ê
U ′
(
COE2
)
U ′
(
C˜OE1
)ROE2

1+ψIRE1 = βE
U ′
(
CRE2
)
U ′
(
C˜RE1
)RRE2

and that ∂ I
OE
1
∂ p j
>
∂ IRE1
∂ p j
> 0 (recall these derivatives are evaluated at ε = εRE , and so
IOE1 = I
RE
1 in the absence of the perturbation).
7.6. Welfare
Proposition 3.7. A social planner using probability measure P̂SP ≺ P, prefers investment
firms that use any probability measure P̂≺ P that satisfies
N∑
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs
 p̂SPs = N∑
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs
 p̂s
where CSPs , R
SP
s = α
CSPs
ISP1
, C˜SP1 are obtained from the solutions to (3.22).
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Proof. This follows from the fact that
{
C˜SP1 ,C
SP
s , I
SP
s ,N
SP
s
}N
s=1
is the unique solution
to the social planner problem in (3.22), and that for any alternative set of beliefs,
{p̂s}Ns=1 satisfying Definition 7.1, these beliefs only induce the unique allocation{
C˜SP1 ,C
SP
s , I
SP
s ,N
SP
s
}N
s=1
, if and only if,
∑N
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs p̂SPs = ∑Ns=1 U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs p̂s.
The latter result can be verified by showing that the FOC of the social planner
problem are identical to those associated with OE equilibrium (in terms of quantities{
C˜1,Cs, Is,Ns
}N
s=1
) in the case that
∑N
s=1
U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs p̂SPs =∑Ns=1 U ′
(
CSPs
)
U ′
(
C˜SP1
)RSPs p̂s and not
otherwise.
7.7. Optimal Investment Expectations with an Infinite Horizon
Before proceeding to the full commitment solution to this problem, the following lemma
will prove useful.
Lemma 7.2. The constraints on It and Kt+1
It ,Kt+1 ∈ arg max
I˜t ,K˜t+1:K˜t+1=(1−δ )K˜t+I˜t
Ê0
∞∑
t=0
β t
U ′ (Ct)
U ′ (C0)
(
RtK˜t− I˜t−Ψ
(
I˜t
K˜t
)
K˜t
)
(7.3)
can be equivalently be represented by
U ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
Kt+1 =
∞∑
τ=1
β τ ÊtU
′ (Ct+τ)
(
Rt+τKt+τ − It+τ −Ψ
(
It+τ
Kt+τ
)
Kt+τ
)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It
Proof. Consider that
It ,Kt+1 ∈ arg max
I˜t ,K˜t+1:K˜t+1=(1−δ )K˜t+I˜t
Ê0
∞∑
t=0
β t
U ′ (Ct)
U ′ (C0)
(
RtK˜t− I˜t−Ψ
(
I˜t
K˜t
)
K˜t
)
can be solved using the Lagrangian
Λ= Ê0
∞∑
t=0
β t
U ′ (Ct)
U ′ (C0)
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt−qt (Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt− It)
)
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which has first-order conditions
U ′ (Ct)qt = β Êt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+qt+1 (1−δ )
))
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It
where qt ≡ 1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
)
. A useful relationship to note is that
qtKt+1 = βEt
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
 Rt+1Kt+1+Ψ′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
Kt+1+qt+1Kt+1 (1−δ )


Since
Kt+1 (1−δ ) = Kt+2− It+1
the above relationship can be re-written as
qtKt+1 = βEt
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
 Rt+1Kt+1+Ψ′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
Kt+1−qt+1It+1+qt+1Kt+2


Solving forward
qtKt+1 = Êt
∞∑
τ=1
β τ
U ′ (Ct+τ)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+τKt+τ − It+τ −Ψ
(
It+τ
Kt+τ
)
Kt+τ
)
and using the definition of qt yields the desired result.
I now turn to the main result of interest.
Proposition 3.8. Under full-commitment with ε < β−1, and assuming that the optimal
investment decision is conceivable (i.e. it is a an investment decision that can be optimally
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chosen under the restriction P̂≺ P), an interior solution to the program (3.24) is given by
qt =
β
βε
Et
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
+
(1−βε)
βε
(
Ψ′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
)
− (1−βε)
βε
βEt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
Ψ′′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
K2t+2
K2t+1
)
qt ≡ 1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It
K0 : given (7.4)
This will characterise the investment decision made under optimal expectations, provided
there exists a set of optimally chosen beliefs, P̂, satisfying
qt = β Êt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
and P̂ is a well-defined probability measure with P̂≺ P
Proof. Following the approach of Brunnermeier and Parker the OE program for firm
managers with an infinite horizon is given by:
max
P̂,{It ,Kt+1}∞t=0
E
∞∑
t=0
β t
(
t∑
τ=1
ετU ′ (Ct−τ)
(
Rt−τKt−τ − It−τ −Ψ
(
It−τ
Kt−τ
)
Kτ−τ
))
+E
∞∑
t=0
β tU ′ (Ct)
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
+E
∞∑
t=0
β t
( ∞∑
τ=1
β τ ÊtU
′ (Ct+τ)
(
Rt+τKt+τ − It+τ −Ψ
(
It+τ
Kt+τ
)
Kt+τ
))
(7.5)
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subject to:
P̂ is a well-defined probability space with P̂≺ P
I˜t , K˜t+1 ∈ arg max
It ,Kt+1:K˜t+1=(1−δ )K˜t+I˜t
Ê0
∞∑
t=0
β t
U ′ (Ct)
U ′ (C0)
(
RtK˜t− I˜t−Ψ
(
I˜t
K˜t
)
K˜t
)
where the constraint that
P̂ is a well-defined probability space with P̂≺ P
is equivalent to the following restrictions on the optimal subjective probabilities
1 =
∑
st+1
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)
for all t, and for all τ ≥ 1
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)≥ 0 for all t
P̂r
(
st+τ | st
)
=
τ∏
j=1
P̂r
(t)(
st+ j | st+ j−1
)
for all t, and for all τ ≥ 1
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)
= 0 if Pr
(
st+1 | st
)
= 0 for all t
To solve this program, I begin by defining the following random variables on the
probability space {Ω,F ,P} .
Yt ≡ βEt (mt+1Xt+1)+βYt+1
Ht ≡ εXt−1+ εHt−1
Xt ≡U ′ (Ct)
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
mt+1 ≡
P̂r
(
st+1 | st
)
Pr
(
st+1 | st
)
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where I have made use of the property that under absolute continuity, there exists a random
variable mt+1 satisfying
Êt (Xt+1) = Et (mt+1Xt+1)
1 = Et (mt+1)
Using Lemma 7.2, the above definitions, and reformulating the problem under the
restriction of absolutely continuity, it follows that the optimal expectations program can
be re-written as
maxE
∑
t=0
β t (Ht +Xt +Yt)
subject to:
0 = Yt−βEt (mt+1Xt+1)−βEtYt+1
0 = Ht− εHt−1− εXt−1
0 = 1−Et (mt+1)
0 = Xt−U ′ (Ct)
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
0 = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt− It
0 =U ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
Kt+1−Yt
mt+1 ≥ 0
H−1 = 0,X−1 = 0 and K0 given
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The FOC w.r.t Xt ,Ht ,Yt ,mt+1, It ,Kt+1 at an interior are respectively
0 = 1−λ4,t +λ1,t−1mt +βεEtλ2,t+1 (7.6)
0 = 1−λ2,t +βεEtλ2,t+1 (7.7)
0 = 1−λ1,t +λ6,t +λ1,t−1 (7.8)
0 = βλ1,tEtXt+1+λ3,t (7.9)
0 =−λ4,tU ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
+λ5,t
−λ6,tU ′ (Ct)Ψ′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
(7.10)
0 =−λ5,t−λ6,tU ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
+βEtλ4,t+1U
′ (Ct+1)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
))
+β (1−δ )Etλ5,t+1+βEtλ6,t+1U ′ (Ct+1)Ψ′′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1Kt+2
K2t+1
(7.11)
with the constraints completing the full set of FOC at an interior solution. I now simplify
the above conditions.
Notice there are two possible solutions to (7.9)
λ1,t = λ3,t = 0
or βλ1,tEtXt+1 =−λ3,t
I choose to focus on an equilibrium where the first solution holds. In this equilibrium the
lagrange multiplier on the absolute continuity constraint is valued at 0, implying that at
the optimum the restriction of absolute continuity does not constrain the optimal choice of
investment and beliefs. For further discussion on this interior equilibrium, see Remark 7.2.
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Proceeding under an equilibrium where λ1,t = λ3,t = 0 it follows from (7.8) and (7.7) that
λ6,t =−1
λ2,t =
1
1−βε
Using these results in (7.6)
λ4,t =
1
1−βε
And so (7.10) and (7.11) collapse respectively to
0 =− 1
1−βεU
′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
+λ5,t +U
′ (Ct)Ψ
′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
0 =−λ5,t +U ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
+
β
1−βεEt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)))
+βEtλ5,t+1 (1−δ )−Et
(
U ′ (Ct+1)Ψ
′′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1Kt+2
K2t+1
)
or more simply
βε
1−βεU
′ (Ct)qt =
β
1−βεEt
U ′ (Ct+1)
 Rt+1+Ψ′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1


+U ′ (Ct)Ψ
′′
(
It
Kt
)
Kt+1
Kt
−βEt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)Ψ
′′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
K2t+2
K2t+1
)
qt ≡ 1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
)
Note that the implicit assumption in this solution for investment is that the investment firm
manager would chose the above solution even if he or she was not restricted to choosing
optimal subjective probabilities that are absolutely continous with respect to the rational
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probability measure. That is, this solution assumes there exists a subjective probability
measure,P̂, satisfying
qt = β Êt
(
U ′ (Ct+1)
U ′ (Ct)
(
Rt+1+Ψ
′
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
−Ψ
(
It+1
Kt+1
)
+(1−δ )qt+1
))
and P̂ is a well-defined probability measure with P̂≺ P
Remark 7.2. To clarify, the interior equilibrium I focus on is equivalent to solving the
program in (7.5) using the following algorithm.
Step 1. Obtain a sequence
{
I∗t
}
that solves
maxE
∑
t=0
β t (Ht +Xt +Yt)
subject to:
0 = Ht− εHt−1− εXt−1
0 = Xt−U ′ (Ct)
(
RtKt− It−Ψ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
0 = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt− It
0 =U ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
It
Kt
))
Kt+1−Yt
H−1 = 0,X−1 = 0 and K0 given (7.12)
Step 2. Find a set of beliefs P̂ that satisfies the constraints
U ′ (Ct)
(
1+Ψ′
(
I∗t
K∗t
))
= β Êt
 U ′ (C∗t+1)
(
R∗t+1+Ψ
′( I∗t+1
K∗t+1
)
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
−Ψ
(
I∗t+1
Kt+1
))
+(1−δ )
(
1+Ψ′
(
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
))

K∗t+1 = (1−δ )K∗t + I∗t
K∗0 = K0 : given
and P̂ is a well-defined probability space with P̂≺ P
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Thus, implicitly the equilibrium I focus on assumes there exists a probability measure P̂
that satisfies the constraints specified in step 2.
Conjecture 7.1. A sufficient condition for establishing that such a P̂ exists satisfying the
conditions in step 2 is to verify that
It
(
st
)≥ I∗t (st)≥ It (st) for st and t ≥ 0
where It
(
st
)
is the first element of the sequence
{
Iτ
(
sτ
)}
τ≥t
solving
{
Iτ
(
sτ
)}
τ≥t
= arg max
{Iτ}τ≥t
∞∑
τ=t
β τ−t
U ′
(
Cτ
(
sτ
))
U ′
(
Ct
(
st
))
 Rτ
(
sτ
)
Kτ
(
sτ
)− Iτ (sτ)
−Ψ
(
Iτ(s
τ)
Kτ(s
τ)
)
Kτ
(
sτ
)

s.t : Kτ+1 = (1−δ )Kτ + Iτ
with Kt
(
st
)
given.
and
{
sτ
}
τ≥t ∈Ω is a sequence of histories that results in the smallest possible investment
decision at time t, given observed history st , that is conceivable assuming the future
sequence
{
sτ
}
τ≥t is realised almost surely. Similarly, It
(
st
)
is the first element of the
sequence sequence
{
It
(
sτ
)}
τ≥t solving
{
It
(
sτ
)}
τ≥t = arg max{Iτ}τ≥t
∞∑
τ=t
β τ−t
U ′
(
Cτ
(
sτ
))
U ′
(
Ct
(
st
))
 Rτ
(
sτ
)
Kτ
(
sτ
)− Iτ (sτ)
−Ψ
(
Iτ(s
τ)
Kτ(s
τ)
)
Kτ
(
sτ
)

subject to:
Kτ+1 = (1−δ )Kτ + Iτ
with Kt
(
st
)
given.
and
{
sτ
}
τ≥t ∈Ω is a sequence of histories that results in the largest possible investment
decision at time t, given observed history st , that is conceivable assuming the future
sequence
{
sτ
}
τ≥t is realised almost surely.
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Proof. A formal proof is beyond the scope of this chapter. As a sketch of the conjectured
argument, sufficiency of the proposed condition should follow from the fact that
probability spaces are convex. If It
(
st
)
is the smallest possible investment decision that
can be implemented given some probability measure P≺ P, and It
(
st
)
is the largest
possible investment decision that can be implemented given some probability measure
P≺ P, then if
It
(
st
)≥ I∗t (st)≥ It (st)
the convexity of the space defined by the general set of probability measures{
Ω,F , P˜≺ P} implies there should exist at least one subjective measure P̂ ≺ P that
implements I∗t
(
st
)
, and thus satisfies the constraint specified in Step 2.
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Chapter 8
Appendix to Chapter 4
8.1. Data
Equity prices
I use the Vanguard S&P 500 ETF price measured at the close of trading of each quarter
from September 1976 to June 2010. These data are used in all estimation samples and
are sourced from Thomson Reuters. For the pre-estimation specification tests that use a
sample from March 1952 to June 2010, I backcast (splice) the Vanguard S&P 500 ETF
price index using the price changes history for the US S&P 500 (again sourced from
Thomson Reuters).
Consumption and labour income
These data are obtained from Martin Lettau’s website (available from March 1952 to June
2010 at the time of writing), and are reported in log real per capita terms.113 For a full
description of these data see Lettau and Ludvigson (2004).
Dividends
Dividends per share are measured as the sum of gross dividends paid in the quarter,
with respect to the US S&P 500 index (SPX). Non-seasonally adjusted data are sourced
from Bloomberg. Seasonally adjusted estimates are calculated by the author using the US
Census Bureau X12 method applied at a quarterly frequency.
113See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/data/cay q 10Q2.txt.
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Non-equity net wealth
To construct a measure of non-equity net wealth I use:
Non-Equity Wealtht = Total Household Net Wealtht
− Household US Equity Wealtht
where:
Household US Equity Wealtht = Household Total Equity Wealtht
×
(
1− All US sector foreign equityt
All US sector domestic and foreign equityt
)
Wealth data are obtained from the US Flow of Funds Accounts. Total household net
wealth is reported under identifier FL152090005.Q, household total equity wealth under
FL153064475.Q, all US sector holdings of foreign equity under FL263164103.Q, and all
US sector holdings of domestic and foreign equity under FL893064125.Q. In line with
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), all wealth variables are lagged one quarter to be consistent
with their beginning of quarter values.
Equity quantities
I use:
Equity Quantitiest =
Household US Equity Wealtht
Vanguard 500 ETF Pricet
where the denominator is the equity prices measure previously described. This measure
is also lagged one quarter to be consistent with its beginning of quarter value.
Personal consumption expenditure deflator
Equity prices, non-equity wealth, dividends and labour income are deflated using the
personal consumption expenditure deflator, Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Table
1.1.9 Line 2.
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Population
Non-equity wealth and equity quantities are converted to per capita values using US
population estimates, Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Table 7.1 Line 18.
Details of the instruments used in estimation are now discussed.
Valuation confidence index
These data are obtained from the Yale School of Management website. I use the
proportion of respondents who viewed the stock market as overvalued. From October
1989 to April 2001 biannual survey data are available. From September 2001, six-month-
ended averages are reported at a monthly frequency. I construct a biannual measure for
the full sample, from October 1989 to April 2010, and then linearly interpolate the data
to a quarterly frequency.114 As noted in the main text, the use of a linear interpolation
will have no effect on the validity of this instrument once the second difference of this
measure is used in estimation.
Option volatility
This measure is 30-day option-implied equity volatility with respect to the US S&P 100.
These data are sourced from Bloomberg (with ticker VXO) and are measured at market
close on the last trading day of the relevant quarter. For comparison, estimation on a
shorter sample was also undertaken using 30-day option-implied equity volatility with
respect to the US S&P 500. These data are also sourced from Bloomberg (with ticker
VIX).
114From September 2001 onwards, the Yale School of Management reports the six-month-ended average
percentage responses, st =
1
6
∑5
k=0 st−k. To adjust for this change in reporting, biannual monthly survey
responses are calculated by the author using
st = 6(st − st−1)+ st−6
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Forecast dispersion
This measures the weighted standard deviation in long-term earnings-per-share-growth
forecasts for companies in the US S&P 500, using the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (I/B/E/S). The weights used reflect market capitalisation, with this series sourced
from Thomson Reuters. This series is measured at the beginning of the quarter.
8.2. Specification Tests
Table 8.1 highlights that the null of a unit root cannot be rejected for each of the
endogenous regressors using either Augmented Dicky-Fuller or Phillips-Perron tests.
Table 8.1: Unit Root Tests
March 1953–June 2010 sample period
Variable ADF test statistic(a) PP test statistic(b)
Consumption −1.71 −2.48
Dividends −1.53 −1.37
Non-US-equity net worth −0.79 −0.70
Labour income −1.32 −1.83
Equity quantities −1.04 −0.93
Equity prices −1.91 −1.93
Notes: All tests include four lags in their construction; ***,**,* denote test statistics that reject the null
of a unit root at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels
(a) Augmented Dicky-Fuller test statistic
(b) Phillips-Perron test statistic
Table 8.2 reports results from lag-order selection criteria tests, and Table 8.3 reports
results from Johansen Trace Tests concerning the rank of the cointegration matrix.
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Table 8.2: Lag-order Selection Criteria
March 1953–June 2010 sample period
Lags LR(a) FPE(b) AIC(c) HQIC(d) SBIC(e)
0 3.4× e−15 −33.42 −33.42 −33.42
1 3 651.9 5.9× e−22 −48.99 −48.77 −48.45
2 197.67 3.4× e−22∗ −49.53∗ −49.10∗ −48.46∗
3 67.15 3.5× e−22 −49.51 −48.86 −47.90
4 56.61∗ 3.8× e−22 −49.45 −48.58 −47.29
Notes: * denotes lag length selected
(a) Likelihood ratio test statistic
(b) Final prediction error
(c) Akaike information criterion
(d) Hannan Quinn information criterion
(e) Schwarz Bayesian information criterion
Table 8.3: Johansen Trace Tests
Maximum rank Trace test statistic Trace test statistic Critical value(a)
Mar 1953–Jun 2010 Jun 1986–Jun 2010
0 111.95 110.68 94.15
1 73.74 71.33 68.52
2 41.84* 38.75* 47.21
3 22.92 19.71 29.68
4 10.27 9.76 15.41
5 2.69 3.29 3.76
Notes: * Denotes the implied rank of the cointegration matrix
(a) 5 per cent level of signficance
Table 8.4 reports results from Lagrange Multiplier tests for up to third-order serial
correlation in the VECM residuals (estimated subject to the restrictions that the
cointegration rank r = 2 and that β
′
2 =
[
0 1 0 0 0 −1
]
). A check on the stability
properties of the eigenvalues for this restricted VECM are consistent with estimated model
being stable.
Table 8.4: Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Residual Serial Correlation
June 1986–June 2010 sample period
Lags Test statistic P-value(a)
1 50.40 0.06
2 40.00 0.30
3 43.45 0.18
Note: (a) Obtained from a Chi-squared distribution with 36 degrees of freedom
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8.3. Bootstrap Methodology
90 per cent confidence intervals are constructed using the following semi-parametric
bootstrap procedure:
1. Using the procedure outlined in Section 4.3, I obtain estimates of the semi-structural
residual vector ε˜t =
[(
uPt
)′
,
(
εTt
)′]′
conditioning on β̂ and the instruments β̂1yt and
zt (recall zt is the relevant instrument for mispricing shocks, either forecast dispersion,
option volatility or valuation confidence).
2. Randomly draw with replacement (by column) from the matrix of estimation residuals
and zt ,
 ε˜1
z1
, ...,
ε˜T
zT
, so that in effect a form of ‘pairs’ bootstrap is used that
accounts for the joint empirical distribution of the errors and the instrument used
in identification. One thousand random samples of length T = 83 are drawn.
3. Simulate data to construct the vector
 yit
zit
 using
zit = z
i
t
yit =
(
I−̂˜A−10 ̂˜α∗β ′− ̂˜A−10 ̂˜A2)yit−1+ ̂˜A−10 ̂˜A2yit−2+ ε˜ it
for t = 1, ...,T and for i = 1, ...,1 000 where i is an index identifying the relevant
draw in Step 2, and where ̂˜α∗, ̂˜A0, ̂˜A2, β̂ are the point estimates used to construct the
statistics of interest discussed in the main text.115
4. For each artificial sample, i, estimate ̂˜α∗i , ̂˜A0,i, ̂˜A2,i and then construct the estimated
impulse response function (moving average) matrices
{
Ψ̂ j,i
}100
j=1
for i = 1, ...,1 000.
Note that β̂ is treated as known and is not re-estimated with each sample.
115For brevity, I abstract from deterministic terms. In implementation I allow for an unrestricted constant
in the SVECM.
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5. Construct Hall percentile confidence intervals following Lu¨tkepohl (2006). Let s∗j,0.05
and s∗j,0.95 be the 5 and 95 percentiles of the statistic s
∗
j =
(
Ψ̂ j,i− Ψ̂ j
)
where Ψ̂ j is
the estimated impulse response function based on the observed data, j quarters after
the initial shock of interest. The Hall confidence interval is given by
CIH =
[
Ψ̂ j− s∗j,0.95,Ψ̂ j− s∗j,0.05
]
8.4. Alternative Identification Strategy
Rather than partitioning the system in Equation (4.9) according to those variables directly
influenced by permanent and transitory shocks, I now partition the system into equity
prices (y22t) and other variables
(
y˜1t =
[
y′1t ,y21t
]′)
. That is,
 B011 B012
B021 1

 ∆y˜1t
∆y22t
=−α∗β ′
 y˜1t−1
y22t−1
−
 B211 B212
B221 B
2
22

 ∆y˜1t−1
∆y22t−1
+
 ε˜P,Tt
εT,bt

where again I use six normalisation restrictions on the main diagonal of B0. Using
the same methodology as that discussed previously, it is straightforward to verify that
provided
(
B011
)−1
exists, one can proceed estimating
∆y˜1t =−
(
B011
)−1
B012∆y22t−
(
B011
)−1 [
α∗β ′
]
11 y˜1t−1
−
(
B011
)−1 [
α∗β ′
]
12 y22t−1−
(
B011
)−1
B211∆y˜1t−1
−
(
B011
)−1
B212∆y22t−1+
(
B011
)−1
ε˜P,Tt
using zt as an instrument for ∆y22t . The estimated reduced-form residuals, comprising
both permanent and transitory shocks
̂((
B011
)−1
ε˜P,Tt
)
, can then be used as instruments
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for ∆y˜1t in the estimation of
∆y22t =−B021∆y˜1t−
[
α∗β ′
]
21 y˜1t−1
− [α∗β ′]22 y22t−1−B221∆y˜1t−1
−B222∆y22t−1+ εT,bt
where I have used the conformable partition
α∗β ′ =
 [α∗β ′]11 [α∗β ′]12[
α∗β ′
]
21
[
α∗β ′
]
22

The additional restriction that mispricing shocks have only transitory effects,(
limk→∞
∂Et(yt+k)
∂
(
εT,bt
)′ = 0n×1
)
, is not imposed.
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